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Metaphysics of the reliable

Logical-philosophical experience of formal hermeneutics

Nizhny Novgorod 1996

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Preface

- What is the purpose of this book?

- In an attempt to think the grounds, the essence of our thinking. But not as an essence that expresses the pre-reason¹ of modern metaphysics: “I” is the “unity” of existence, on which all culture stands - from religion to science. But as the essence that itself carries out the meaning of any metaphysics, which itself gives everything a meaningful understanding.

- So, the book strives to become an understanding of everything that is understood. What will make her understand herself?

- Of course, in order to see the meaning of some pre-reasons, it is necessary to confess others. In order to reveal one metaphysical structure, it is necessary to be in another, elusive from the field of view, since the means of consideration cannot be its own object under consideration - the “speaking” can never be “said”. But, on top of that, in order for the book to be understood, the elusive metaphysics must be the same metaphysics we interpret. This super-task determines both the structure of the book and the method of its reasoning.

It rethinks the deepest metaphysical concepts of our tradition : sign, meaning, being, being, form, memory, number, reality, truth, “this”, “I” ...

- But what makes you talk about the “rethinking” of these categories, a thousand times stipulated in one way or another, will this book not fall into the tautologies of old quotations?

- The fact is that the meaning of metaphysical categories, however, and everything else, we are merging with the already mentioned escape of metaphysics from its own consideration, an escape that leads the metaphysical content away from tautological (or paradoxical) throwing around the hermeneutic circle. The meaning of this escape from the emptiness of tautologies is the source of all that is meaningful. But how is this “source” to be conceived when it is its own reflexive elimination from meaningful content? - It is impossible to “think” it, but it can be demonstrated, o-existed² in the reflections of my book, which are a complex

¹The inevitable foundations before all thinking and awareness

²By analogy with the Russian word 'Implementation' - to make existing, to give birth.

structure of mutually reflective hermeneutic circles: from the first paragraph to the entire tripartite structure of the book. This book doesn't "talk about something", this book demonstrates "how to...". Therefore, in order to understand it, it must be read from beginning to end.

As you can already guess, the sought-after essence of understanding, the source of everything meaningful, which is also the proposition of meaning, is conceived by me as a hermeneutical circle, but not as a circle revealed in the texts of our culture, but as its implementation in demonstrating "reading these texts". It is this last stage of the reflective demonstration of the old metaphysics that provides the basis for the "rethinking" of its categories.

What came of it - judge for yourself.

Part I

The Significance Proposition

Chapter 1

Meaning. Memory.

1.1 Meaning and significance

"What's the point of that?", "Does it matter?", "It doesn't make sense!", "It doesn't matter at all." - What are we asking here, what do we want to point out: is it the meaning of meaning or the significance of meaning? What is contained in this game of words? And why do we call the latter a game? Doesn't the language itself hint with this expression - "play" - to the insignificance of the questions just posed, including the one being read at the moment? - But what is the meaning of this insignificance; Is it the one that speaks of the cessation and prohibition of all discussion on this subject? - A philosopher can stop reasoning only by showing their impossibility, which presupposes the meaningful nature of the questions posed. - The circle is closed.

We again returned to where we started, without really taking half a step. But has n't some-thing changed? - Yes, we are in the same questioning position, but now we have a circle outlined in front of us, the contents of which clearly indicate what we are asking about, previously closed by an indefinite indicator "in this", - now the meaning itself stands behind it. We ask about the meaning of meaning. But we are not just asking about the meaning of some meaning, the indefiniteness of the pointer "in this" makes us look for an answer to the question about the meaning of any meaning. Further, the language of the circle tells us that the search for the answer to this question is inevitably connected with another word - "meaning". For something to have meaning, it must be a meaning in language, it must be the meaning of our language, our thought. "Meaning" and "meaning" are so closely related that it is difficult to distinguish them from each other: the meaning of something and the meaning of something can very well say the same thing, depending on how we play these words in one way or

another. a different context, i.e. in some kind of word game. Consequently, if we seriously decide to understand our own questions, then we cannot avoid playing, I emphasize, namely playing with these words, which is already somehow present in our speech. Otherwise, the question of the meaning of any meaning will stumble upon the indeterminacy of the pointer “this” or in the comprehension of something else, “falling into our hands”, but not the “meaning of any meaning” itself. In the first case, we must admit our complete powerlessness in front of our questions and declare them meaningless, having no answer; in the second - to “fall under the arm” to attribute meta-physical attributes, depending on one’s own taste: the world Universe, the laws of Nature, God - an explicit or implicit guarantor of the first two, and lead oneself by the nose around the reinterpreted meaningfulness of the first case.

The dilemma presented above, at first glance, seems to be an insurmountable obstacle in the way of our thought, indeed, in order to talk about the meaning of something, including the meaning itself, it is already necessary to be able to meaningfully speak to any considered meaning, i.e. . there must be something that makes it possible to speak meaningfully before our first self-realization . But since this something precedes in its consideration any comprehension, any meaning, it must either be meaningless (as prior to meaning, otherwise there is no precedence), or it must itself be the meaning of any meaning, preceding itself in the circle of tautologies. Which again pushes us to the game with these words.

Let’s start our game with the question (by the way, we are already playing it): what is the meaning, or what role does the very “irresistibility” of our dilemma play in this game, and are the words “meaning” and “meaning” so indistinguishable in it? Otherwise, what is the role of all these words, the mutual conditionality of which creates our game?

The insurmountability of our dilemma indicates that the game, no matter how hard we try, will essentially be played in a circle limited by the “meaning of meaning” and the “meaning of meaning”, moreover, the inseparability of the dilemma itself is nothing more than the circle of our game, that which it closes on itself, forming and completing. What can it tell us about completeness and play? - The fact that the “significance of meaning” and “the meaning of meaning” were identified with each other and, having closed the circle, completed the game, leaving us with nothing. Note that in our game “identify with each other” and “close the circle” are different interpretations of the same thing - the completion of the game. But if the game ends on the identification of the “meaning of meaning” and the “meaning of meaning”, then, therefore, what allows it to be

played is the difference of the latter, our game eliminates this difference by the interchangeability of the roles of our expressions, hiding the replacement behind the word "circle".

Where lies the difference between "meaning" and "meaning" - for us means: what makes it possible to play our game.

So, the possibility of our game in a different understanding of "meaning" and "meaning", the game obscures this difference. Let us consider what "the significance of this sign" and "the meaning of this sign" can mean for us?

"The meaning of the sign," irrespective of any particular symbol, turns into the expression "the meaning of this," ending with a meaningless index, the meaninglessness of which says that the meaning of the sign is its own demonstration of itself, usually interpreted by "representation." The conclusion is as superficial as it is invisible. Who can think, with a completely serious attitude, that the letters that he sees have no connection with themselves, i.e. They are not here. Thus, we have found out that the "sign meaning" is nothing but an empty connection of a sign with itself, i.e. its demonstrability (reflexivity).

On the other hand, when we ask about the "meaning of a sign," we necessarily assume some-thing different from the meaningless connection of a sign with itself and equally inseparable from this sign. (The basis for this assertion is the possibility of making our game, the possibility of distinguishing "meaning" and "meaning".) But this can only be a connection of the same sign with some-thing different from it, i.e. "meaning" implies the connection of the sign with other meanings. Thus, the "meaning of a sign" is the connection of a sign with other meanings that are different from it, but demonstrating its significance in this connection.

Consequently, the difference between "meaning" and "meaning", as well as the possibility of our game, is contained in two connections inseparable from each other - the connection of the significant with itself and the connection of the significant with other meanings. Their inalienability from each other actually indicates the entry and completion of our game, where this inalienability acquires meaning in the fact that we think of any connection as significance, and any significance as a connection of meanings that determine it. The game is that which eliminates the distinction between the connection and the connected.

As a result, we come to the conclusion that "meaning" and "meaning" obscure something significant in the game for us as well. Moreover, this something also carries out its demonstration in the game. "Meaning " and "meaning" tell us about a game action that points to itself as identical to itself and, consequently,

different from its game realization in signs. Based on the last phrase, to imagine this something is completely beyond human power, although there is nothing closer to a person.

The fog will clear if we ask again: what does it mean to point to something? - The question leads to a mass of answers: to imagine, to have adequate criteria, etc. But all such answers must imply one. To point to something is to remember and remember it as...

After this, it is not at all difficult to reveal (as has just been shown) that "meaning" and "meaning" are pointers (remembering) to the realization of memory and to something remembered in its realization. Our play is a "remembrance" that seeks to indicate the accomplishment of memory as something contained in it and therefore meaningful.

1.2 Memory and oblivion. A game.

It may be objected, what have we achieved by reasoning in the first paragraph? Does replacing the words "meaning" and "meaning" in our game with "memory" and "completion of memory" change anything? - Yes, and it changes in a completely radical way. The fact is that through memory, which points to its own implementation, the game itself, the very implementation of its play connections, is included in the circle of our game. This allows us to hope for a deeper understanding of how meanings acquire their meaning. Consideration of the meaning of "memory" and its "accomplishment" (realization) will help this.

"Remember", "remember", "learn" - it makes sense if we can point to what we remember, remember and recognize. You cannot remember at all, you can remember something specific, even if we are talking about what is remembered in the form of an empty indexical "about this": about what matters. The indexical "this" itself provokes to consider as significant only what you can poke your finger at, imagine in front of you; but I can remember my name, but I can't imagine, I can't point my finger at it - I hope that we can distinguish the concept from its manifestation in the written. Therefore, we will not interpret the significant, remembered, recognized as presented by us, but vice versa - presented, in order to be such, must be recognized by us, even if we cannot say anything about it except for the index "this". Moreover, the index itself acquires its own meaning of a pointer, if we can learn and remember something, in demonstrating this possibility, the meaning of the meaningless index "this" is contained.

Memory is a deeper category than imagination and will combined. That interpretation of memory as a reflection of the coming world in consciousness or

somewhere else not only does not explain anything, but even speaks of something else, but not about memory. Memory is not a record anywhere. Any mechanism that describes memory describes the record, but not it. Any epistemology regarding memory as a function of representation is fundamentally wrong when it comes to the linguistic forms of "meaning" and "meaning."

Memory is that which gives meaning its significance, being realized as its meaning, i.e. as a memory, as a comprehension of meaning. It must be emphasized again that giving meaning (o-meaning) and pulling it out in front of you from some dark reservoir is not the same thing. If I take out my meanings from the black box, then I do not o-signify them, since their signification is already predetermined by the meaning of "getting", "meaning", "black box" and what can be in it, including "to be in general somewhere". I deceive myself by saying that my box is dark, there are enough holes in it to spill out all the contents. And then what? Does the latter mean that I can remember at once everything that exists and existed in this box, even if the name of this box is the Universe? - No, you can remember and remember only something significant, pointing to itself, to itself as a single (demonstration of the emptiness of "this"), one thing - these are the euphemisms of the word "something". If you remember everything at once, then you are unconscious.

But can I see several objects in front of me at once? - Of course you can, but objects, not values. The visible picture can be significant for me in this or that context of my actions and positions, which can force me to refer to the meanings of the objects visible in the picture in the game - and then I "focus my attention on this subject", which only states: recognizable by me is something one-significant. If this argument is not convincing, well, then try counting the number of wrinkles on your palm at once, and not one at a time.

Okay, but still, "from where" do the meanings I remember come up?

To begin with, it would not hurt to ask, what and how do we remember? Do we remember meanings or something else? And what does it mean to remember, to recognize meanings?

Let's turn to one of the ancient Chinese puzzles. "My friend Lao Tzu dreamed that he was a butterfly. And now, waking up, he does not know who he is - Lao Tzu, who dreamed that he was a butterfly, or a butterfly who dreams that she was Lao Tzu. (if we remembered the meanings, then many of us would flutter through the flowers).

What prevented Lao Tzu from enjoying the nectar, and what allowed him to doubt himself? The answer to the second question is that Lao Tzu "dreamed"

and the butterfly "dreamed." What we dreamed about was recognized by us as such, but we do not remember it as such now, its meaning indicates the complete possibility of its recognition by us, and not the recognition itself. Therefore, although it is said: "Lao Tzu dreamed," but the meaning of this sentence in the puzzle is "he dreamed" of the nameless one, who dreamed that he was a butterfly. Butterfly, on the contrary, "dreams" that she is Lao Tzu, i.e. her dream is realized for her, pointing to Lao Tzu as the name of the butterfly, although the sleeping butterfly itself is also nameless, since the unanswered question is possible: what kind of butterfly is Lao Tzu? Lao Tzu cannot remember who he is, because he always remembers something else, different from the significance of his memory. Question: who is he? - Lao Tzu or a butterfly, - makes Lao Tzu turn to the implementation of remembering the name, but the implementation of memory takes on meaning when the recognized name is significant, which eludes its implementation of meaning (reflection) and again pushes Lao Tzu to the implementation of memory, not allowing to remember who he is in the endless circle of his doubts.

The answer to the first question: what prevents us from fluttering through the flowers? - from our very non-fluttering, it says that the memory of Lao Tzu remembers not the meaning of the name, but its very o-meaning, the very action or realization of memory, reflectively pointing to itself in the connections of the meanings of Lao Tzu's games. Now, if Lao Tzu during sleep really forgot all the connections in which his memories are realized, saying that "he" remembers here (reflection of meaning), Lao Tzu would not only doubt himself, but, perhaps, could not at all to remember his existence, would not know that he once was and is.

The considered case with Lao Tzu showed us that memory is not the discovery of forgotten meanings, but the accomplishment of o-meaning in such a way that the very act of o-meaning is eliminated from the content of the game behind the remembered meaning - "he" is the end of reflection. Memory is not possible without the elimination-forgetting of its reflective realization, other-wise we will not remember our name. Thus, memory is the oblivion of its realization in pointing (remembering) to the remembered meaning; or - oblivion of meaning (cessation of reflexive doubts) in mindfulness of significance ("he" - Lao Tzu). The interpretation or, more precisely, the demonstration of what has been said above is the empty indexical "this", the realization of the meaning of which is impossible without the presentation of a meaning different from it as "something significant".

We see that "memory" and "forgetting" are attributes of a single (contentless - reflection) on-going implementation of memory. It is "forgetfulness in remember-

ing” (transcription of reflection) that is memory, and we knew about this earlier when we said that you can remember something that is one-valued, i.e. eliminating everything else. We encounter ”forgetfulness in mindfulness” when we find that our words and thoughts come ”as if from nowhere,” by themselves.

Let us now see what is the meaning of the question: ”Where do memories come from?” - To know where something comes from means to know how this something can move, and this for us is equal to the power of knowing how remembrance is accomplished, i.e. remember how memory itself is accomplished. We have shown that memory is memory insofar as it is realized as oblivion (removal from the meaningful) of its implementation (here and now), and, therefore, the requirement to remember the implementation of memory (this memory itself) is tantamount to the requirement of its own elimination from our games. The question ”from where?” excludes the possibility of his answer, makes the word ”from where” meaningless for memory, in no way connected with it.

We will never be able to understand exactly how ”these words and thoughts” come to our minds , how I remember exactly this and exactly this way - and this is not a psychological property of our consciousness. ”Memory” and ”forgetting” as a single realization of ”forgetfulness in mindfulness” are the deepest categories of our existence, much deeper than space and time. It suffices to note that everything previously referred to in philosophy and religion as ”transcendental” and ”otherworldly” made sense only to the extent that one or another allegory could interpret the significance of memory through the ”elimination-forgetting” of its implementation.

In addition to the fact that ”forgetfulness” and ”memory” are a single, inseparable accomplishment of mindfulness, we can also say that they are related as ”meaning” and ”meaning”. Meaning - that which pointlessly points to the fulfillment of memory as to itself, to a meaning that is identical to itself - ”this is so” (here it cannot be explained, but only demonstrated in the words of the text); meaning - points to its own realization eliminated in the meaning: ”the meaning of this is ...”, i.e. meaning always implies a different explanation for what is indicated, always implies the possibility of its reflexive realization.

It is also necessary to understand that ”forgetfulness” does not mean destruction or removal to a dark and inaccessible corner. Other, forgotten meanings, i.e. the meaning of its implementation eliminated in it does not go anywhere, if only because ”where”, ”where”, ”whence” are not concepts associated with it. Memory, existing, inevitably manifests itself in meanings, reflecting on them , and thus speaking of the ”forgetting” of its implementation as a constantly present source

of everything that has meaning.

The forgettable realization of memory itself is not eliminated into nowhere, but reveals itself in the meaningful connections of our language, being always outside of them in its reflection, i.e. always meaningless meaningful, and therefore equally interpretable in any connection, in any sense. Such an arbitrariness of interpretation can be called language games - interpretations of the empty meaningful implementation of memory in the content of our games. The category of the game on these pages expresses the outsideness of the implementation of the game to its meaningful interpretations.

Although it is rather difficult to immediately give a clear definition of the “game”, without it it will not be possible to continue our research. Therefore, let us first dwell on the following definition: we will call a language game the semantic unity of meanings, in the implementation of which they acquire their meaning, eliminating (forgetting) their own reflexive implementation of mindfulness from the game content.

It follows from the above definition that one or another sense and meaning can be spoken about only within the framework of one or another language game, where they are carried out as forgetting the game action in mindfulness of the game significance. Otherwise, any sense and significance is only as significant as it is possible through them to carry out the interpretation of the meaninglessness of the reflection of memory.

For an intelligible philosophical study, it is necessary to see the boundaries of one's language games. But they are not so easy to see, since the “unity” of play and the “emptiness” of memory reflection are interpretations of the same thing. The boundaries of the game are trying to hide in the game itself. Let's go back to the case with Lao Tzu. Let us ask ourselves, why is the narration in the parable not in the first person, why does Lao Tzu himself not want to share his doubts? - Yes, because trying to indicate in his name his own implementation of meaning, i.e. to signify the non-significant - both the name and its implementation in memory at once, Lao Tzu rushes between two language games: Lao Tzu and butterflies, without fully implementing either of them, therefore there is nothing significant for him at all. He would not have been able to say anything at all if the described thing had really happened to him. But then how does his friend know about what happened? One of two things: either a friend is lying, or Lao Tzu is playing the fool.

1.3 Accomplishment and indication. Other. Interpretation.

Having revealed that memory is an action of pointing, forgetting about itself in the indicated (here we cannot avoid tongue-tied tongue, because it cannot be described, it can only be demonstrated), we have the right to ask ourselves why we interpret the implementation of memory by the action of pointing removed from the content of the game, but not in any other way? Earlier it was stated about the equality of all interpretations of “forgetfulness in mindfulness”. - About equality of interpretations , but not interpreted.

All language games that consider their own implementation or the implementation of other language games, we will call them syntactic games, in order to remain the unity of a rememberable connection, i.e. to remain an interpretation of the contentless significance of realization, must necessarily speak in its content of what is meaninglessly eliminated; But how can meaningless significance be revealed in meaningful connections of language games?

Any change in something, the accomplishment of something, has its meaning in the correlation (this is the connection) of at least two values of what has changed or happened. In our situation, one of the two meanings does not exist, since it is eliminated from the content of the language game by its own implementation. What to do? - Nothing complicated, just point your finger or always be able to explain “that the meaningless meaning left in the game has its own meaning ...” - i.e. to demonstrate in words and gestures (hence the two articles: definite and indefinite) the implementation of a language game, - to demonstrate the meaningless implementation of memory as an indication - the essence of any index. The pointers “this”, “that”, “I” have no other meaning in themselves. Therefore, we can only speak of the contentless realization of memory by pointing to it through our indexes, i.e. to demonstrate in them our lost lack of content of game implementation.

So, the realization of memory is an indication because the understanding of “memory” is impossible without demonstrating its realization. This is the meaning of the intentionality of Husserl’s thinking.

The exercise of memory removed from the content of the game, in addition to the meaning-less nature of indexes, also brings with it “inalienability” from the meanings of the game, saying that “this” accomplishment of memory points to “these meanings” and not to any others. But this contradicts the emptiness of the realization being eliminated: the meaning of the empty is precisely that it is

equally connected or not connected (a contradiction is empty) with any meanings and meanings, it is always different from them in the reflection of consideration, even different from its signification in “empty”, which, if you look closely, is also an index.

To get out of this contradiction, let us ask again about the meaning of the difference. Differences between what and what? What difference are we looking for? - The difference is generally meaningless: the difference of any difference in its difference is nonsense! “Difference”, like any meaning, is possible only in the implementation of this or that language game, where its specific meaning is realized in specific meanings. Then the difference between the contentless realization of memory and the memorized meaning is nothing else than the connection of the meanings of the game, demonstrating its meaningless implementation. The difference between the contentless realization of the game and its content is determined by the meaning of the game connections. Consequently, the meaningless significance of memory will be nothing other than something indeterminate from the value indicated in the game, but its own other, other than this value. That is, by what makes the semantic connections of “this meaning” in the game.

The meaningless realization of the game is not denied by its content, as our dialectic interprets, but, on the contrary, the content acquires its significance in demonstrating the meaninglessness of the realization of memory. As will be shown in the second and third parts of my research, negation is not a demonstrable proposition of our thinking, but only a playful interpretation of the reflexivity of memory, a particular interpretation that presents “forgetfulness in remembering” (reflection) as two different meanings.

For what follows, the categories of “other” and “interpretation” introduced will be of central importance as the main tools of our research, along with “language game”, “memory”, “form of asserting authenticity”, etc. Therefore, it is necessary to give them firm definitions.

Another meaning is the ongoing action of the language game, which is eliminated from the game content by this meaning, i.e. its meaning.

A different realization of memory, a different meaning in a language game will be a meaning, an indication of which is eliminated (oblivion) from the content of the game, the emptiness of “this” realization of the game.

Interpretation will be called revealing (teamwork) in the content of the game, the implementation of the meaning of its meanings.

From the above definitions, it can be seen that the interpretation of the meaning will be the revelation in the content of the game of its meaning, demonstrating

the game implementation. This is tantamount to the assertion that any meaning can be understood in a language game by realizing its game meaning.

The interpretation of the meaning will be the interpretation of the meaning that points to this meaning as "something" carried out in the language game.

Thus, it is not difficult to see that the interpretation of a meaning is a meaningful identification in the game of its other, and the language game itself is carried out as a unity of a remembered connection in the interpretations of its meanings. The mindful connection of a language game is an interpretive connection.

Of particular interest are the "other indexes" and their interpretations in languages and languages.

Other than the indexal is the very implementation of the language game, like any other meaning, the difference here is that for non-indexal meanings their meaning can be interpreted in connection with other meanings of "this" game, i.e. their meaning can be interpreted in meaningful connections. The meaning (other) of indexes, as shown above, is to demonstrate with words and gestures the implementation of a language game. What does it mean to show a game? - That the demonstration, by pointing to a game, interprets it in another game (in consideration reflection), which will be a language game of syntax to the game being demonstrated, whose execution "demonstrates" the meaning of the indexes. Thus, the meaning of indexals can never be interpreted by the meaningful connection of the meanings of one game, the interpretation of the indexal necessarily leaves the game, demonstrating its implementation as the action of its "player" playing (being out-side it) "this game". - Impossible to point without "pointing".

The indexal in the language game has a special role: on the one hand, the indexal points to any value as something identical to itself, - the interpretation of the meaning of the meaning by a game connection with the same value (the shape of the circle of tautologies $A = A$), on the other hand, the meaning of the indexal points to the "player" playing this game and being outside of it - the interpretation of the meaning of (another) meaning within the framework of the game of its syn-tax, and thus the index is outside the language game, reflexive in relation to it.

1.4 Givenness and possibility.

The meaning of the index is the externality to the game of its player. - What does this indicate? - To the familiar "forgetfulness of pointing in the indicated": the game is carried out as an elimination from the content of its player, the player can never turn into a game, playing it, we forget about ourselves as performing

game actions, we forget ourselves in the game, even if we follow them according to the rules of the game, we will still not be able to monitor the correct use of the rules by us, etc. No matter how hard we try, we will never combine in a single pointer (sign) both its meaning and its implementation in the game.

So, the implementation of the game eliminates the player from its content, but this does not mean that the meaning "player" cannot appear in its concepts: football is impossible without "players". But football players do not make the game, but are themselves game values, the game is accomplished by the unity of the connections of all players and arbitrators, and this "unity" is not signified anywhere inside football, but only for an outside spectator, football for whom is the syntax of what the football players play. The spectacle of the game is no longer the game itself.

The comprehension of the language game as its "player" leads us to the consideration of the categories of "givenness" and "possibility", which meaningfully interpret the outsideness of the game, what we called "forgetfulness in remembering".

The memory exercise, pointing to the value, is eliminated last. - Where? - Into the interrogation leading to the elimination of memory itself, of thinking itself, and, consequently, there is nothing left for us but to recognize that the realization of memory is meaning itself; a conclusion leading to a single interpretation: the realization of memory interprets itself in the meanings of play, escaping behind play allegories. "Meaning" becomes a demonstration of the implementation of the "player's" memory, an index pointing to the inevitable givenness of one's own existence to oneself.

Givenness and necessity are interpretations of everything "significant" in our languages and languages, interpretations of the "significance" of the reflection of games. We can say instead of "meaning" - its "givenness" for the "player", - the inevitability of the player's existence.

Just because I can change value symbols in games doesn't mean I change the values them-selves. The values are given in the need for the implementation of language games. Values are given as language. Where does the language come from, where does the meaning come from? - The only meaningful answer to this question is the demonstration of a circle of tautologies: the givenness of one's own existence to oneself. Necessity interprets the significance of the emptiness of our existence. Language comes from nowhere, since any "from where" already requires language and memory. It is in the absence of content of these tautologies that the meaning of "givenness" and "necessity" is realized.

“Possibility” is the interpretation of the meaning of “givenness”, its reflexivity, i.e. interpretation of the very reflection of the implementation of the language game. Possibility thus interprets the reflexivity of the vacuity of the tautological circle in which the “givenness” acquires its meaning. Indeed, the opportunity has a choice, i.e. is outside the “data” of language games, and is for them the meaningless significance of their implementation, since it can equally remember any meanings from any games (a variant of the axiom of choice and the paradoxes that follow from it).

When I express “my will” in choosing something meaningful, I think in “will” outside of myself to everything that makes sense in the content of my games. “Possibility” says that “I” is not just an index, but such an index, the meaning of which is outside (reflexive) to all meanings, the meaning of which demonstrates its own oblivion in games, its own lack of content of reflection.

1.5 “I” and “being”. Metaphysics.

The comprehension of “givenness” and “possibility” leads us to a pointer to the very outsideness of the implementation of language games - to the “I”.

Wittgenstein once remarked that if there is anything mysterious in logic, it is “I”. In the previous paragraph, we found the source of the mystery of our “I”.

The attentive reader might notice that already at the end of the third paragraph, the mysterious “I” was interpreted by the reflexive connection between the game of language and the game of its syntax. “I” indicates this connection, regardless of the content of the language game. But then, in what language game does our “I” acquire meaning? After all, to say that for ourselves our self does not make sense (it does not exist) is the height of absurdity!

However, my research requires asking the question: what, in fact, do we know about our “I”?

Let’s discard the answers right away: I am such and such, I have such and such a biography, nose and ears - all these are aspects of what games we play, what words we speak; we want to understand - who is playing? who is speaking?

“Who says” is the same as “where do our thoughts come from” - for its answer it requires the elimination of memory and thought. It remains to be assumed that playing and remembering are not the same thing: when playing, I necessarily carry out mindfulness, but are all memory realizations language games?

The stubborn posing of the question “who?” will lead us to a sequence of syntactic games interpreting the external realization of the previous ones, which will turn into a circle “I am” (“I am the one who speaks; the one who speaks is me”,

“I am the existing; the existing is me”, “I - am; there is - I”), i.e. demonstration of the same index “I”. “There is” - the identification of the indexal “I” as a pointer to the language game, whose accomplishment it demonstrates; “I” in “I am” is the meaning of the index “I as I am”, i.e. the external realization of the demonstration, its reflexivity.

Is it possible to call walking in a circle “I am” a language game? The unity of the semantic connection of meanings?

Meaning is the elimination of indication in the specified. Meaning can be an index to the actual meaning of the language game. But can the value be an index, which in turn points to the first index? Such indexals are the circle “I am”, not the “I am”, which is now before your eyes in the context of this paragraph, but the one that is trying to catch itself by the tail: to reveal in memory the very realization of memory, to signify the unsigned (closed in himself Lao Tzu). Of course, this structure of two indexes cannot be a value, and the ‘I am’ circle cannot be a language game. In essence, it is an attempt to think without thoughts, demonstrating the externality of the implementation or the reflexivity of memory - this circle can be interpreted by silence, whose attention is turned to itself. But such a structure can be understood as being eliminated (interrupted) for any value of any game, it can be considered as a form of memory implementation, in the future (Chapter Two) I will consider these two pointers to be a single form of memory, more precisely, “a form of memory reflection”.

But still, we have a clear game idea about our “I”, which can hardly be called an empty form. “I” exists, my I has a will, it feels and realizes, my I has all these properties. - Who possesses? - and we again run into the circle of reflection of memory.

Let’s take a look at all these properties. In essence, they all boil down to the following pre-reasoning: there is something “existing”, existing in its being, as “will” in the “necessity” of the world, in which the possibilities of will are determined; pre-reasoning, which Heidegger called metaphysics.

On the other hand, when asking a question about our self, we embark on the path of building syntaxes for our games, syntaxes of “playing selves”, which lead us to demonstrate a form of memory reflection in the circle of game tautologies that mutually interpret the revealed “playing selves”. A system of game structures appears, closed in meaningless indexes, in which our pre-reasoning, our metaphysics acquires meaning. The resulting index structure - metaphysics - thus demonstrates in logical attributes the playful content of our pre-reasoning.

Metaphysics is not a language game, its main categories: “being”, “being”,

etc., are indexes to other language games, where they acquire their meaningful meaning. The metaphysical structure only points to language games that interpret the indexical “I” in a certain way.

“Will and Necessity”, “Existing and Being”, “Time and Space” - all this is an index demonstration of the reflection of memory.

Metaphysics is the key to all our language games, through which we get an idea of our “I”, considering it to be ourselves. Since metaphysics is possible, as are language games themselves, if the “I-playing” games allow the indexical structure of metaphysics to be interpreted in their meanings, therefore, metaphysics says something important about all language games, namely, what is “certain” in them, i.e. about what and how language games are carried out.

So reliable in the Western form of thinking is the representation of our “I” as something “existing”, i.e. the meaning of the index “I” is considered to be an ordinary game value, a game sign. “Existing” is a memorable sign, “I” is another sign, its external realization of meaning. The elimination of the “I” (forgetting its indexical meaning in games) lies in the fact that it is considered to be the same “existent” as any represented sign, outside the reflection of existence.

Then the main feature of Western culture becomes clear: the hypostatization of the fulfillment of memory (“existing”) and the elimination of the “I” outside of them from the content of games, i.e. what we call realism. Even Western solipsism eliminates its “I”. Even Wittgenstein in the “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus” (5, 64) noted that “strictly carried out solipsism coincides with pure realism.”

The meaning of Western thinking can be reduced to one thing: everything that exists (real-ized) I is a meaning-sign, presented before the “I”, the same sign. Even the invisible God, and He has with us the sign of the cross.

Further research will be aimed at revising the entire logical-philosophical structure of Western metaphysics in the new categories discussed in this chapter.

What’s the point of this? - an understanding of what, nevertheless, our metaphysics closes with itself. That is, the definitions of the logical forms behind the “deep grammar” of the language. This should sober us from our own self. For what? - to see what we’re doing in our games.

In the words of Heidegger, this is one of the attempts to “overcome metaphysics.”

Chapter 2

A form of memory reflection.

2.1 Form and attribute.

What is form and attribute? What are we asking when trying to understand them? What game relations of “meaning” and “meaning” are hidden behind them? What does our memory point to when calling them to play? What are they forgetting?

“Form” and “attribute” owe their existence to philosophers, they are one of the biggest mile-stones on the path of metaphysics, the path of revealing the outsideness of the index “I” to all games.

We will not make a strict distinction between the language game and its syntax here, this is the work of the third part, but we need to define a categorical apparatus that allows us to speak of language games as the implementation of a game action-meaning. Therefore, here we will talk about the direct connection of the game with its content. I will only emphasize that all reasoning will be carried out within the framework of syntactic consideration.

In order to interpret the connection of the content of the game with its external implementation, with its “playing self”, in our game of syntax there must be a meaning that indicates the entire language game under consideration, and, therefore, this meaning can be interpreted in connection with any content of the language game. A link indicating that “these values” belong to “this game”, so our value must have a meaningful (in-game) interpretation.

On the other hand, the implementation of the language game is removed from its content, which is expressed in the meaningless significance of the game “unity” - an index demonstration of the reflection of the implementation of the game.

Thus, we discover an empty indexical meaning, the meaning of which has game interpretations.

But what does the emptiness of the index mean in its meaningful interpretation? What does the very possibility of such a meaningful interpretation of meaningless meaning in the language game speak of? - That I can play “this” (indexal) game, remembering its meanings, i.e. to recognize it in a reflective examination.

Our indexical meaning - let’s call it form - says that the implementation of the language game for itself can be its own demonstration, i.e. to reflect on oneself, pointlessly point at oneself (usually this is called self-consciousness). And since this reflective interpretation points to itself as a meaningful implementation of “this” language game, then its meaning will be “this” game interpretation of the reflective form index in meaningful attributes.

Let’s sum it up: a form is a reflective index, pointing to its own pointing in the implementation of a language game (let’s note, a syntactic game). Attributes are the meanings of the language game, interpreting the meaning of the “form” index as its own game content, i.e. game values involved in demonstrating the “form”.

To clarify the essence of the matter finally, let us illustrate the “form” and “attributes” in the language of ordinary ideas about our self. Form is the ability to think of our own existence as our own “I”, i.e. the ability to point to oneself (“possibility” is an interpretation of the externality of the reflection of the form over the content of the game). Attributes - everything in language games that speaks in various allegories about the previously indicated “I”, - the properties and qualities of our “I”.

The relations of form and attributes in our language are the most confusing. Moreover, the opportunity to unravel the tangle of their relationship is stopped right there on the spot, when philosophy textbooks explain the meaning of the form by the example of a vessel and water poured into it. Hence the skewed emphasis on form and content: form is something accompanying (accidental), something that exists substantially and changes its forms. An attribute is a sign that is recognizable during all changes of form, forgetting about the attribution of the very possibility of recognition.

The source of this confusion lies in the fact that the form is thought of as an attribute, losing sight of the reflexivity of the “form” index, its externality to the content of the game. - So what? After all, we can talk about form only in a language game, i.e. through its interpretive attributes; Isn’t it all the same what to call a form?

In many ways, this difference is not significant, but it takes on a fundamental character in determining the boundaries of language games, i.e. which meanings

belong to which language games, are we using the meanings of one game within another? If we think of the form of a language game as its own game attributes, then the values of these attributes will both belong to the language game and not belong to it at the same time, which, firstly, is nonsense, and secondly, the front gate for all kinds of philosophical “speculations” and delusions. This contradiction is explicitly expressed by Hegel in the Science of Logic (chapter “Determinant Being”): “The boundary is the mediation through which something else both is and is not”.

Mediation and boundary, according to Hegel, come out indefinable and, at the same time, simply participate in language games. Doesn't this remind you of the signification of the unsignified?

In fact, the form of a language game can never be interpreted in itself, otherwise the form is not external to it, forgetting this is a condition for the implementation of our games, therefore, for its interpretation, the form requires the creation of a new language game, the language game of synthesis, which has never been found in philosophy. should be confused with the first. The attributive interpretation of the form within the framework of syntax is able, to one degree or another, to tell how the form of the game in question is accomplished in the structure of game interpretations, but not what it is in it. Moreover, the form is nothing of the meanings of the language game, this “what” is meaningless for it.

But on these pages the form is defined as something significant, in the language game un-folding before us, the form plays. - But the essence of this game is to demonstrate the reflexive lack of content of the game implementation.

Perhaps the entire history of Western philosophy can be viewed through the search for suitable attributes of language games interpreting the form. I will only point out some of the findings of the philosophical search. Thales and other “physiologists” - “water” as something present in every-thing. “To be present in everything” - this is the interpretation of the outsideness of the form to the content of the game. Next came the semantic identification of the attribute of “presence”: in a four-membered structure - earth, water, air, fire; in conceptual abstraction - the presence of the invisible, apeiron, atom; and, finally, in the linguistic, “logical” interpretation of the conceptually present - eidos (Plato, Aristotle). But the logical interpretations themselves were thought of attributively, placing the implementation of the language game in its content, confusing the game and its syntax.

The philosophical study of language games requires us to find such attributes of form, whose interpretive connections will most deeply allow us to understand

how the form contains language games, how the meaningful interpretation of the contentless significant takes place .

What can these attributes point to?

Only on in-game semantic connections that allow the language game to be realized, i.e. on the meanings that speak of the meanings accomplished in the game as “reliable”, - those that have carried out the language game. Such semantic structures can only be reflective upon themselves. This leads us to the understanding of ”logical”.

2.2 Logic. Credible and true.

Logic is a reflexive interpretation of the “form” of a syntactic language game in its own content, demonstrating the “reliable” game connections in the attributes of the form. Logic is what demonstrates in its attributes the implementation of the language game, interpreting it as valid for its meanings. ”Reliable” has the meaning that ”these meanings” carry out ”this language game”. Therefore, the authentic is always a reflective consideration of the possibility of realizing a language game.

Logic is one of the possible interpretations of the form of language games. But what makes us distinguish it from many other interpretations?

That logic is the only interpretation that demonstrates the reflexivity of memory . The revealing of reflection in the relations of syntax and language game makes logical interpretation the most powerful apparatus of philosophical research.

The reflection of the logical interpretation of form, the “logical form”, turns the study back to memory itself, to that which realizes all meanings and all meanings. But our logic itself is carried out in the Western tradition of metaphysical thinking, which eliminates the externality and lack of content of existence behind the game content (“I” as “existing”). Following the Western form of thought, logic, referring to memory, turns it into a language, into an organon, into the subject of its reflection, transforming the latter into a structurally reflective analysis of the attributes of reliable statements. Moreover, the one who carries out the analysis is implied a priori and authentically clear “I”, revealed in the propositional bundles of logical attributes that exist before any statements. Apriorism is the essence of the ”oblivion” of our metaphysics.

The certain becomes the proposition of the sign, logic becomes the omnipresent judge of all language games. The language games themselves are transformed into

the world and the law of the omnipresent judge, and philosophical research into the epistemology of legislation.

The most interesting thing happens to the authentic. It turns into "truth", i.e. and dexal on meaningful unity of propositional connections. Let's try to understand this.

What is certain is that which carries out the language game. The authentic can be called the implementation of the language game in memory, the reliable is accomplished by our memory. But Western logic says that certainty is propositional connectives that exist before the implementation of language games, which is expressed in the truth of certainty. Thus, "truth" is those meanings and meanings that do not need any games. Truth is meanings without meanings (hence the apriorism of our thinking), truth is an empty sign. But not just a sign, but a sign that exists on its own, outside of memory: objectivism, "thing in itself". Truth is an attribute of attributes, it is also the "form of forms" in the Western tradition. The main thing is that what is reliable as truth is no longer accomplished by memory, but our memory follows the truth, using it for its own purposes.

The "use" of truth is so ingrained in the Western tradition that it is rarely surprising to anyone at the obvious contradiction between the emptiness of "truth" ("What is truth?" - we did not understand) and the certainty of its use by us. The ingrained use of "truth" also passed to the pages of my research under the pseudonym "givens", and striving for the questions "what?", "to whom?" and "who?" send in search of God, read - Truth.

"Truth" blinds philosophy, sending it in search of what is "before the eyes", and even closer to the eyes.

Logic stumbles upon the lack of content of its own meaningful (realized) attributes, initiating accessible language games in the "scientific worldview" with them. But what to do, apparently, it is inevitable. Inevitable, but not irresistible!

It is necessary to find new attributes of the form, indicating the externality of the implementation of the game to its content. The logic should indicate the difference between the form and the attributes that interpret it. Logic must make sense of a form of memory reflection.

2.3 Form of memory reflection.

The logical form, we will call the form of the language game and its logical attributes in this way, is already a demonstration of reflection. In fact, the logical structure expresses the reflection of the "I": two indexes pointing at each other - "truth" as a demonstration of logical connectives. A new index is needed, the

introduction of which can change the entire semantic structure of logic. An index indicating that the logical interpretation of memory reflection is not reflection itself, but only interprets it in its game implementation. Logical connectives are not the basis for the truth of judgments, but only realize the possibility of a “truthful” interpretation. The apriority of logical connectives is the emptiness of existence, and not the pre-givenness of “truth” (God).

The logical form that points to itself as a game interpretation of reflection will be called the form of memory reflection.

What will change after the introduction of a new category in relation to “truth”?

First of all, what is certain will not be true; an attribute of all games, since the very interpretation of the authentic will indicate the externality of its implementation. The authentic, interpreting the form of reflection of memory, will say that we know what kind of game we are playing, what meanings have meaning in it and what it is. The authentic will speak of knowledge as the possibility of implementing language games. The propositional connectives will now be attributes interpreting how the form of memory reflection is interpreted in these games. “Truth” will indicate the semantic unity of this interpretation in this game. “Truth” as something preceding the language game loses its meaning.

The authentic will not be the use of truth, but its own implementation in language games. Reliable - the possibility of implementing language games.

The metaphysical world, as it were, turns into a set of language games that replace each other. Replacing before whom or what? Or - what makes us talk about the change of language games as a single thing? It turns out that there is something that the index “I” points to, remembering language games outside of game connections. What is this?

The answer was given in the first chapter. - The structure of mutually indicating indexes, demonstrating in their implementation a form of memory reflection, i.e. metaphysical structure.

This structure is not a language game, therefore, speaking of “I”, we cannot speak of “personality”. For its comprehension, this structure refers to one or another language game, since each of the meanings of metaphysics is an empty index to games. Metaphysics acquires meaningful meaning within the framework of specific language games that interpret it, and for which metaphysics is a way of talking through which the index “I” is represented by “personality”.

As you can see, the form of reflection of memory is not a simple mutual indication of two indexes, but also an opportunity to refer to the language games of

its image of interpretation. What makes it possible to speak of the replacement of some games before others is a demonstration of the meaningless significance of existence in “this” metaphysical structure. The “single” of games demonstrates the externality of the implementation of the form of memory to any games, to any meanings.

Who knows what else is hidden behind the form of memory reflection. But how do you know what it is ?

It is unlikely that it will be possible to find out what it is, since the answer to this question is tantamount to eliminating memory itself, but this is how it is, language games will help to under-stand. Therefore, we must first ask - why do we trust the interpretations of the form of memory reflection in language games? Don't they distort our idea of it?

2.4 Representation. Reality and Appearance.

Let us ask ourselves, is it possible to distort the form of reflection of memory in its interpretation by language games? What sense could such a distortion have?

The accomplishment of memory is ”forgetfulness in remembrance” of what is signified in it. Elimination of one's own accomplishment in the accomplished. This is possible if the accomplishment is nothing of the accomplished, i.e. between them, nothing can be signified as their connection, not even the meaning of “negation” or “difference”: this will be the condition for the implementation of the language game. Between the realization of the game and its content, no meaning of the same game is possible, and, consequently, no “between”. This is tantamount to the fact that if there is any meaning in the accomplishment of memory, then it is completely signified in it by this accomplishment.

To distort reflection, to break it, means to place between the realization and the realized the meaning of their difference, which is tantamount to demonstrating something that exists outside of its own existence, i.e. nonsense.

Distortion of reflection is tantamount to meaninglessness, i.e. the impossibility of implementing language games. But if the game is feasible, then its form is fully signified in its play connections, the form of the game is represented by its content.

The representation of language games has a special character: the meaning of game actions is fully represented by its meanings (there is no one behind the screen of “oblivion”). The representation of games does not have its representable prototype, it simply cannot be pointed out in the game as a represented value, the prototype is eliminated by the game.

real” and ”appearing” in their metaphysical interpretation would be meaningless . We’ll take a closer look at this in the next game.

Are there werewolves?

Behind the negative answer to the question posed are the arguments of the modern scientific worldview, emancipated from dense and not very dense prejudices. I will not list them completely, but only note: firstly, the contradiction of the transformation of a person into a wolf and back to the entire system of scientific ideas and, secondly, the absence of any evidence of the actual existence of werewolves.

The affirmative answer exposes almost the same arguments: firstly, the absence of were-wolves contradicts the entire system of the way of life and beliefs of our ancestors, and secondly, the presence of direct witnesses of turning a person into a wolf.

Adherents of science will immediately characterize the arguments of their opponents as invalid , in the grip of pagan prejudices, and their evidence will be called apparent , convincingly explaining the appearance of the collective unconscious.

If the adherents of the existence of werewolves had their same broad theoretical basis as the first, then they would have answered the “scientists” in the same way: the arguments of the scientists are invalid , since they are dominated by modern prejudices of science, and the alleged lack of reliable evidence of the transformation into wolf is explained by the incorrectness of the “true” criteria applied by them to the object under consideration.

No one doubts the existence of electrons, although no one has seen them either. As for their trace on the oscilloscope screen, there are wolf tracks in the forest, as well as human ones.

But the electron cannot be seen in principle, it is a special object. - It’s the same story with werewolves since Amaya: if they are not special, then who is?

As we can see, the dispute is resolved in the direction on which you stood from the very beginning. Everyone has their own opinion. Logically, I emphasize, purely logically, the dilemma is unsolvable. (Try replacing werewolves with fireballs and doing the same reasoning.)

Where is the source of such unresolvability?

The fact is that for their opposite views, the disputants use the prejudice of the representativeness of the representable, rooted in our tradition, which assumes the presence of a represented object, and for their own views, the representativeness of language games that realize the meaning of their “objects”.

Werewolves, like electrons, are exactly as much werewolves as far as we can

realize their meaning in their language games. The authenticity of werewolves is their game feasibility, the object of “werewolves” is identical to the sense of “werewolves” realizable in the game. But as soon as we conceive the authentic as a representation of the metaphysical “truth”, i.e. “really existing object,” then this object, like pre-reason, whether scientific or pagan, turns the “real” of play into the “appearance” of the world, since now only it itself is real, preceding all reasoning.

Yes, werewolves don’t exist if you’re playing science games, because “werewolves” have a very different meaning to them. But they do exist, as electrons do for us, in pagan language games with sorcery, divination on the water, with night terrors and round dances.

You just want to object: but this is not a real existence. I will ask you: in what language games does your “reality” realize its meaning?

Trying to compare two realities - electrons and werewolves, you have already made your choice before the comparison, making the comparison in your language games.

So, is it possible to live life among sorcerers, unicorns and wizards? - Yes, if you do not play other games that make sense of the reality of wizards. Or do you think that our games are more protected from such nonsense than games with sorcerers? - Go to the nearest crazy house! It’s just that there are a lot more games that destroy the reality of wizards than ours right now, but this can only be temporary.

So, the representation in games of their form of implementation says that everything that makes sense is really as much as this sense is feasible in language games. The reality of the games themselves is determined in the performance of others. It is meaningless to speak about the reality of the very form of reflection of memory, if only because it is beyond games.

The most important thing for us is the following: according to the presented content of games, we can talk about the form of their implementation (meaning of representation), i.e. In addition to the meaning realized in the game, another language game reflecting on it is always possible, a game of syntax that interprets the content of the first game as a representation of a form of reflection of memory. In other words, any language game can be considered within the game of its syntax, which gives a “formal” understanding of what is represented in the game content. Understanding is here the implementation of syntax interpretations, the construction of such syntaxes can be called formal hermeneutics, which reveals and interprets the form of memory reflection.

Where does this alignment of syntaxes lead, what can formal hermeneutics tell us about the mysterious “I”, because we are so used to considering it to be ourselves.

2.5 “I” and “nothing”.

“Know thyself” - Delphi knew a lot about thoughts, blessing the Hellenic wisdom, which declared three centuries later through the lips of the wisest of the Hellenes: “I know that I know nothing.” - It should be noted that the conclusion is annoying. Let’s try to understand what he means or hides behind him.

The reflective knowledge of “oneself” with “fatal fatality” directed the thought of Hellas to search for the meaning of “I”, and no matter how the Hellenic wisdom tried to cling to something meaningful in the “I”, the form of thinking made me say: “I don’t know anything about my “I” know”, “I” was a meaningless index. Each index points to something; the Hellenes could not find what this index points to - “I don’t know anything”.

It was easier for Socrates to admit his own incompetence, and even in the form of an obvious contradiction: if he “knows nothing”, then what about the knowledge of this “knowing nothing”? - than to admit that his “I”, hitherto being himself, hides behind him “nothing”, an empty place.

In the context of our study, the reason for the predicament of Socrates becomes clear. Reflective philosophizing led him to reveal the very reflection of games, to the very outwardness of their realization to their content, i.e. to the outsideness of the index “I” to all games. There is not a single language game where “I” could signify itself, i.e. point to its realization as something conceivable. Such signification is tantamount to the destruction of memory, meaninglessness. Therefore, Socrates did not find “the true meaning” anywhere, since for him there is no language game.

Let’s pay attention to our “nothing”. That it already is “something” was not noticed by me long ago. The meaning of this is the following: in order for “nothing” to be nothing, to have its own meaning, it must be realized in language games, representing its realization in its meaningful interpretation. As a result, the interpretation of “nothing” can only be expressed in game meanings that exclude the indexical demonstration of “nothing”, since this “something-nothing” interprets the very externality or lack of content of language games, and as a meaningful interpretation cannot demonstrate it in the content of the game. That is, if “nothing” were an index demonstrating its game implementation, then, consequently, as a game interpreter of its implementation, it would assert that there is

no realization of the meaning of “nothing” in the game, i.e. ”nothing” by itself is meaningless. ”Nothing” can demonstrate itself. “I”, on the contrary, speaks in the content about its implementation as “existing”, which has its own meaning and meaning in the language game, therefore “I”, in contrast to “nothing”, is an indexal shown in the game.

In revealing the meaning of ”nothing”, we must ask ”nothing of what” or ”nothing of whom”, etc. To say: “I don’t know anything” regardless of the subject of ignorance is to say stupidity. Socrates was too wise for this stupidity, and therefore expressed his thought through a contradiction. His ”nothing” referred to ”I”.

“I am nothing” is what Socrates feared and what Buddha insisted on. It is clear where Nirvana led him: she tried to interpret the hanging and meaningless “nothing” here too - and dexal went nowhere and for nothing.

In any case - Socrates is. What is the meaning of Socrates? - In the unity of the games carried out under this name. Socrates is the unity of games called life.

The answer is banal. What is the problem then? - The problem is how to connect the unity of the games played by Socrates with the indexes “I” and “nothing” (we will consider “nothing” as a meaningful index).

The problem is in the ability to see logical forms and use words in accordance with them. The “nothing” index hung - honestly interpret it, without Nirvana! How to interpret? - All significance (cashed out) of the games played - by the “what is”.

So, instead of “I am” and “I am nothing”, we get my alternative: “I am nothing of what is.”

What I considered my “I” is only its cashed out realization, the “I” itself is nothing of the “existent”, but always its o-existence. “Nothing” is just that “I”, which is not signified anywhere, even in the meaningful interpretation of “nothing”. Therefore, this “nothing” escaping from every-thing is not interpreted by the playful meaning of “nothing”, but is demonstrated by the realization of its meaning, is demonstrated by the most reflexive lack of content of existence: “not this, not this, not this ...” and so on ad infinitum, equal to circle of tautologies.

Let us return to the Socratic “I know that I know nothing”, which is tantamount to the fact that the Hellenic thought despaired of signifying the unsignified and forgot itself in the use of the preexisting metaphysical “truth”. The reverse side of this was that the “I” of Socrates, the unity of his life, being nothing of what is present in it, should be signified by “existing” - the soul of Socrates, identifying the elusive nothingness with simply “nothing”. Further - a matter of technology:

the soul of Socrates will lead to his Deity. The “nothing” of the “I”, the signification of the outsideness of the realization to “what is” (the condition of our form of thought - its forgettable), turns into “will” - the possibility of using “truth”. Hellas chose philosophical reflection as its opportunity, defining the main forms of Western culture for two and a half millennia.

I cannot speak confidently about the Hindu form of life, but the transfer of the meaning of “existing” to Nirvana made it difficult to consistently reveal the reflection of thought. However, the truth of the Hellenes is also referred to the world, but is designated in it as an “idea”, the existence of the Hindus in another world, in “nothing”, the world itself is in the power of Maya, and its knowledge is Avidya. Maya and Avidya are interpretations of “nothing”.

We see how the two philosophical emphases ‘I am’ and ‘I am nothing’ entail two different forms of life. Does not the formula revealed on these pages conceal behind itself the third form: “I am nothing of what is”? - Don’t know. But the disclosure of this form, if such is possible, is possible on the path of philosophical reflection of language games.

“I am nothing of what is” does not interpret “I” as “existent”, does not attribute language games to life. This phrase says that my “I” is not “existing” at all, neither on Earth, nor in Heaven, nor beyond the seventh heaven. “Existing” reveals its face as “significant”, which makes sense in language games, even Nietzsche pointed out this in attempts to “reassess all values”.

Formal hermeneutics cannot say where and how the form of life will be revealed, it can only interpret it retroactively as metaphysics, but it is possible to show how old categories are interpreted in new aspects of thought.

Chapter 3

The Significance Proposition.

3.1 Masks of “playing me”.

Words, meanings, positions, concepts, connections, images, emotions - this is not a complete list that tells us about our games. We recognize games by their meanings and meanings. So what points to them is the possibility of understanding their meanings; to understand is to lose them in the game or to assume a similar loss (to know its syntactic interpretation). But in any case, a pointer to the possibility of implementing a language game is needed.

This pointer cannot be an “I” index pointing to the implementation of any game, we need a pointer to exactly “this game”. It should point only to the player of this game - to its “playing self”.

The playing self becomes for us a mask of the game, obscuring from us the meaningless significance of our existence, and thus giving us the opportunity to “forget” in the game. Our whole life becomes a series of such masks.

To talk about games is to talk about their masks. But with a huge variety of games, what can be found in common in the features of their masks?

They have only one thing in common - the representation in the content of the game of a meaningless form of memory reflection.

Revealing the masks of our games, the games of European culture, we will see in them the meaning of the pre-existing metaphysical truth, in the use of which the playful “forgetting” of the meaningless is carried out. The revealed features of the masks will be the propositional structure of truth, and hence the form of memory.

Traditional logic, speaking of a proposition, interpreted it as a connection of signs-indexes that preexisted all meanings. Therefore, the very meaning of the “sign” and its connections remained in the complete darkness of apriorism, i.e.

what western logic rests on has remained illogically undetected. In fact, no theory of meaning has yet existed.

All semiotic theories, including metaphysics, set theory, problems of the foundations of mathematics, have revealed only how we use signs, but not how self-use (accomplishment of memory) is carried out in the sense of a “sign”.

In the pages of my research, I try to fill in the understanding of significance. The first part can be called the theory of the sign, based on the new categories introduced in the first two chapters, which provide an opportunity to comprehend the game significance, previously closed to us, since in the form of the old metaphysics of being, the “being” itself obstructed the view aimed at understanding the meaning of the sign . . . All attempts in this direction cut off the branch on which they sat: revealing the meaning of the sign, they rejected their logical foundations (Frege’s paradox), the foundations of that form of thought, where the authentic is represented by the other.

3.2 Proposition - demonstration of the meaningless.

The undisclosed essence of the sign is the meaning of its meaningless significance, i.e. the demonstration by the sign of the externality of the implementation of the language game, revealed in the tautological circle of play connections. The meaning that all meanings are significant as far as and how we can implement the circle of game tautologies in them.

This circle demonstrates the relations of the propositional structure of the sign, indicating the demonstrative nature of the implementation of the very structure of the proposition, thus closing the circle in its tautological emptiness.

The sign is thus interpreted as pointing to the meaningless closure of the entire propositional structure.

The reflective demonstration of a proposition is, in essence, the realization of an uncontentious significance represented in the contents of language games.

The proposition itself, like the metaphysical structure, is not a language game, but only a demonstration of the isolation of the content of any language game in the circle of tautologies.

Describing the proposition of meaning, we do not describe some hidden object, some hidden basis of thought, but only find more or less complete interpretations of the meaninglessness of our own existence, expressed in our cultural tradition. There is no single proposition - there is a propositional unity (emptiness) of the language games being carried out.

3.3 Identical and its other.

The most obvious proposition in logic is the proposition of the identical to itself (significance - “=”) and its other (“not” - conditionally, further the difference between the other and the negation will be shown). Let us consider it as an interpretation of the reflection of the meaningless.

a) $A=A$ - connection of the sign with itself: interpretation of the index A by pointing ($=$) to its significance (A), - a circle demonstrating the meaninglessness of indicating as the significance of the sign A presented in its implementation.

Such a demonstration presupposes a reflexive difference between the implementation of the indication and the indicated one, that which is signified by two signs in the identity $A = A$ (their indistinguishability indicates the playful elimination of this difference, that “the sign is significant in itself” as a being). Consequently, the proposition of what is identical to itself also implies the interpretation $A = B$, where B is thought to be different from A , i.e. In another A .

b) In “not” A (In other A) - interpretation of the index A by demonstrating (“not”) the realization of its meaning as something different (B) from its significance, - demonstration of the reflexive externality of pointing to the indicated.

Note that my proposition of the other (“not”), let’s call it together with the proposition of the identical ($=$) the proposition of play significance, differs from the negation in that it speaks of an-other “this meaning”, located in “this” circle of interpretation of the meaningless, “other” speaks of the realization of the meaning of “this” meaning, and not of anything other than A . For me, the proposition of negation does not exist, since the meaning of “negation” cannot participate in the demonstration of meaningless significance: “nothing” cannot demonstrate itself (Chapter 2, §5).

What does “anything” mean? - Anything outside the semantic connections of games? Then this “anything” is nonsense, meaningless in any way.

No, you object, we meant “anything” that has a place, that exists .

But how is it existing? If as a semantic connection, then this is not a negation, but something else of the connection, its implementation in memory. If not, then what is hidden under it, what is the point? - Only one: that the sign A exists by itself, speaking in the language of contradictory dialectics, it has its own meaning in itself. The last phrase cannot but remind Descartes’ maxim: “Cogito ergo sum” - “I think, therefore I am.” That contraband of thought, in which negation as a proposition of thinking was found. The smuggling of ancient pre-existent truth, God, but in new forms of European life, emphasizing not so much the preexistence of truth as its use in our games. The problems of the method become the central

problems of thought, the meaning becomes a representable sign, the object of the method.

In this objectivity of meaning, “anything whatever” acquires its meaning as everything that can take place in a given objectivity. “To have a place” and “to exist” are thought of by Descartes as equivalent, therefore objectivity acts as the Universe of representation, the perfection of language games.

The “proposition of negation” becomes a pointer to the other of the entire Universe of representation, which excludes its own basis for negation - “I think”, since outside the represented in the Universe there is no language game where “denial” itself would take place. There is no place in the objectivity of thought where objectivity itself can be comprehended. But we comprehend it, therefore, “from where” we think, so to speak, has no place in Cartesian: “I think, therefore I exist”.

Descartes hastened with his indubitable reason, forgetting the logical form of his indubitable truth, forgetting the meaning of the “I”. Who exists here? - Indicating or indicated?

No, in fact, for language games, Descartes’ maxim sounds different: “I think, therefore I ... existed.”

The paradoxical mismatch of times expresses the demonstrativeness of the externality of the implementation of language games - the demonstrativeness of game reflection.

3.4 “And” and “or”. Proposition of game connection.

It is easy to see that the proposition of “identical-other”, or the proposition of play significance, necessarily implements in its interpretation of the meaningless another logical proposition - “and” ($\&$) and “or” (\vee). It can also be seen that the proposition “and-or” is impossible without demonstrating the proposition “identical-other”. If the identical and the other tell us about meaning as an index sign, then the proposition “and-or” points to the very realization of the meaning of pointing in the interpretive connections of the language game. The proposition “and-or” is the proposition of the game connection.

The game connection points to the unity of the meaning of the game (the emptiness of the circle of “identical-other”), reflecting on the game content, therefore, the proposition “and-or” is a reflexive (syntactic) demonstration of the proposition “identical-other”. And the meanings of “and” and “or” are reflexive indexals over the indexals of “identical” ($=$) and “other” (“not”).

a) A “and” B - tells us that the values A and B make sense if they interpret each other in uni-ty (&- “and”) game connection - game implementation. Even the “difference” between A and B speaks of their playing unity (&) in the sense of their “distinction”. ”And” can also be interpreted by reflection on the index of ”identical”: ”A and A” interprets in the syntactic generalization ”A=A”.

b) A “or” B - says that the meaning of the difference in the significance of A and B from their play connection cannot coincide with the play content of signs A and B, in this difference there must be something common and outside their content - a choice between them. “Or” interprets the outsideness of the implementation of the game connection to the game content. ”Or” can also be interpreted by reflection on the index ”other”: ”A or B” interprets in syntax the action of distinction ”A not B”, speaking of ”other” as the implementation of the action of choice.

Thus, by analogy with the proposition “identical-other”, the indexal “and” can be called the “identical” of the game connection, and “or” - the “other” of the game connection.

We noticed that “and” and “or” are indexals to indexals of “identical” and “other”, and we interpreted “and” as a reflection of “identical”, and “or” - “other”. But to demonstrate the entire proposition “and-or” as a reflection on the emptiness of the proposition of play significance, it is also possible to interpret “identical” - “or”, and “other” - “and”.

“A=A”, if “A or A”, i.e. if we distinguish between the meaning and the realization of its meaning (we can demonstrate the sign). ”A not B” if ”A and B”, i.e. if the interpretation of the “difference ” between A and B is carried out in the semantic unity of the game connection.

Thus, we have two possibilities of reflexively interpreting the proposition of play significance (“=“ - “not”) by the proposition of play connection (and-or”):

- a) interpretation of the “identical” meaning by the “identical” game connection (“=” is interpreted by &, “not” – ∨);
- b) interpretation of the “identical” meaning by the “different” game connection (“=“ - ∨, “not” - &).

The possibility of choosing these two interpretations will also be propositional, demonstrating the empty significance of the very reflection of demonstration. Let’s call it the proposition of ”beginning” and ”end”. What is the meaning of this proposition?

“Beginning” indicates the externality of the implementation (choice) of the language game as the possibility of its reflexive (syntactic) consideration; “end”

- to the way of interpreting the meaning of the game connections chosen in the game. We will call these two ways of interpreting game significance the forms of meaning or the forms of assertion of a reliable : case a) - $\delta\alpha\xi\alpha$; case b) - $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$.

The next chapter will be devoted to a detailed consideration of the forms of interpretation of play significance .

Let us now note that the "beginning-end" proposition asserts that any meaning has meaning only if its realization is begun and ended in linguistic and Greek; the completeness of the meaning is a demonstration of the reflexive consideration of the game content.

Figuratively, the proposition of "beginning-end" can be called the proposition of "death": every life, every meaning, with the necessity of its realization, goes to its end and to "death"; if this is not the case, then there is no meaning and no life.

Hence the conclusion: immortal life is meaningless.

The fact that we are mortal is no less surprising, as if we were immortal. Why is everything destroyed in this world, everything is transient? "Because otherwise everything would be meaning-less , in no way remembered, forgotten by anything. Death is not a property of the living, it is the logic of life .

All memory is mortal, immortal being is not being.

All attempts to circumvent death turn into nonsense. Find out with intellectual honesty "to the point of cruelty to yourself" what the afterlife means to us without end. At best, it will be inexpressible for us, i.e. meaningless. But where does the fear of death come from?

We are not afraid of death, but of the meaninglessness of our existence, of what it is , and from which our games shield us. Whatever idols of our culture would not split under the "philosophizing hammer", all the same, progress comes to the place of paradise, Reason comes to the place of God, etc. Although none of this explains anything, it still makes you forget in new games.

3.5 Proposition of given language. Implication.

In the previous paragraph, we saw that the form of memory reflection is represented by language games in two forms of interpretation of play significance. Thus, the meaning of "language games" - the meaning of the difference of forms - enters the circle of the propositional structure . Language games are propositional, i.e. reflexively demonstrable.

Language games are not only the results of our activity, they are the very reflexivity of the consideration of significance, the necessity of realizing everything meaningful in language games. Therefore, language games can be interpreted as a proposition of the givenness of language.

But how is the meaningless significance of the form of memory represented in the givenness of language ? - Only as a reflective demonstration of the syntactic consideration of language games in language games: games realized in these meanings (true - I) , and games not realized in the content under consideration (false - L). Truth will speak about the realized (I) sense of the considered language game, in its content; lies - about the unrealized (L) demonstration of the game in question, in its meanings, i.e. "false" will demonstrate the meaningless significance of the indefinite index "this" rather than the circle of playful tautologies. Let's consider this in more detail.

Thus, the following connections of syntax with a reflexively considered language game are possible (first the realization of syntax, then the game):

a) $L \rightarrow L$ - syntax demonstrates meaningless significance (L) by its non-fulfillment (L) (emptiness) of the "true" interpretation of the meanings under consideration, i.e. syntax can also reflect on its own implementation as a meaningless indexical "this", what we call the outside of the implementation of the language game.

b) $I \rightarrow I$ - the feasibility of the syntax (I) is interpreted by the demonstrated feasibility (I) of the content in question as "true". In other words, other than its meanings cannot participate in the demonstration of a language game.

c) $L \rightarrow I$ - interprets the lack of content of reflection (L) of a syntactic demonstration over the content (I) of the demonstrated language game. Demonstration of the difference between syntax and the language game considered by it.

d) $I \rightarrow L$ - the impossible connection of syntax with the considered language game, since the implementation (I) of the demonstration is impossible without (L) the implementation of what is being demonstrated.

It is not difficult to see in the resolved connections a), b), c) and in the unresolved connection d) a well-known propositional connection of material implication.

Let us try to interpret the implication connections as given by our memory, as given by our language.

a) $L \rightarrow L$ - the outsideness of memory reflection to any content of any language games, its existence outside of language games. This can be called the proposition of "silence".

b) $I \rightarrow I$ - any game connection is possible only as a meaningful implementation

of the language game. Let's call this connection the proposition of "assertion".

c) $L \rightarrow I$ - says that any language game can be considered in the implementation of another language game, outside the first one - in the game of its syntax: i.e. any meaning can be interpreted as meaningless, demonstrative. This is the proposition of "questioning".

An important conclusion follows from the latter: that any question goes out of the language game either into silence, or into the game of its syntax. Moreover, the question is asked from a syn-tactic game and, in fact, contains the possibility of its implementation. If this possibility is realized in syntax, then we understand the rules of the game in question - the meaning of its implementation, we understand what is being asked, if not, we are silent.

3.6 Question. Syntax.

Now we will be interested in the central core of the proposition of the given language (implication) - the proposition of the question ($L \rightarrow I$).

The question, first of all, is the connection of the meanings of a language game with its syn-tax, or of the game content with its external implementation.

In order for a question to have the meaning of this connection, it must point to the entire language game as an implementation of a form of memory reflection and have a meaningful interpretation of this implementation in the language game of syntax.

You can point to the whole game, and specifically to "this game", only from another game, and the question in it must be an index to all values that implement the game in question. This role is taken by the interrogative words "who?", "What?", "Why?" etc. But in an interrogative word, pointing to all the meanings of "this game", it must have its meaningful interpretation in the syntax, the question must have its meaningful meaning in the syntax, its meaningful answer. A question without an answer is meaningless.

The interrogative word is an indexal "on the contrary". If "this" points to something concrete that has meaning in the game, eliminating its meaningless realization in the indicated one, then the interrogative word, pointing to the "unity" of the question, the signification of the meaningless realization, presupposes in syntax a meaningful interpretation of its realization - meaning.

But if we can ask a question about any language game, and if it makes sense, does that mean that there is already a syntactic language game? Who created it? - Not created, but implemented: its feasibility is the representativeness of the form of memory. The proposition does not exist as an object, but demonstrates the

feasibility of meaningless significance - the significance of reflection. We cannot be before or after our memory.

If the question does not make sense, then either you are talking nonsense, or you are asking about metaphysical, i.e. propositional structure of thinking, demonstrating its empty content in the question.

For example, asking: “Where does the being come from?” or “who created the world?”, we answer - God, or we say that the world has always existed, or was born from nothing as a result (if from nothing, then where is the “result” from!) “Big Bang”. If you consistently begin to find out the meaning of these answers, you will come to their meaninglessness. - What is God? That which can-not be seen or known.

Why is it so? Because the syntax for a metaphysical or propositional structure will be this propositional structure itself, which is not a language game, but an indexical demonstration of the meaningless significance of existence. The question will not have an answer, and the answer (God, the Universe) will have a playful content, except for the meaning of a pointer to the meaningless realization of the circle of the proposition of meaning.

3.7 Hermeneutic circle.

Are metaphysical questions useless? - In a meaningful interpretation - yes. But ask yourself, how do you know the meaning of “meaningless”, “meaningless”, etc., on what basis is the proposition interpreted by the demonstration of the meaningless?

Based on its demonstrativeness, closed in a circle of tautologies. The circle of propositional interpretation of the meaningless that we have completed is the circle of realization of any under-standing in general.

The structure of the circle of understanding - the hermeneutic circle - can be interpreted by familiar indexes pointing to each other, and by breaking game connections in two forms of interpreting the meaning. Realizing it, we realize the experience of understanding the “empty”, “formal”, without which no understanding is possible.

The hermeneutic circle is the circle of thought experience through which the syntactic sequences of our culture are revealed. From the completeness of the identified categories in this circle, the categories actually implemented in our games, the actual propositional structures of our thinking, depends on the completeness and depth of understanding of what is happening in our life, what meaning is contained in it.

In other words, the implementation of the hermeneutic circle frees thought from the masks of its language games, frees it from the oblivion of its existence, frees it from the darkness of the apriorism of “truth”.

All of the propositional structures that we have identified: “identical-other”, “and-or”, “implications”, “beginning-end” are different demonstrations of one empty meaningful implementation of the form of memory reflection.

The considered propositions demonstrate the same hermeneutic circle, but in the implementation of different language games and their syntaxes. The circles of “identical-other”, “and-or”, “givenness of language” interpret the only circle. Therefore, our propositional circles cannot be considered as semantic mediations - spiral circles that reach qualitatively new levels of understanding. Such an interpretation of the spiral suggests a guiding goal that lies outside the hermeneutic circle, and therefore outside of meaning.

What we call progress, the development of forms of thought (I would call the fate of language) is the interpretation of the reflection of the hermeneutic circle in the syntactic sequences of our tradition.

What happens when a life form fully reveals (as we will say in the third part - cashes in) its hermeneutic circle in all games and syntaxes? The form of life, following the proposition of “beginning-end”, ends - dies. And it depends on what we have understood in the obsolete form whether another form will unfold its circle. It is impossible to say how far such a change of forms can extend, since “extension” acquires meaning only in the realized form of thinking. Our job is not to predict, but to understand, including predictions.

Chapter 4

Space and time are interpretations of significance.

4.1 Two interpretations of significance.

Any understanding, any implementation of a language game can be considered in the tautologies of the hermeneutic circle, demonstrating the meaningless significance of its own implementation. This demonstration of the meaningless is possible in two forms of reflexive consideration of play meaning. The essence of which lies in the possibility of interpreting the sign as either an identical game connection (“and”), or its other (“or”) (Chapter 3, §4).

What is the difference between the two ways of interpreting game significance?

In the fact that the interpretation of the meaningless itself indicates reflexivity in two equivalent ways of demonstrating the hermeneutic circle: whether we begin the demonstration with the interpretation of the meaninglessness of the sign by the playful content, or, conversely, we interpret the playful content at the “beginning” of the circle by the meaninglessness of the sign. Thus the “beginning” proposition of meaning interpretation leads us to various ways of demonstrating the proposition of meaning. If at the “beginning” there is no difference in the forms of significance, then we will not be able to reflect on the emptiness of the hermeneutic circle, and we will not have any idea about the forms $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$ and $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$.

4.2 Time - $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$.

When the identical game significance is interpreted by the identical game connection (“=“ - “and”; “other-not” - “or”), then we will say that the values belong

to the language game of the form $\delta o \xi \alpha$, where they interpret their own $\delta o \xi \alpha$ implementation . What does it mean?

The fact that the meanings of the game of the form $\delta o \xi \alpha$ themselves indicate their own realization of meaning in the language game, i.e. are interpretations of their validity. It is enough just to pop up such a value in memory, how the game of the form $\delta o \xi \alpha$ will be carried out in it , or rather, we will play this game, and we do not need anything else, except for this value, so that we can con-firm that we are reliably playing this game . The very ”confirmation” of this loses its meaning.

Where can we get these games? - Anywhere. Suffice it to say that we play them all the time, calling them our ”will.”

Yes, ”will” is a language game of the form $\delta o \xi \alpha$, which interprets its meanings by the significance of the game connection.

”I want it that way”, ”Let it be so” - these are the interpretations of the above reasoning. Their significance indicates their own feasibility of meaning - ”so I want”, so I carry out the language game. The values of $\delta o \xi \alpha$ are reliable, i.e. make sense insofar as they are now feasible for us, regardless of any other interpretations - ”I want it that way”.

Consider now the interpretation of the implication proposition as the significance of the form $\delta o \xi \alpha$, leading us to the interpretation of ”will” and ”time” .

a) The proposition of silence ($L \rightarrow L$).

Since the identical meaning is interpreted by the identical game connection (”=“ - ”and”), then another meaning (L), which is eliminated in the identical implementation of the meaning, will be interpreted by another (L) game connection (”not” - ”or”), t .e. the meaning of the implementation of the game will be outside in reflexive consideration (L L), and the implementation of the meaning of ”will” and ”time” will be empty both in the meanings of the game and in syntactic consideration (the groundlessness of the arbitrariness of the will).

The realization of the indexals ”will” and ”time” (their meaning) cannot be interpreted in the content of their own games and syntaxes, limited only by the reflection of this content, the meaning of ”will” and ”time” can only be demonstrated as a pointer to the own realization of pointing (volition). ”Time” and ”will” are equally groundless - this is their playful meaning. ”Will” always implies volitional arbitrariness, without this arbitrariness there is no will, just as ”time” - a pointer to its own implementation - cannot be identified with some content. Any such interpretation will end with an index to the implementation of the form of memory: will is here ..., time is my implementation of the interpretation of

time, i.e. its demonstration.

So, the proposition of silence tells us that the meaning of time and will is inexplicable in their games, and their meanings always have the character of meaningless indexes to their own implementation in games of the form $\delta o \xi \alpha$.

b) The proposition of the statement ($I \rightarrow I$).

The significance of games $\delta o \xi \alpha$ (“=”) is interpreted by the significance of game connections (“and”), i.e. interpretations of the meaning of the meanings of $\delta o \xi \alpha$ are possible only as interpretations of the content of its syntactic game ($I \rightarrow I$), which introduces the arbitrariness of its conditional interpretations into the reflection of consideration.

Will and time can be interpreted only by the perfect presentation of the meanings of the games of the form $\delta o \xi \alpha$, by the memorable connection of the signs of another game demonstrating “will” and “time”. The content of the game cannot be extracted from the indexes themselves “will” and “time”.

To speak of will outside of its manifestation (outside of its syntactic demonstration) is sense-less . “What I want” I can understand in the awareness of the manifestation of my desire. In the realization of the fulfillment of the indexal on its implementation.

Therefore, “will” and “time” are interpreted simultaneously and isotropically (the unity and reflexivity of the syntactic demonstration) in the correlation of the presented (demonstrated) meanings, expressing in these concepts the meaningless significance of indexals on themselves.

How much time has passed can be said either by the indication of the clock, or by the position of the heavenly bodies, i.e. in the interpretation of the syntactic consideration of the meaning-less meaning of the word “time”. All attempts to interpret time as “relative” and “anisotropic” refer to various syntactic games with “time” and not to time itself, since the contentless index on itself will always remain so.

Einstein did not say anything about “time” itself, since this is logically impossible, but only created his own syntax, demonstrating the meaningless significance of time by correlating events in the physical world with the invariant of the speed of light.

c) The proposition of questioning ($L \rightarrow I$).

The last proposition of syntactic relations (implications or givens of language) speaks of the very possibility of interpreting the meaninglessness of the indexes “time” and “will” by syntactic content. The meaninglessness of the meanings of the form $\delta o \xi \alpha$ can be meaningfully interpreted in syntax, because the very

implementation of the syntactic language game is outside (L) of its content (I), i.e. the very implementation of the syntax may exhibit a meaningless index.

Thus, the meaning of a meaningful interpretation of time and will lies in the demonstration of the implementation of a syntactic interpretation. The comprehension of time is possible only as its own syntactic demonstration of the game, usually called the unidirectionality of time. No meaningful interpretation of time is possible outside the demonstration of this content - this is how one can interpret the prohibition of the implication connection $I \rightarrow L$.

The proposition of syntactic relations considered by us - the proposition of the given language showed that the interpretation of the significance of the form \rightarrow turned out to be a semantic structure, which we considered will and time. Voidness, simultaneity, isotropy, one-pointedness - all these are doxic or temporal interpretations of play significance.

“Time” and “will” turned out to be allegories of a form of memory reflection. Time is not an ageless element in which the events of life splash; then we would know meaningful time; time - the interpretation of the form of memory in something one-meaningful game. The empty significance of which makes time the most mysterious and elusive concept. “Everything flows, everything changes”, “You can’t enter the same river twice” - you can’t think of time only in one language game You can’t enter even once.”

4.3 Space - $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$.

The form that interprets the significance of the content (“=”) by other (“or”) game connections we will call the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$. The implementation of the game of this form should be interpreted in terms of game connections of other meanings, i.e. a valid value of $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ implies the feasibility of other interpretations in other meanings of the game, saying that this value has carried out this game. The meaning itself cannot be certain of its own realization of the meaning, as it was in the case of $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$.

Consequently, in the language game of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ there must be values that speak of the “reliability” of its meanings or suggest the interpretation of “reliable”. Hence it is clear that any syntactic game will be a game of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ there is no doxic syntax.

I call language games of this form games of understanding or recognition. I saw a heptagon, but the fact that it is really a heptagon requires counting its sides, i.e. interpretation of its significance by other game connections of its meaning - its “other” - account. If the polygon flashed with-out allowing itself to be examined

(interpreted), then I can't say anything whether it's a heptagon or a circle, and I will either have to say that the game has not been realized and I don't know what it was, or guess when playing play of the form $\delta\alpha\xi\alpha$.

But what about the fact that "I see red and do not require any confirmation"? - The fact is that when you see, you are in the game itself $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, and not in its syntax, as in our study, there-fore you cannot interpret its game implementation by the content of the game, outside of this con-tent, You can't prove the truth of a vision by seeing. But your vision (this is already syntactic reason-ing), in order to be a vision of "red", requires its constancy, that the red color will not begin to shimmer or disappear, and this is nothing more than an interpretation in other meanings of "vision of red " . That is, the game of color recognition involves the interpretation of its authentic in other game connections.

Let us now turn to the interpretation of the proposition of syntactic relations as the significance of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$.

a) The proposition of silence ($L \rightarrow L$).

Since the significance of $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ ("=") is interpreted in other ("or") game connections, before the implementation of these interpretations (L) we must assume the possibility (emptiness - L) of their implementation in the game ($L \rightarrow L$). We must presuppose this meaningless possibility as the totality of all possibilities for the realization of the game in its connections, somewhere present before all reasoning.

What could it be? What do we assume? - Space, the receptacle of everything that exists, i.e. the totality of all possibilities for the implementation of all games. The meaningless significance of the form of memory becomes the world of all the possibilities of everything that exists - the being of the world. And not just being, but being that realizes the understanding of the language game of the . Being becomes a speaking being, addressed to us - the source of the cognizability of the world.

"Space" is a pointer to the meaningless significance of the form of memory, interpreting it in the attributes of "eternal" and "infinite", since memory has no boundaries outside it: what cannot be remembered cannot be interpreted. The "unknown" is also what is remembered, but as the possibility of remembering itself.

b) The proposition of the statement ($I \rightarrow I$).

The meaningful meanings of the game $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ (I) make sense only in relation to other (syntax) meaningful (I) meanings of this game ($I \rightarrow I$). In other words, a point in space out of cor-relation with all other points is nonsense. The

interpretation of the correlation of points as the emptiness of the form of memory will lead us to the concept of isotropic.

It follows from this that space is not a continuum of points, but a continuum of their correlations - distances.

c) The proposition of questioning ($L \rightarrow I$).

In order for the syntactic interpretations of the reliable meanings of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ to point to the meaningless implementation of the language game (“=“ - “or”), the content of the game (I) needs to be represented by the form of memory reflection that is external to it (L). The content-less meaningful implementation of the game must be demonstrated (syntax) in meaningful tautologies of the hermeneutic circle, thanks to which the “non-content” becomes “giving place” to the significance of the play content. “Give room”, “exercise” are allegories of the openness of space, some-thing that you can go through without resistance if you find a way to move in it. Space cannot be something that resists the realization of the game, since it is itself the interpretation of the game’s feasibility. The openness or non-resistance of space is the essence of the representativeness of the form of memory.

Devotion, capacity, infinity, isotropy, correlation, openness - all this is a spatial interpretation of the significance of the language game of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$. Space is one of the forms of interpretation of the exercise of our memory.

4.4 Place of “existing”.

Space and time are two interpretations of the form of memory, two demonstrations of the realization of a hermeneutic circle that interprets the meaningless significance of existence as the content of language games. Can we consider them as certain given objects, as objective givens of our being?

No and no again! Since their meaning is in their demonstrativeness, and not in their representation before any understanding. The last one is representation, a spatial interpretation of “demonstrativeness”. Space and time cannot exist prior to our understanding, because they themselves are forms of our thought, two demonstrable propositions of thought. Object-subject relations are meaningless for them. Space and time cannot be the subject of research, since they themselves are a logical form of research carried out by our games: why research “something” if the research itself (any research!) demonstrates this “something”.

But still, we are talking about them as demonstrations of the implementation of games, so they are something?

Are we talking about them? No, we demonstrate them in this or that game, using for this meaningless meaningful indexes, pointing in fact to the player of the game, to our self. Speaking of space and time, we reinterpret the “playing self” of our games in two forms, interpret our “I” as “being in its being” and “willing or observing”. Thus, interpreting space and time, we determine the place of “existing” (everything significant) in our games, the game meaning of our “I”.

Then why do we claim that we are talking about space and time, since we are reinterpreting meaningless meaning?

Because any interpretation, any comprehension is an interpretation of the contentless by content, we have no choice but to play with “space” and “time”, revealing the logical forms of our thinking in their meaningful interpretations. The very difference between space and time is the acceptance of the game of their “observer” - the player of the game of their comprehension. The place of which in the games will indicate the revealed propositions.

4.5 Past, present, future.

We have shown that time is an interpretation of a meaningless index to its implementation of indicating the form $\delta\sigma\xi\alpha$ in the game . But what are the tenses of our speech?

When we interpret “time” we are in a syntactic language game considering our own implementation or the implementation of another game, so meaningful interpretations of “time” will reveal the syntactic relations of language games - the relations of implication proposition.

Past tense ($L \rightarrow I$).

A meaninglessly meaningful index (L) performed in a syntactic game - this is how we will understand time - is interpreted by the implementation of the content (I) of another language game, different from the interpretations of syntax. The syntax interprets the contentless significance (L) of time by the “representation” of the content (I) of another game considered by it ($L \rightarrow I$) (the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$). Thus, the considered meanings acquire the attributes of the spatial interpretation of the form of memory - they are interpreted as “taking place”, completed and accessible to their interpretation, - the interpretation of the space-container of all the implementations of language games.

In order to remember something, we must assume that this something is in the “realized”, in the played space of games, assume that it was .

Present tense ($I \rightarrow I$).

A meaningless indexical is interpreted by the content of its own interpretive syntax ($I \rightarrow I$), but the external realization of the content cannot be interpreted in it, let us recall Zeno's aporia: "at the point where the flying arrow left, it is no longer there, but at the point where it flies, - not yet". Therefore, the present can be pointed to, but it cannot be described.

How then do we talk about the present?

Only as a meaningful interpretation in the game of "its meaning" ($I \rightarrow I$). We say: "what time is it now?", "now I'm going home", - "now" is a pointer to the interpreted meaning of the game. In these sentences, we do not define formal time, but try to determine our position in the game, the meaning of our play actions. All meaningful statements of the present tense do not refer to the "present" as the implementation of the game being performed, but as the meaning of the game meaning being implemented "now". "Now" is a pointer to "this" game meaning, the interpretation of which demonstrates the meaning of "now", closing the circle of game tautologies.

Future tense ($L \rightarrow L$).

If we try to interpret, more precisely, to demonstrate the meaningless index (L) to the very outside implementation of syntax (L), then this impossible attempt at a meaningful interpretation will be the future tense - a demonstration of a playful implementation outside the content of the game. The "impossibility" of such a meaningful representation is interpreted by the "unpredictability" of the content of the future tense, but already in the next stage of syntax.

We really cannot interpret its external realization in the content of the game, but we can demonstrate it by the game itself, reflexively pointing to its lack of content ($L \rightarrow L$). But for such a demonstration, we must move on to the next syntactic game, in which meaningless meaning will be clearly demonstrated by the hermeneutical circle of game meanings. The syntax should reveal the proposition of meaning and interpret it as the content of the future - probability, possibility.

For example, we will never be able to answer the question: "Will there be a naval battle at Salamis?" The answers "yes" and "no" are equally devoid of a meaningful interpretation of their credibility - feasibility. But the answer: "there will either be a battle or not", being a demonstration of the hermeneutic circle, has

the meaning of the meaningless significance of “presence in the game”: either this will happen in the game, or this is again a circle. Further, already in a different syntax, we interpret the presented demonstration of the circle of the game with the content of the past tense, the content of another language game, introducing the concept of probability and additional meaningful conditions (whether there will be a storm at sea or not).

If we fail to build a syntactic game to the revealed hermeneutic circle, in the content that demonstrates it, then the events we are considering are unpredictable.

The conducted studies have shown that the past, present and future are interpretations of the meaningless index on the implementation of another game, on the implementation of “these” syn-tactic meanings in syntax and on the very outsideness of the implementation of syntax, respectively.

Forms of tenses - forms of syntactic relations of games.

4.6 The border of the world - its history.

In this chapter, the proposition of implication has been interpreted both as a spatial representation of the form of memory, and as syntactic relations of language games, as “times”. Therefore, they have a single semantic structure. Therefore, spatial interpretation can be interpreted as a “temporal” interpretation of syntactic relations, i.e. the semantic structure of “space” is isomorphic to the structure of “times” - past, present and future. Or: the boundary of the world is its history.

Indeed, the “boundary of the world” is the certainty or signification of space - the receptacle of everything that exists in the world; “history of the world” - the identification of the world existing in the game content. Both are interpretations of the same thing. Let’s illustrate this.

I note that the “endless world” (limitless), i.e. outside the interpretations of language games, has not found its complete interpretation in the Western tradition, which is quite understandable: the outside is only demonstrated, not commented on. The “boundlessness of the world” has led to the contradiction of its existence as something observable. Let me remind you that if the world is infinite and isotropic in this infinity, and, precisely, this is the absence of its boundaries, then in any direction of the starry sky there was at least one star, the sky would simply glow with solid light. On the other hand, if the world is infinite in time, then it could not come from anywhere, therefore, any moment of time of the world as a whole is identical to any other, and since the meaning in the framework of the language game of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ is the correlation of its meanings, then the world itself has no meaning as existing in the correlation of two indistinguishable

indexes on itself. The world is strictly determined as meaningless. And since the world is the totality of all the possibilities of human games, the whole life of any and every person is meaningless.

But the meaning of our life is in our history of life, its events, therefore, in order not to be meaningless, the world is reinterpreted as its history, i.e. the world must have an end and a beginning.

Or, if what I thought was my "I" makes sense, then the world must be created and destroyed. In all forms of thinking, recognizing the significance of "existing" - man, the world was created and limited.

The world of the Greeks is closed in the circle of the "great year" and in the ring of celestial spheres, the world of the Aryans, Egyptians, Syrians, etc. is also closed. Kant's objection to the boundaries of the world with the question: "What is beyond the boundaries?" - groundlessly, since in the absence of the boundaries of the world, neither the world nor space has any "further". By saying "beyond the boundaries", Kant assumes that he is standing next to it, next to the signification of everything that exists, and, consequently, himself next to himself - when someone does this, I will accept Kant's objection.

Even in modern science, far, at first glance, from the ideas of creaturehood and the Creator, after an unsuccessful attempt to comprehend the infinite world, it turned out to be born and closed - the Big Bang theory. And since scientific thinking is reflective thinking, the interpretations of the "movement" of the history of the world (progress) also touched its boundaries: the Universe began to expand, following its history.

Do not look for a causal relationship here, the relationship here is not causal, but logical.

The world is created and limited because my "I", my life has meaning. Because the dextral "I" is also represented by "existing".

Chapter 5

Proposition of corporeality.

5.1 Insignificant.

It is necessary to explain why this chapter appeared. The logical foundations that have led us to meaning as a hermeneutic circle have been set forth in the first four chapters, and a direct transition to the study of forms of authentic language-games has been prepared. The fifth chapter will add nothing to the interpretation of the proposition of meaning as a form of memory reflection. A categorical introduction to the theory of meaning was given in the first two chapters, and a structural-logical interpretation of the proposition of meaning in the third and fourth. Why is this chapter need-ed?

Because the author wants to be understood.

The presented concept of meaning and meaning is fundamentally different from everything that has hitherto been conceived in the Western tradition, but it is expressed within the same frame-work of the Western tradition, which, due to its rootedness, obscures the “fundamental difference” with its pre-reasons, without understanding which all the way I have done is meaningless. Therefore, once again it is necessary to draw our attention to it.

The meaning in the Western tradition of “existing”, whether in formal or existential philosophy, an inexplicable pre-existing sign and the rules for its use. Even Aristotle noted that in any philosophical system there must be inexplicable concepts, the use of which describes everything else. Axiomatics is inexplicable and pre-given. Nothing in Western thought for two and a half millennia has escaped the indicated inexplicability of the “beginning of all beginnings”. Whether the god of the theists and gnostics, or the foundations of Bourbaki’s set theory, everything equally relies on this “inexplicability” and, on the other hand, the absolute clarity of the sign, the reverse side of the “inexplicable”, which allows one

to recklessly operate with symbols of an inexplicable meaning.

This approach has become so ingrained with us that it is impossible to imagine otherwise. The axiomizing approach is the only true approach, and hardly anyone will deny this. Although there is nothing more true in it than in bouncing and patting oneself on the thighs: “here, they say, what is a sign, and now let’s forget about it and move on to our games.”

Of course, addressing how the sign is used in games is necessary for understanding games, but it is also necessary to understand what is forgotten, what is left behind the “inexplicable” sign.

The meaning of the “inexplicable” is that we refuse to consider it further and thereby carry out our language games. The basis of our thought is in the forgettable inexplicability of the sign. The inexplicable, removed from the content, becomes the possibility of the games themselves.

The revelation in logical forms of the non-significant basis of language games is the “fundamental difference” of my theory of meaning.

In other words, I want to define the meaning of the following infinite sequence : if you axiomatize something, then, following the meaning of the “axiom”, you must axiomatize both the possibility of axiomatization itself and the possibility of this possibility, and so on ad infinitum, excluding in the end any axiomatization.

How can logic avoid this pernicious infinity?

Remember that it is just an attempt to get out of the circle of your understanding. Not understanding in general (complete nonsense!), but your understanding, namely your understanding, carried out here and now, demonstrating itself in its playful meanings.

The proposition of meaning is not the axiomatics of the sign, but this circle of accomplished understanding of the “inexplicability” of the sign in language games. Ultimately, the “inexplicability” of a sign is “oblivion” (reflection) of the lack of content of our existence in the contents of our life - an oblivion that gives o-essence to everything that is meaningful.

propositional interpretations of ”meaning” and ”meaning” that I have presented that serve as a means of revealing this circle .

The proposition of meaning is nothing of the signified, nothing of the axiomatized, but the very realization of the circle of understanding. In fact, we will never be able to fully identify the proposition of meaning, to point to it as represented in the language game, but we will be able to realize its meaning in game interpretations.

But what is the meaning of understanding the “unsigned”? It will always

remain a demonstrative meaningless index.

It is not a matter of this elusive meaning of “contentless”, but of what is realized in its elusiveness, what is actually realized in the games of our life.

Later in the chapter, in some separate studies, an attempt will be made to re-think from a new point of view the old prejudices and propositions of our thought. The difficulty of what has been done is that the revealed foundations of our games are too close to the game meaning realized in them, too transparent in its light, and the most transparent is also the darkest - it is not visible.

5.2 Body and corporality.

“Faith in the body is more fundamental than faith in the spirit” (F. Nietzsche).
- The deepest truth of logic that I have ever met.

Following the paths of the hermeneutic circle, we reveal in the interpretation of the meaning proposition the unity of the implementation of language games - their player, “playing self”. Our interpretation of meaning leads to the hypostasis of the realization of memory as something or someone present in it. The meaning proposition thus interprets some index to its unity of implementation, which we ourselves demonstrate, and which is usually our body, is a sign that we are playing our games, and it does not matter that we are talking about the foundations of mathematics.

But the body is only a pointer to the form of reflection of memory, only a sign, and every sign must have its own meaning different from it (“other”): if you signify the body, then you signify the soul.

The meaning of our sign is the interpretation of all our “playing selves”, all our roles that tell us who we are, what is the meaning of our “body”, what is our “corporality” - a meaningful interpretation of the proposition of meaning, in the attributes of which we think of ourselves as our own “I”.

The fact that we think of ourselves as a unity of “I” is not at all obvious, this is the result and basis of the habit of thought, our experience of understanding in the hermetic circle of games of the self-sustainability of life, an experience that reveals what it was and is.

If earlier in the “beginning of beginnings” there was an empty index (God, eternity, a sign), then my “beginning of beginnings” is the very realization of understanding the meaninglessness of our existence . Understanding empty significance, I fulfill myself in my games, while remaining nothing of them.

5.3 Soul and body.

Corporeality, the meaning of the body, is not signified by it: our body is always larger than itself. But even then someone must carry out the treatment of our body, i.e. and corporeality must be significant, - this is how the human soul appears. Since the soul is an external realization of the meaning of the body, it must also be meaningless among bodies - the soul is invisible and other-worldly. The soul is an index to the externality of the implementation of language games, the soul is “beyond” the “body” outlined in the hermeneutic circle.

Corporeality through the soul is conceived in our games as something meaningful, and thus the content of games is eliminated (forgotten) the outside of their meaning, our existence ceases to be meaningless meaningful. Corporeality, like the soul, equally become the subjects of our existence, equally take on the role of the meaning of our “body”.

We have always searched for the secret of our being. We marveled at him, the wonderful groundlessness of which led us to the conviction that man and his life have their own secret meaning.

- What is the point? Your worries are not enough for you.

- Yes, not much. The earthly meaning of life will immediately disappear, I ask myself: why all this?

Why is this? What is this? - and we do not find an answer, except for an empty indexal to the “it” itself.

Remember that unanswered questions are meaningless. Does this mean that when we ask questions about the meaning of life, we are talking nonsense? - But I say: why all this? - and they understand me, that is. find the meaning of the question. What is it?

In its unreasonable feasibility. The meaning of these questions is that they are feasible for us as an index (soul) to the non-significant in games, to the demonstration of meaningless significance in the circle of our questions and our “answers”.

So the soul and body, heavenly and earthly, being the experience of understanding our corporality, long ago interpreted the proposition of meaning, interpreting the “outsideness” of the realization of memory by the “transcendence” of heavenly and earthly, soul and body, the objective world and subjective perception, etc. .

We see how for thousands of years different concepts: “soul”, “body”, “subject”, “object” interpret the same meaningless form of memory . And everything that is is such an interpretation.

- So, are you an atheist? - you ask me.

How can you tell a theist from an atheist?

The atheist also considers the meaning of life something significant in itself, like the theist, only in other attributes. They have the same form of thinking, the same prejudices. The point is not that “the meaning of life is in itself or in its correct (salvation) realization ”, but in the fact that the meaning of life is completely insignificant in it, it is its insignificant.

- So you're an agnostic?

Well, what an agnostic I am. The agnostic also signifies the meaning of life by his ”unknowable ”, that which is inaccessible to him, the agnostic, and, consequently, is presented as ”inaccessible”. We are not able to know the meaning of life, says the agnostic. But I say something completely different: the “unknowable” meaning of life is interpreted by its games, represented in them. The “absolutely unknowable” is already absolutely known by us as such, known to the end in its own “absolute unknowability”. - But we are talking about the content of the ”absolutely unknowable”. - Excuse me, if you know that it has content, then it is not “unknowable”, but something else.

You see, I'm not a theist, I'm not an atheist, and I'm not an agnostic either. My thought does not fit into your pre-reasons.

- So who are you? Where is your soul?

My soul is corporality: the realization of understanding in the hermeneutical circle of the “obsessionless possession” of the form of memory. Corporeality is the understood experience of the self-sustainability of life. My proposition of meaning is my proposition of corporeality. I play myself. Having played, I discard what is signified in the game, cashed in it, as something that is no longer me. And in all this there is not a drop of acting - everything here is real, not feigned. Rather, everything before that was feigned.

But what about death? Do you understand that sooner or later the games end, don't you feel sad about it?

Sad, no doubt sad. But the longing for ”death” has its meaning in our form of life; it may be a thousand-year-old habit in another. The fact that I am afraid of death indicates the nature of my games and nothing more.

The fear of death is the fear of meaninglessness, but we are all the more afraid of it, the deeper we “forget ” in our games, the more valuable the meanings of our games are for us. If in games the meaning is lost, and this happens, moreover, it is logically necessary (cashing out - Part III), then the “meaningless” is not much different from the meaningful, and our fear of death becomes less significant for us. If we stop being afraid of death, it means that the form of life is close to full interpretation in the circle of understanding, it cashes in and dies. Therefore,

when death is right in front of our face, we are not at all afraid of it.

Death-“nothing” as a pointer to the very reflection of the outsideness of our games is meaningless, remember: “when I exist, it is gone, when it exists, I no longer exist.”

- You do not want eternal life?

To answer this question, I have to know if I want “this” life, but there is no place for “this” in life.

Ask me: do I want a different life? - and I will answer: yes, because I cannot help wanting something else. The meaning of “desire” is in its “other”.

5.4 God and Gods. Death of the Gods.

To deny the existence of God is as foolish as to say that there is a God.

“If there is no God, then everything is permitted to man.” For Dostoevsky, this means the collapse of morality, but only? Is it not because the collapse of morality is so terrible for him that it is the collapse of any meaning of human life. - So, “if there is no God, then there is no point” - this phrase is more accurate.

“God” points to the possibility of the feasibility of meaning, God is the guarantor of meaning, God is the meaning itself, the form of reflection of memory itself outside everything.

If you put together everything that has been said about memory and its implementation, re-name memory to God, then it is not difficult to make a theological system out of the rest of the concepts.

God is thus the most detailed proposition of meaning, the proposition of our corporeality. We have called the fulfillment of our memory God for so long that it was simply necessary for Him to be born of a Virgin. (If the reader has understood me so far, then he will understand that there is not a grain of irony in the last lines.)

Religious thought is in the history of mankind a form of reflective thought, whose realization is something significant in itself. Religion is a reflection of “existing”.

Having the experience of the elusiveness of the “source” of being, understanding it: “it is impossible for a person to see God and not die”, “God is invisible and unsearchable”, - all these are interpretations of the externality of the form of memory, - all religious thought, both in the east and in the west, still places his God in the meaning of his games, as soon as he begins to pray to Him, i.e. implement in the game the meaning of the meaning “God”.

“Do not worship anyone but your Lord” - if you want to be consistently religious, then do not worship Him either.

What matters is not who and how you worship, but how far you go along the path of thought that “God” points to. Western thought followed it to the end, fully revealing the hermeneutical circle of the religious form of thought, thereby defining the indefinable God, and killing Him. “God is dead” - the form of reflection of the existent has completed its circle of understanding, having cashed itself out. The meaning of “God” is signified, and therefore He is not needed as unsearchable, He is researched by us on our path. The religious form, after a perfect circle of understanding, becomes atheistic thinking, that thinking where God is fully interpreted in the laws of the world and thought, where the role of an empty pointer to the external realization of the form of memory is left to Him.

Atheism is the same religious form of thought, only fully interpreting the proposition of corporeality in the attributes of being. But in spite of this, atheism still remains a reflection of what is in its scientific prejudices, therefore all atheistic revelations of God are cutting the bough on which the modern scientific and atheistic worldview sits.

The “God” of the atheist is the causal relationship of everything that exists, the interpretation of the realization of understanding, i.e. the same as God is for the theist - everything is in God. An atheist, unlike a theist, only leaves no room for Satan, he fills his whole life with his God, he is pan-religious.

“God is dead” not because He does not exist, but because the Western form of thought has completely cashed in culture the playful interpretations of “existing”, and has remained with the same demonstration of an empty index, buried in the achievements of civilization, in which there is no place for anything else . , except for the present, the interpretation of existence. ”God is dead” because He became an index.

“God is dead” not in religious and social institutions, but in the growing importance of the emptiness of life.

If you want the meaning of life - look for new forms of thought.

But having died, God finally became the only God-indexal.

There is a well-known dispute between the Hellenes and the Jews about God and the Gods. Being in the power of modern prejudices about the scientific God-indexal, we are ready to interpret this dispute as a misunderstanding by the pagan Hellenes of the monotheists of the Jews, as the backwardness of pagan Athens in front of the religiously progressive Jerusalem.

But we forget that the Jews brought a dead God to Athens with vague rumors

about His resurrection, which, in itself, is not news to the worshipers of Dionysus. The Jews told the Athenian dialecticians the concept of the “one” God, but the Hellenes knew for five centuries that the one finds meaning in the multitude (Gods). It is not enough to preach a single God, all pagan peoples and tribes have a concept of it, it is necessary to reveal from this single God a new form of thought in many language games. What happened, but for this Christianity had to become ”Platonism for the people” - after the Ecumenical Councils.

The initial success of Christianity was the success of the death of the Hellenic Gods - they became meaningless and became the only God of metaphysicians and philosophers. The Christ of the apocalypse takes His place. - He becomes powerful in the Hellenic world, as he preaches apokatastasis: finding the meaning of life through its destruction, through the death of the Gods. He alone pointed out this path of gaining meaning.

And only the enormous power of the spirit of the Hellenic culture was able to deliver the Western world from a really impending end, creating the Christian Church of the Councils, which turned out to be a new version of the Hellenic metaphysics of “being”. Only now the “existing” is not a given of the phenomenon of life in a sign, number and gesture, but their signified function: a way to achieve meaning - the Kingdom of Heaven, in trampling on all that is signified - the crucified Christ. Christianity for the first time made the human “essence” an object of its own manipulations.

The death of the gods is the birth of an indexal god.

The death of Christian saints is the birth of Protestantism.

- But still, is there a God in your opinion or is he not? - asks me persistent reader .

If I answer that God does not exist, then I will deny in our tradition the existence of any meaning, including the meaning of the denial itself, since in God the logical form is important to me, and not nonsense about the transcendent; if I answer that there is a God, then I will designate Him as an Idol, I will place the realization of memory in its own content, i.e. I'll talk about something else, not about God.

I can't say either, I can't even say ”I don't know if God exists or not”, because in this sentence I doubt my own existence. God is a form of reflection of memory, you can know or not know one or another of its interpretations in language games, but not itself.

5.5 Meaning and corporality. Labyrinth.

So, there is no transcendent world, the transcendent is the inability of Western metaphysics to connect the ends with the ends of its thought. But not only is there no transcendent world, which is more or less tolerable, the immanent world is gone!

What is immanent is what is immediately clear to me, without everything else. There are meanings known to man a priori. - I argue that there are no such a priori meanings. - How then is your form of memory, doesn't it exist before any games?

Of course not, since in order for it to "exist", i.e. to be interpreted in this way, a language game is already necessary. - So there are a priori language games? - And games do not exist before the form of memory. - But then a priori there are both games and a form of memory, what was previously called a given language.

Alas, "givenness" makes sense only in the already perfect circle of understanding. Any "groundless" given becomes meaningful only after the hermeneutic circle has been realized, but not before it.

- What then makes these circles and these games come true?

It depends on what language games you are going to comprehend it. But whatever attributes you use, you will always signify the same form of the hermeneutic circle, which does not exist a priori.

Meaning is not what reveals itself from the form of memory, but what is realized in it as a playful meaning, being the very realization of memory. Meaning can be signified, but it is not mean-ing. Form can be interpreted by content, but never will be. The whole apriorism is in the confusion of these concepts, in the comprehension of the existence of something existing.

- What is the meaning of these implementations?

In understanding. - What? - What the "playing egos" of our games and their syntaxes point to, the meaning of which I call corporality, is an interpretation no worse than existence.

Corporeality is the ongoing experience of understanding and fulfilling "themselves". Corporeality is meaningless without the meanings and masks of its games, but it is also none of these meanings and masks. Corporeality is a way of finding meaning in the interpretation of meaningless meaning.

What is this path?

The circle of the labyrinth, the circle of the labrys - a double axe: the groundlessness of games and the lack of content of forms - the blades of memory and the blades of oblivion.

The labyrinth always clearly indicates the way, but does not say where to go, the labyrinth always has a free path, but it is not clear what is beyond it. This Cretan symbol, like no other, fits into my category of “forgetfulness in mindfulness”.

In any labyrinth there is a Minotaur, but not everyone has Ariadne’s thread, especially since to exit the labyrinth you need to kill the Minotaur, if, of course, you can find it.

Until now, trying to get out, we have been pounding the walls of the labyrinth with rams of the “transcendental” and “existing”, forgetting that the most reliable labyrinth is a closed space without walls. The path through such a labyrinth is a path without a goal, what Heidegger called “will to will.”

One would like to say that an aimless path is a meaningless path, but its “senselessness” is the only thing that drives the very meaning.

A labyrinth without an exit is a meaningless path, because it is meaning itself. We enter into it, or rather, we find ourselves in it and, following it, we acquire our corporality. Having proceeded from it, we again find ourselves in the same place and our corporality turns into a “body” that we do not need. - What’s next? - If by “further” we mean the acquisition of a new meaning, a new corporality, then we need new paths in the labyrinth or a new labyrinth. The only thread of Ariadne’s bottom here will be understanding, understanding the form of memory in language games, i.e. that which is outside the traversed path.

We have to go through the corridors of the labyrinth again, but already following the thread of Ariadne, and maybe she will lead us to freedom or lead to the Minotaur. The first cannot be counted on without the second.

If this is so, then I have already seen the Minotaur - this is the “body”, my cashed corporality. Kill him and you are saved. Philosophize with an axe.

5.6 Words and things.

Wandering the corridors of my labyrinth, one observant Frenchman noticed that the Western human self, the object of close attention of centuries-old culture, is suddenly somehow imperceptibly lost between our words and things.

This amazing incident is an excellent confirmation of the above.

What are words and what are things?

Two forms of interpretation of meaning: words - $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$, things - $\epsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ I would name two triplets:

$\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$ — time - word;

"Do you know this word?" - "Yes, I know him." Whether the word spoken, written, indicated in any other way in the game is recognized by you immediately, like your name. (I note that an unfamiliar word is not yet it, how do you know, maybe they are mocking you.) If you recognize the word, then you don't need anything else but it to use it, i.e. interpret other words. The play connection itself - the connection of recognition, recollection of this word is indicated in it, this is the essence of recognition. If the word is not recognized, then the game connections interpreting it as "recognized" have not been realized, and the word is not the value of the form $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$. Knowing a word and recognizing it is completely indistinguishable. - The difficulty here is that we always con-fuse the meaning and meaning of a word with its phonetic, gestural or orthographic signification due to its correlativity of our memory, what we will call "cashing out". The significance of a word is that I can remember it: the phonetic and spelling correlates are cashing witnesses to the exercise of our memory, relating to the rules of particular games of communication. The meaning of the word refers to them in the same way as chess moves during a game with their own protocol record by the players.

It is a deep delusion that we think when we say the words to ourselves. This is a matter of habit and the need for communication. - Each of us has repeatedly discovered that the desired thoughts and solutions come from "nowhere" - this is the implementation of memory without any reflective correlate necessary in the language games of communication. If thoughts come from no-where, then the words are different from their correlates.

- Yes, I came up with this complex idea as if from nowhere, but I don't know how, I don't remember it, - you object.

Why don't you remember this? Is it because "these are not your thoughts", or do you consider yourself, your I, not that which carries out the meaning of your thoughts in your memory? What is surprising here, to believe all your life that you are the one who speaks, writes or draws, and suddenly, when it turns out that something that is not related to the above mentioned happens to you - consider it a stranger. If these are "not your thoughts," then how did you know them? Someone suggested them to you, but then you must remember how the prompting took place, but you don't remember that either.

No, these are your thoughts, thought out by you, but in a different language game, where the phonetic correlate is optional.

You do not remember how these uncorrelative games were played, because you cannot interpret in them what you hitherto considered your "I", you cannot

recognize them “and the player” in your understanding of your own “I”. These games have a different physicality.

- But why do I remember myself in other games? - Because their implementation was also fixed by the correlates of games, by what cashed them out, made their meanings things and cashed words, and thus opened the way to a single syntax in our communication, a syntax that led to an understanding of our corporality of modern man. Non-correlative games cannot be comprehended in a single cashing syntax of communication, their “playing self” is therefore insignificant for us - it does not exist.

The correlative cashing out of language games is necessary for the unified syntax of our culture, in fact, culture is this cashing out. Without it, reflective thinking, and indeed no other that we have known so far, cannot open up. Still, thought is not a phonetic correlate.

Also, one should not think that the form of memory is that non-correlative thinking, and its correlates are reflective content. Such an interpretation does not give anything, as it leaves us again with questions about the meaning of meaning. I dare say that these uncorrelated games are exactly the same as our ordinary language games - otherwise why are we so immediately clear ideas ”coming from above”.

Now let’s move on to the consideration of the ”thing”. A thing is that whose meaning is real-ized in correlation other meanings that interpret it. A thing is not necessarily objective: an unknown word that requires its own interpretation, also a thing is the meaning of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$.

A thing is something that is given in “sensations”, “located”, “used”, etc., everything that requires its implementation of meaning in other meanings of language games, different from the sign of the thing itself. “Objectivity”, “appearance”, “openness” of a thing as such - all this is a spatial interpretation of the proposition of meaning, an interpretation of the significance of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$.

A thing that has no other interpretations is the well-known “thing in itself” Cantabe, a mean-ingful thing, an empty abstraction, - Hegel also noticed this. “Thing in itself” is by no means the ba-sis of the objectivity of the existing world. The objectivity of the world is a propositional interpretation of the form of memory as the significance of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$. Objectivity is a game con-cept, not a closed one. The objectivity of the world is not in the fact that real things, meanings of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, exist by themselves, but in the fact that the language games of this form of significance interpret the realization of memory as a pre-given space-container of all possible game im-plementations. Objectivity is

an interpretation of the pre-givenness of space (Chapter 4).

Western tradition tends to speak of the existent as "objectively existing", i.e. as about the meanings of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, and things themselves are conceived as their objectivity - the appearance in presence. But objectivity is not a pointer to cash games, but a pointer to one of the forms of games. The thing "in itself", outside of language games (indexal), exists in exactly the same way as our words. The thing itself turns into a word.

Imagine that something completely unknown and incomprehensible lies in front of you. I ask you: "what is it?" - You answer - "I do not know". Moreover, you answer in the affirmative, indicating that this something has its significance, but it is unknown to you. Now try to demonstrate this significance "by itself". You will get nothing but an indexical demonstration of meaningless significance. The same index for meaningless significance is "in itself" and the word is the form $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$. Thus, the thing "in itself" and the word "in itself" are indistinguishable meaningless indexes on the form of memory - both of them are realized as its reflection.

The difference between words and things, therefore, in their language games.

You object: I can use the words as I want, but it is still given to me as it is, it is "in front of me", and I can't do anything about it.

Firstly, I doubt that you can use words as you like: the form of the word is the form of your "will", desire, and you cannot do anything with this presence of your will, the very possibility of wanting or not wanting. You can redefine the "this" index, but the meaning of the index does not change. Secondly, the meaning that "you can do nothing with the givenness of this incomprehensible thing" is exactly the same as the meaning of the significance of the word, with which you also cannot do anything, cannot think outside the demonstration of reflection. The fact that you see something incomprehensible has the same meaning that you remember some incomprehensible meaning, or, more precisely, the meaning of "incomprehensible", demonstrating the off-game reflexivity of memory.

- But still we can, thank God, distinguish words from things. What kind of verbiage with which you are trying to confuse our heads? Don't you yourself know where are the words and where are the things?

Yes, I can distinguish between words and things, but I ask myself what allows me to make this distinction, what is the meaning of this distinction?

The meaning of this is in two forms of interpretation of one external realization of the form of memory. The objectivity of things and the subjectivity of words do not refer to the "nature" of their meanings, but to the forms of language

games, in the attributes of which I interpret my existence as the existence of my “playing self”. The universe, laws, Gods and people, everything is found in the interpretation of existence by our “I”. The very difference between words and things lies in the interpretation of the “I” as something “existing”. And how I interpret my I, what is the corporeality of my “I”, depends on what my “words” and my “things” will be.

- Finally, we have figured you out, - the reader will rejoice, - you are a solipsist.

Once again I must disappoint my reader. The solipsist claims that there is only his “I”, the meaning of which he refuses to consider, everything else is only the properties of sensations and memories of this “I”. The “I” of solipsism is the only thing that matters. I have the opposite: “I” has the same meaning as words and things perceived and recognizable in all games. “I” only indexed the realization of memory, but not the memory itself, not its subject of existence. Solipsism hypostasizes the fulfillment of memory by one’s ego. My hermeneutics, on the other hand, always points to this hypostatization as the meaning of the forgettable in the contents of our games.

To say for me that “only I exist” is just one of the ways of interpreting the reflection of memory, with the consistent implementation of which we will directly come to categorical realism: “there is only the world in the multitude of its phenomena, and “I” is one of them” - words become things.

Indeed, by carrying out the language games of solipsism, we affirm that all meaning is contained in our “I”. In turn, the “I” of solipsism makes sense in the interpretation of the perceived meanings of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$. The meaning of “I” becomes the correlation of the values $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ in the pre-givenness of the space-container of all possibilities, all games. Consequently, the meaning of everything becomes the meaning of correlations of everything with everything in the pre-existing space. The “I” of solipsism dissolved between its words and things, precisely in what, as Michel Foucault aptly remarked, Western realism of modern times dissolved its “I”.

5.7 Image and emotions.

Among the words and things of our world, the meanings that make up the whole world - the world of images and emotions - do not find their place of meaning . It cannot be said that imagery and emotionality were not comprehended in the Western tradition, but their meaningfulness always presupposed something different from the comprehension of words and things. If metaphysics, ontology, science and logic belonged to words and things, then to images and emotions -

aesthetics and ethics, using an approach different from strictly logical. Image and emotions are not logical categories of Western thought. This does not mean that ethics and aesthetics were not subjects of logical-philosophical analysis; Losev comprehended all ancient philosophy as its aesthetics in the fundamental “History of Ancient Aesthetics”, but these concepts still referred to words and things that interpret images and emotions in the context of verbal culture. The world of images and emotions itself was a kind of external phenomenon subject to descriptive analysis.

For example, Bakhtin’s idea of the destructive function of laughter, leading to the birth of the new through the death of the obsolete, makes sense only in the context of the verbal culture of a medieval city, represented by Rabelais’s novel, whose verbal character we can hardly doubt. But laughter itself remained a logically unrevealed phenomenon, hidden behind the metaphysical images of pregnant old women and the all-consuming womb of Gargantua. The significance of emotions was considered by the significance of their epiphenomena, the description of which consisted in a more or less skillful interpretation of available texts.

I affirm that emotions and images are the same meanings of the form $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$ and $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, respectively, as are the meanings of our words and things. The logic of words and things is also the logic of emotions and images.

Emotions are the same words, only without phonetic and spelling correlates ; emotions - the experience of realizing the significance $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ in non-correlative language games of experiences. Images are the same things without a correlate of objectivity: the image of a triangle is as unshakable as any thing in its objectivity, but is the image of a triangle “in front of you”, as this thing is in front of you - a triangle thing without objectivity. And yet the triangle is in front of you, it is given to you as the value of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$.

Therefore, images and emotions differ from things and words in the nature of the specific games in which they participate. And everything that has been said about the proposition of meaning applies equally to images and emotions.

But words, one might argue, I recognize in their semantic context: saying “horse”, I know how to distinguish this word from others, for example, from “colt”. Emotions do not have such a context: “laughter” differs from “chuckle” differently than “horse” from “colt”. - Why? - Only by the fact that words, due to their correlative cash, have a more concrete place in language games, determined by the structure of semantic interpretations, but this refers to the nature of our games, and not to the form of meaning.

Also, one should not confuse the emotions themselves with their pointers in

other language games, the “inexpressible ” of joy with the pointers “laughter” and “joy”, the “inexpressibility” of which is the interpretation of an external implementation of syntax to the language game under consideration.

Do you have difficulty experiencing joy, boredom, or grief? No, you have difficulty interpreting emotions in other language games. Since emotions for syntax are equally meaningless indexes, their distinction requires a description of the very syntactic interpretation of emotions, what we called descriptive analysis in verbal culture. Note that when interpreting our emotions, we encounter exactly the same difficulties as with the interpretation of an incomprehensible word from a foreign language. The understanding of what “yin” and “yang” are is no more definite than “laughter” and “chuckle”.

Interpretations of emotions lead to interpretations of their imagery - to a descriptive syntax for the way they are viewed. That is, the experienced emotions are remembered by us as their images, meanings $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$. Which says: the relationship of images and emotions is the relationship of the language game and its syntax.

When constructing the syntaxes of ethics and aesthetics, we must always keep this in mind, and approach the emotional in the same way as the interpretation of texts of a different language and culture.

Let us return to the image of a triangle, the syntax for which is built in the same way as for emotions , it does not distinguish between them, they are equally indexes for it in the syntactic relation of the past. Therefore, it is possible to interpret the triangle in emotional terms and vice versa. Let us recall the four elements of the Pythagoreans: earth (sensuality itself) - a cube, water (experience) - an isocahedron, air - a dodecahedron, fire - a pyramid; Let us recall that musical tones also had their geometric images - the music of the spheres.

Such free, in the modern view, interpretations of the ancient Hellenes were not an arbitrary fantasy, but a necessary identification of the logical forms of the syntactic relations of language games, games - where “I” was the significance of $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$.

All correlative significance of our speech is based on the syntax of images and emotions. Words, in the traditional sense, are the meanings of syntactic games for the emotions and images of our lives. Let us turn to the first volume of A.F. Losev’s “History of Antique Aesthetics” “Early Classics”. In the chapter examining the images of natural elements in the poems “Iliad” and “Odyssey”, Losev shows that natural elements - lightning, storm, and the like are found in the texts of Homeric epics as a rather lengthy description of an ongoing natural

event, ending with a line or two related to the emotional experience of the hero: this is how fleet-footed Achilles got angry. It is easy to see that the first, the description of nature, is a syntax for the second, the affects of the hero, i.e. their syntactic description in external images associated with known experiences. The listener of the poem, reproducing in the syntactic description the emotional significance familiar to him, experiencing it again, is included in the syntax of the epic and realizes the understanding of the hero and related concepts, and in the epic the hero is always the personification of some concept - anger, honor, duty. The Homeric epic shows the structure of the genesis of our speech, its formation in correlative cashing.

Our entire language, in the usual sense, is a syntax for the experience of our life, but not its organ anon, an instrument. A syntax can be a tool, but a tool can never be a syntax to itself.

5.8 Experience.

Thinking about memory and language games, we are forced to refer to the concept of experience or ability to play these games and build syntaxes for them.

Thus, in speaking of laughter, my experience should suggest that the meaning of "laughter" finds its meaning in a play of syntax that reveals the emotional self at play. The aesthetics of laughter is therefore possible as the aesthetics of the laugh.

But in the Western tradition, we are easily ready to construct an aesthetics of laughter in general, considering the conceptuality of laughter, despite the indexical nature of this meaning. We are ready to build a whole philosophy of what we cannot really say. What makes us do it?

Experience. He not only makes us do it, but, more importantly, he makes us believe it. We believed in the logic of Hegel's contradictions, based on the identification of being and nothingness.

What is experience? - Ability to play certain language games. - What is their definition? - In an attribute that interprets the index on the form of memory ("I"). Experience, therefore, outlines a circle, the inclusion in which makes us think of our "I" as something significant in our games. Experience - inclusion in the form of thought, eliminating the contentlessness of existence from the content of games. Experience - the ability to forget in the exercise of games.

When the hermeneutic circle of the form of thought is fully marked in the cash of culture, experience can circle us around it for a long time, bombarding us with

all sorts of fantastic aesthetics, esoteric constructs, and “meaningless” theories. mechanics, and so on can serve as examples of such whirling.

- How, quantum mechanics! This is one of the most beautiful, effective and pragmatic achievements of the twentieth century - an empty whirl! Well, it's already out of the way.

Let's get rid of emotions. What is quantum mechanics? - The language of operator algebras over linear spaces, i.e. the structure of reflexive syntax over the mechanics of Hamilton and Langrange. Syntax to Syntax in the Western Tradition Chain. He would not have been an empty whirl of thought if he had more fully interpreted the proposition of the "being" of Western metaphysics, but this did not happen. Instead, we got a wave dualism - the emptiness of the contradiction against the background of the same concept of the Galilean observer with the addition of reflection in the form of the principle of complementarity: the observer to the observer.

Quantum mechanics in the sphere of thought, I emphasize - in the sphere of thought, only revealed once again that the metaphysical structure of the "existent" is not a language game: the probabilistic nature of the causal relationship is a demonstration of the emptiness of the outlined hermeneutic circle, but experience made us believe into this, although we had no more reason for this than for believing in ghouls. Einstein was right - "God does not play dice", i.e. language games either take place or they don't.

The probabilistic nature of the cause-and-effect relationship (undermining the foundations of Western metaphysics - they are the unity of God) indicates that our form of thought no longer creates language games authentically (and this is the reality of language games) interpreting our proposition of corporeality, the proposition of "existing", but only demonstrates the meaningless significance of the identified hermeneutic circle. Existing is no longer certain, it is not realized in games, but is only indicated in them as something already accomplished, i.e. loses its game significance and turns into an empty index (wave dualism - emptiness of contradiction).

As for the practical achievements of quantum mechanics, this belongs to the sphere of our experience, not thought. Acquired skill makes us forget about the results. The results themselves are not yet the basis for a reliable understanding; to the implementation of new language games. Landau's admission that modern physics describes what it is unable to imagine suggests that we are in front of our achievements, like savages in front of a shaman: the shaman heals, but it is impossible to imagine, although there is a theory of his journey to the Heavenly

Losihi.

Let us recall that quantum mechanics was also built for the “explanation” of known results , but the “explanation” turned out to be the experience of a syntactic description.

5.9 The Last Judgment or the cashing out of life forms.

The reality of the modern world, having rendered existence meaningless to the point of indexal, is becoming more and more like a new mythology of old preconceptions. The significance of what is carried out in our life becomes more and more insignificant for us. It is impossible not to notice what Nietzsche called “meaninglessness of higher values”: it doesn’t matter what you live for, it matters how you live, whether life brings you satisfaction or not, everything else is fiction - this is the quintessence of modern times. What is its meaning?

“It doesn’t matter what you live for” - says that the “truth” (the purpose of life) of the West, its “existence”, no longer requires its implementation in games, it becomes an index turned to its own cash in culture, to its experience . Truth loses its significance to the significance of a meaningless index: why be versed in all the intricacies of modern scientific syntax, when all you need to do is press a button on a TV or computer, the truth of which, i.e. the ability to carry out their functions is guaranteed by modern experience; the modern professional does not have to be an educated person, he can be just a beast of a trained cultural experience.

But if “truth” becomes an empty index, then our games in the cashing of culture begin to represent this index as a form of memory. There is a primitivization of the forms of language games against the background of a highly complex cultural structure: instead of the structures of cultural syntaxes, games interpret the indexal for their own implementation in the game, i.e. interpret the meaning of the form $\delta o \xi \alpha$ - “it is important whether life brings you satisfaction or not”. The experience of “truth” becomes its certainty. Our games no longer represent the structure of Western meta-physics, but turn to cashed experience, realizing its authenticity in the meanings of the form $\delta o \xi \alpha$.

Such a “depreciation of the highest values” is not an organic defect of this or that culture, but a logical form of cashing out existence in the hermeneutic circle of language games. Any culture, once it has begun its implementation, must logically complete it.

Form $\delta o \xi \alpha$ (the significance of emotions and volitional arbitrariness) are reliable, everything else is reliable as much as it serves to implement them, as far

as it is filled with emotional experiences of comfort and satisfaction. This is the essence of mass culture, alcoholism and drug addiction, giving a direct experience of the significance of strong emotions as the “meaning of life”. This is the meaning of modern technology - the effective use of experience to experience the results of civilization. This is the meaning of the whole life of the West, its ”will to will” - or consumption for the sake of consuming experiences. The latter is fraught with such a deformation of our culture that any picture of the Last Judgment may seem like a cheap illustration from a comic book. I’m not exaggerating - what could be worse than the hopelessness of the collapse of emotional bestiality. Follow God for two millennia, only to end up in a pigsty as a result.

The worst thing about this is that nothing can be done about it, any attempts to overcome metaphysics lead to aggravation of its profanation. There is nothing more ruthless than logical forms.

My goal is to see them where they were not expected to be found before. Everything significant is first of all subordinated to the logical forms of memory, secondly - to the game connections of the content . We have to look into this in more detail, deeper than the level of significance. We are interested in the forms of the language games themselves, but for this it is necessary to understand how meaning is connected with the form of the game, it is necessary to understand what a judgment is.

Part II

Forms of authenticity.

Chapter 6

Judgment.

6.1 Judgment and game connection.

We will talk about the connection of meaning with the language game - about judgment as a semantic connection. The proposition of meaning stated above was a demonstration of meaningless significance - a demonstration of an index pointing to its own pointing. Our task is to see the same demonstration in more complex structures than the index. To do this, one must understand that a meaning can also be a judgment. The meaning of the word "take" is already interpreted by its use in game connections, indicating what can be taken and what cannot be taken when making a game, i.e. making judgments about it. Meaning and judgment appear in the reflexive unity of their realization, otherwise we will not be able to demonstrate the "significance" of meaning, i.e. we can't "remember" it.

Let us turn to the area where significance is the most remote from the world of words and things, where it is difficult to confuse significance and its reflexive demonstration - to emotions, meanings of the form $\delta\alpha\xi\alpha$. What is the meaning of emotions? What does their other significance indicate?

The other of emotions is the very form of reflection of memory, the requirement to comprehend it is tantamount to the requirement to stop experiencing emotions and consider them in a syn-tactic game, which interprets their meaning. The meaning of emotions, therefore, is in their transience, i.e. the same as the meaning of time. Only in syntax can we judge our emotions. Therefore, judgments for the meaning of emotions are possible only in their syntactic play. This is the difference between meaning and judgment: that judgment is an interpretation of the playful connection of "meaning" with its "other", with what realizes its meaning in the game.

Judgment is the revealing of a game connection in games that allow both

“meanings” in their content, and the significance of its meaning, which is carried out in the form of game judgments . Not all games presuppose judgments in their content, but only those that point in their interpretations to the “other” of their meanings. For emotional games, judgments are impossible, which is tantamount to requiring their understanding in syntax.

But on the other hand, all the language games of our speech carry out their interpretations in the form of judgments. Let us pay attention to what “understanding of what has been said” means for us. What tells me about my understanding of “these words”? - The fact that I can express judgments about them, judge them. The meaning of the last phrase is that I can realize the meaning of the “ spoken words” in their language game, i.e. interpret them differently. “Have you figured out how to play ‘this game’?” - ”Yes.” “Then play it.” - But how do I know that he will play “this game”? - I know this from the fact that he will show (demonstrate) me the realization of its meaning in its meanings. The manifestation of meanings in their game implementation, i.e. the manifestation of meanings in their demonstration of the game connection of “this game” (the lack of content of the demonstration) is what makes it possible for me to say what game he is playing, whether he under-stood what was said correctly. The possibility of this lies in the form of judgments. For emotions, I can never claim that “he experienced them as I did”, moreover, I myself cannot experience them as “the same” (time is irreversible).

meaning and its syntax into the language game ? - Not quite so: syntax - the revealing of the forgettable (eliminated) in the game content of the implementation of one game (as a demonstration of its circle) in the interpretations of another or the same one; the judgment (its form) only interprets the realization of “these meanings” of the game in its own meanings, leaving the eliminated form of memory reflection syntactically unrevealed in its content. The meaning of demonstrativeness (emptiness) of the game connection remains unrevealed in the game, but demonstrativeness is carried out in the form of judgments, which indicates the possibility of constructing syntactic games only through judgments. “Judgment” itself, as an interpretation of a game connection, but not as a game content, acquires this meaning only in the syntax of its language game, therefore, further consideration of the judgment will go in the syntax to what is comprehended on these pages.

6.2 The significance of the judgment and its other. Trinity.

Interpretation of the game connection - the judgment itself must have a meaning. What is it like?

The answer lies in a different formulation of the question: what is the significance of the game connection? Its significance is the unity of the implementation of the game, i.e. demonstrability of the game in the hermeneutic circle. Therefore, the significance of the judgment is the significance of the meaningless exercise of the form of memory exhibited in the circle of "this" language game. The judgment points to the external realization of the game as its demonstrated, reflexively considered meaning.

When making our judgments, we already assume that they have their own meaning, even if they are "wrong", i.e. play some kind of language game. The meaningless significance of the judgment lies in the fact that the judgment, in addition to the game meaning, requires its understanding in the syntax, which says which game connections carry out the game and which do not (true judgment or false). In other words, the meaningless significance of the judgment lies in the fact that the judgment itself in its game cannot interpret its own game implementation, speak of its "correctness", but only point to it as a meaningless index.

If the significance of the judgment lies in the significance of the external realization of "this game", then what is the meaning of the judgment, what is its other? - The answer is also visible from the interpretation of the proposition "identical-other": a different judgment in his meaningful interpretations of the language game.

We see that the judgment is a reflexive indexical structure, pointing to the empty significance of the form of memory, demonstrated by the circle of "this game", and to the playful interpretations of the content that form "this" circle. But besides these two indexes, the judgment, as a reflexive structure, also points to their own reflexive interpretation in "this game", to the realization of the most meaningless demonstrativeness of "this circle" of the game, making the distinction between demonstration and demonstrated. Thus, the judgment has not a binary, but a trinary structure; in other words, a judgment as a play connection is an interpretation of the interpretation of play significance.

The trinity of the judgment contains the possibility of syntactic constructions: having made a judgment in the game, we ask, and the question makes sense - "is it true?", - ask: "are your emotions correct" - and you will not under-

stand yourself.

6.3 Subject and predicate.

Let us consider the first two indexals of the judgment structure: the indexal for the external implementation of “this game” and for its game interpretation.

The first is the well-known subject of judgment; the second is a predicate.

The subject is a pointer to the meaningless significance of the form of memory demonstrated by the circle of the game, to the significance of reflection. But doesn't this contradict all ideas about the subject? Something, and the subject in the game is the most meaningful meaning, without which no game is conceivable.

Is it so? - Consider the judgment “the apple is red.” Ask: what is an “apple”? Apart from answers like that an apple can be red, edible, discordant, round, etc., we will not get any other answers. So what, “apple” is all of this? But these are only predicates of the “apple”, and not the apple itself. “Apple” is the unity of all these predicates, i.e. meaningless significance of their implementation in language games. And no matter how hard you try to define “apple”, all your definitions will be a predicative interpretation of this “empty” index “apple” in “these” specific games.

But still we know what an “apple” is. - Yes, we know, but we know because the contentless indexical of the subject of the judgment points to “this” demonstration of meaningless significance in “this” circle of the game, cashed in by its demonstration. If the circle of the game cannot be presented for consideration of its syntax, cannot be demonstrated, then we will not know the meaning of the word “apple”, but will be forced to complete the circle of the game itself, without syntactic reflection, “clarifying the meaning of the incomprehensible meaning”.

The question arises: what does it mean to point to the meaningless implementation of “this” language game? - To point to the external and meaningless implementation of the language game means to point to its game interpretations, demonstrating meaningless significance in the form of a circle of tautologies of “this” game. Therefore, the subject of the judgment only makes sense in connection with the pointer to these game interpretations, only in connection with the predicate of the judgment.

The predicate is a pointer to the game interpretations of the subject of the judgment, interpreting the meaningless significance of the hermeneutic circle by the significance of the game content. A predicate is a pointer to the “other” of the subject of judgment, to the realization of its meaning.

There are no meaningless predicates, the predicate in general considered on these pages is the subject of our judgments about it, i.e. meaningless pointer to the implementation of the game in the circle of its meanings.

Thus, the subject and predicate of the judgment acquire their meaning only as a meaningful interpretation of the game connection. Without a pointer to meaningful interpretations of the game, the subject will not be able to point to a demonstration of meaningless significance in the circle of “these” meanings, and without a pointer to the demonstration of “this circle”, the predicate loses the meaning of a meaningful interpretation of “this” game, loses the meaning of game unity. Subject and predicate are different pointers to the same game connection. Therefore, the judgment can not necessarily be represented by two meanings of the subject and the predicate - “the apple is red”, but also by one word - “frosty”, indicating the cold and how cold it is. Moreover, one judgment can be considered the entire language game of any degree of complexity, if the predicate, already syntactic consideration, will indicate the significance of the demonstrated circle of the game as the meaning of the content of the syntax.

But in order for the subject and the predicate to point in the judgment precisely to “this” play connection, the judgment itself must point to its subject-predicate structure as an ongoing play interpretation. In the structure of the judgment there must be a third, reflective pointer, a pointer to the implementation of the interpretation of the game connection, a pointer to the demonstrativeness of the game significance carried out by the circle of the game, i.e. verb.

6.4 Verb: “to be” and “is”.

If the subject is a pointer to the implementation of “this game” (the game being demonstrated), then the judgment verb indicates the implementation of the very interpretation of the game connection by the subject-predicate structure of the judgment (to the demonstration itself). The verb indicates that the judgment is a reflective structure over its own interpretation of the play connection, over its own interpretation of the play significance - the proposition of “identical-other” (subject-predicate). It is the reflection on the play significance that speaks about the significance of the play connection (“and-or” \rightarrow “= - not”).

Both the subject and the verb point to meaningless significance, but the subject points to its demonstration in the circle of the game, and the verb to the very realization of this demonstration, therefore the verb is non-significant in the demonstration circle of the language game, i.e. the verb is non-significant in the subject-predicate structure: “speaking” cannot be “said”.

In Russian, the verb in the judgments “apple is red” is not indicated, unlike, for example, the English “apple is red”, although you can say - “the apple is red”, they will understand you, but they will understand you as a person who does not speak Russian well. Here the grammar, as it were, reflects the logical form of the judgment, the non-significance of the verb by subject-predicate interpretations.

There is only one verb in logic, only one reflective pointer to the demonstration of meaning-less significance in the circle of game meanings. But since the verb is a pointer to the demonstration of the judgments of “this” game, it is important what the subject of the judgment points to: if the subject points to the circle of the game being demonstrated, which means that the judgment is carried out in “this” game, then the verb of this judgment can be interpreted, in the next stage of syntax, presented for consideration by the game connection, it “is”. If the subject cannot point to the demonstrated circle of the language game, capable of interpreting the verb by its meaningful realization, then the verb becomes a simple pointer to its own implementation of pointing, demonstrating itself, demonstrating its ability (outsideness of implementation) “to be” a kind of content.

Note that “is” is always something as meaningful, “is” is always and “it is” or “I am”; “to be” can never be associated with a pointer to “this”: “this to be” is meaningless. “To be” is essentially a demonstration of the experience of one’s own existence outside of any connection other than this “to be”.

Actually, the verb is the verb of the judgment: either “to be”, outside the demonstrated game connection, or “is”, in the demonstrated interpretations of the language game. The verb can hardly be interpreted as a verb linking the subject and the predicate of the judgment: the verb also points to a playful demonstration in the connections of the subject-predicate structure, but does not link the meaning of the game, since neither the subject nor the predicate outside the implementation of the demonstration have no meaning, without a verb there is nothing bind.

The verbs of the “action” of the subject, more precisely, the actions of the “playing self”: “hit”, “thought”, “took”, are logically predicates of the judgment, interpreting in the syntactic game the very meaning of the game connection: “he was (is) striking”. The same applies to the tenses of the verb - they do not speak about the verb of judgment, but express the relationship of the language game and the game of its syntactic consideration (Chapter 4, §5). All these “verbs” do not point to the realization of the demonstration of the game connection in the judgments of the language game, but to the realization of either another game, or to the realization of other judgments of this game, forming another demonstration

circle.

There is another verb widely used in our discussion of judgment, the verb "to exist". This verb is a syntactic interpretation of the verb "to eat" as a predicate of a completed demonstration of the game.

Consider the judgments: "I am" and "I exist." If "is" is interpreted as a predicate, then the first proposition is no different from the second, but if "is" is considered as a verb of this proposition, then "I am" will have no playful interpretations, referring instead to a demonstration of its own implementation of a form of memory. Thus, "I am" will not refer to any language game: the subject "I" will point to the external realization of memory as its own other, to "is", and it, in turn, to "I" as its own. otherwise. That is, we get a familiar structure of mutually pointing to each other indexals, representing the reflexivity of memory. "I am" is tantamount to simply "being" beyond all interpretations ("I am" is inexpressible, and not what is meant here).

6.5 Reflection of the verb. Game circle.

An important interpretation of the verb is the idea of it as an action of the "playing self" through the meanings and in the meanings of the language game. The verb is thought of by the action of the "player", and thus the verb interprets the judgment of the game as a certain meaning of this game, demonstrating through it the proposition of "identical-other".

Consequently, the judgment also has its "identical" of the verb and its "other" of the verb, and not only the identical and the other of the meaningful significance of the game. Therefore, the trinary structure of the judgment is a reflection of the indexes of the game connection "and-or" over the indexes of the game significance "identical-other" (Chapter 3, §4). By virtue of this judgment, there can be forms $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$ and forms $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, depending on what the subject-predicate structure of the game connection points to: the identical verb or its other. If it were otherwise, then we would have no idea both about the forms of meaning, and about reflection in general.

But how does the judgment point to the verb, to its identical or different? - Only by demonstrating the implementation of one form or another. A judgment cannot signify a verb in a subject-predicate structure, the verb is non-significant in it as a demonstration of the very demonstrativeness of the game connection, it requires the following syntactic reflection for its comprehension - the identification of the hermeneutic circle of the game.

For our theory of the verb, this is tantamount to the assertion that the language

game in its implementation represents the verb of its judgments, demonstrating its meaningless and meaningless significance in the tautologies of the game circle. The externality of the verb is eliminated, forgotten, if it is demonstrated by the subject-predicate structure in such a way that the question, "What does the verb of this judgment indicate?", has as an answer another judgment of this language game, the meaning of which, in turn, is interpreted by the first judgment, closing the circle games in the form of tautologies - this is how the identification (oblivion of the outside) of the game significance with the significance of its demonstration occurs.

Let us turn to the well-known "chicken and egg" aporia. This language game is feasible only when the meaning of the chicken is that it lays eggs, and the meaning of the eggs is that chickens emerge from them. The external realization of the proposition "a hen lays eggs", expressed by the game question "where do chickens come from?", is interpreted by the proposition "hens come from eggs", and vice versa. A vicious circle (tautological) demonstrates the meaningless significance of the implementation of the game (the verb of its judgments) and thus determines the significance of the content of the circle as reliable - as carrying out this game in this demonstration.

Question: "Which came first, the chicken or the egg?" points to the lack of content of the demonstration of its implementation, forgotten in the content and the game, and for its consideration requires the termination of the chicken-egg game and the transition to the syntax of this game, where it only makes sense. But the syntactic game is a different game, with different meanings of "chicken" and "egg" representing the proposition of the meaning in a different game relationship.

As we will see below, the "chicken and egg" circle is the only index structure that identifies the meaningless significance of playing the game with the significance of its content, on which everything "true", everything reliable both in the world and in thoughts is based. But for this we must clarify our notion of a language game.

Chapter 7

Language game.

7.1 Game and meaning.

Play is the elimination (or oblivion) of the meaningless significance of existence from the content of our interpretations. The realization of the game and the realization of meaning are indistinguishable for us . The consideration of the language game becomes the consideration of the realization of meaning. Meaning becomes the subject of semantic consideration, which is an absurd thing for non-philosophical thinking.

Who can come up with the thought of its meaning at breakfast, and walking along the boulevard about the correctness of his steps - only a philosopher. By participating in hundreds of games: reading, running, talking, we do not ask questions about the meaning of all this, it is enough for us to do it. The game makes us forget about our exercised significance, so we do not see our games until their meaning leaves us. As soon as we stumble, we begin to look under our feet.

The game becomes meaningful for us when the meaning of what has so far filled our lives, made us forget about the meaning of our existence, is lost. Maybe because “game” becomes a philosophical and logical category in the 20th century, because this century is the century of the loss of the meaning of life? - No, we lost the meaning of life earlier, in the 20th century we tried to deceive ourselves that there was no loss.

Therefore, the game can be comprehended by us when its implementation is stopped , but the implementation of our memory continues in the “empty” attention to the completed game. Play thus becomes an interpretation of this meaningless significance of memory in cashed-out play connections.

From the last statement it follows that the game is not something given, like some kind of cognitive artifact, like a word, like an object. The game is a game

interpretation of the form of memory, i.e. its “significance” and “meaning” are determined by how it is played in the game of its syntax, which interprets the meaninglessness of “this game” in “these meanings”. The reality of the game itself is a game reality, the main thing for which is not some kind of metaphysical content - God, the Universe, the Law, but the very implementation of the game meaning.

Play is thus a form of interpretation of the fulfillment of meaning as the meaningless significance of existence. The meaning of the game is in the presentation of meaningless significance by the significance of the game content.

For the first time, as a philosophical category, the “language game” was introduced by L. Wittgenstein (“Philosophical Studies”). First, he uses this term to denote some primitive language, the meaning of which is to build a reflexive structure of actions on objects to speech (syntax cashing), when the meanings of words are interpreted by demonstrating our actions. In the future, this becomes the main method of Wittgenstein’s research, and the “language game” turns into a meta-physical category, conditioned by the world of facts, preexisting games. “Whoever is not sure of any fact, he cannot be sure of the meaning of these words” (“On the Reliable”, 114). Wittgenstein could not step over the “facts” of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, could not say that the “facts” were just a “play on words”. Therefore, Wittgenstein’s “language game” is a conditional agreement of metaphysical human beings: “In order to err, a person must already judge according to humanity” (“On the Certain”, 156).

But in order to judge, it is necessary to play the game of agreed judgments, otherwise humanity will not be in agreement with itself.

The game is a form, not a convention.

7.2 Game convention.

Any “fact” interpreted as “something you cannot disagree with if you don’t want to be in-sane” is such in its immutability only as a game convention - participation in a language game. The fact of the existence of the “outside world” together with appeals to “common sense” (J.E. Moore) only says that we are forced, referring to the meanings of our “facts”, to carry out their language games. Otherwise, we will remain outside their meaningfulness - insane and misunderstood. The “outside world” exists only insofar as the games of “common sense” are played out. But what makes us turn to them? - Their credibility, i.e. the feasibility in their game content of the representation of the form of reflection of memory: “meaningless” significance can be forgotten in the game, but it cannot

be avoided, as a “givenness of one’s own existence” (demonstration of meaninglessness) is the essence of any “necessity”.

The “necessity” to participate in the games of “common sense” is an interpretation of the emptiness of memory: “if you don’t want to be insane” - “if you don’t want to be empty”. We are talking to you about the “outer world”, therefore, if you want to talk about it meaningfully, then you must realize its meaning in its language games - otherwise we will not understand you, you will not understand yourself. This misunderstanding of oneself is the game convention and “objectivity” of the external world.

The game convention indicates that any meaning, any fact is a game realization, and that any significance of any fact is an interpretation of the “necessary”, “given”, “inevitable” - meaninglessly significant form of reflection of memory, the form of our existence.

The following happens: you deny the “outer world”, then you fall out of our games, we can always push you out of them, using your denial, and then you will not have any game sense in everything, you will be meaningless, empty. It is impossible to deny the significance of the meaningless, since there are no games that carry out this negation of themselves, the “contentless” is absolutely reliable, and if so, then in order to comprehend this authenticity, you are forced to return to our games, you simply do not have others, and thus acknowledge the outside world.

The trick is that from the emptiness of the form of memory, a conclusion is drawn about the need for its meaningful interpretation in these specific games. Indeed, the need for game interpretation takes place, but only as a form of interpretation, while the game content itself is by no means necessary. That is, in our reasoning about the reality of the “outer world”, an implicit assumption is made that the language game is an indisputable fact, and not a form of interpretation of reflection.

Well, let the language game not be a fact of metaphysics, but how do we know what games we are playing? How do we enter into gaming convention?

Here we need to stop and remember that when asking what game we are in, we are already, if we ask a question meaningfully, we are in the language game of its syntax (Chapter 3, 6), which implies your participation in the first. Therefore, we can interpret the meaning of the game in its syntax, but not “where it comes from”, we can interpret the connection of its content with the content of other games, but not what the form of memory “is” and the language game itself is the “forgettable” essence of our existence and, therefore, the essence of everything

meaningful.

Turning to the meaning, we reveal its form, which coincides with the form of the manifestation itself - this is what we call a game: that which requires its implementation in order to be understood. But how then to think of games? - Only through games that speak of their implementation, i.e. about their reliability. Here begins the interpretation of reflection in the syntax of games.

7.3 Credible games and syntax. Structure.

A game is something that requires its implementation in order to be understood, but in order for this to be possible, its implementation must be its understanding, but in a different game that interprets its external implementation. It is necessary that the game could be carried out within the framework of the game of its syntax and demonstrate the hermeneutic circle in its meanings.

The seeming complexity of the presented requirement disappears if we recall that it is also possible to play directly, without checking the actions of the game with its rules (with its syntax), and according to the rules, when, when the actions of the game are a consequence of the use of the rules. For example, when I just write without noticing the correctness of what is written, although I do not violate the spelling rules, and when, as a student, I constantly check the consistency of what is written with grammar; when I tell, “forgetting myself in the story”, and the speech flows by itself without the selection of the necessary expressions, and when I constantly wonder whether my words correctly express the thought I know. These are all examples of language games and their syntaxes.

I note that checking what is written, thinking over what is being said is no less absurd than checking the correctness of steps when walking. However, thinking about and checking the text does not seem so ridiculous to us. Why? - Because there is a game where checking the text has the meaning of interpreting “right and wrong”. Such an interpretation is possible if, in the language game of checking, we can realize the language game of what we are checking, i.e. demonstrate it as “true” or “false” in the presented values. If we find such a game for our steps, then checking them will no longer be ridiculous.

But how can one play into another? How can you implement chess in football? - You can’t play chess in football, you can play the game in its syntax, i.e. to include her interpretations of the form of memory in another reflective interpretation of the same form, when the demonstration of meaningless significance around the first and the game is interpreted as the realization of the very demonstration of syntax. Otherwise, when an outside implementation of the syntax is interpreted

by the circle of the game being demonstrated. An index pointing in the content of the syntax to the displayed circle, i.e. indicating a demonstration of meaningless significance, commonly referred to as "truth." The meaning of "truth" is in the feasibility (reliability) of a syntactic demonstration.

So the syntactic path is the path to "truth"?

Not the path to truth, and in general to anything, but the very realization of the meaning of "truth", "reliability" - a reflexive comprehension of language games in the forms of language games. Understanding the "reliable" in the syntactic game, we thereby interpret the reflection of the form of memory. "Truth" becomes a pointer to the game being interpreted, to its demonstrable implementation. "Truth" itself becomes a game value .

In comprehending language games, it is absolutely not necessary to go to a single truth, it is necessary to indicate in the implementation of the meaning of "truth" the demonstrated meaningless significance of memory - and nothing more.

- Then thousands of truths are possible? - you ask.

- No, only those that carry out language games of syntaxes.

The reality of "truth" lies in the feasibility (or certainty) of demonstrating the contentless significance in the circle of tautologies of the game meanings under consideration.

This is far from being relativistic. Relativism is the same metaphysical interpretation of the preexisting truth, like others - transcendence, axiomatic, objectivity, etc., only the meaning of "relationship" is put in their place. In the implementation of syntax, "truth" is absolute as a meaningless index to the demonstration of the proposition of meaning.

To clarify this, let us turn to one influential trend of thought of the 20th century - to psychoanalysis.

What is formally psychoanalysis? - A new syntax to the old game connections of "cultural and social reality" given in the phenomena of our life. The old text was reinterpreted in different syntactic representations . The "unconscious" became an interpretation of the meaningless significance of the form of memory, it was this index that made it possible to get out of the old tradition of interpreting a person and made it possible to build new syntactic games, re-interpret the meaningless, where the authentic was thought of by a certain semantic structure of the interpreted index - "unconscious". In Freud, the authentic was interpreted by sexual attraction, the sublimation of which explained human behavior (sublimation is essentially a synonym for interpretation); with Adler, a complex of childish and non-childish impressions; with Jung, the authentic was a more complex structure

of archetypes, based not on the history of human disease, but on the history of the "disease of mankind", on the complex relationship of cultural symbols, the language of which was mythology from primitive man to modern art.

In the faces of Freud, Adler, Jung we have three different syntaxes for the same thing. Which of them is right? - you ask - especially since each of them had a successful medical practice based on their ideas.

But what does it mean to be right "one of the three"? - Only that there should be a language game where this "rightness" would make sense. But in our case there is no such game. Therefore, it is pointless to ask about their correctness. Each of them performs its own syntactic play, its authenticity, its own truth, and the very possibility of its implementation indicates the absoluteness of their correctness. (Beware of confusing the latter with pragmatism. Pragmatism does not reflect on itself: its "best" is no better than "truth".)

Otherwise, instead of asking "Which of them is right?" ask: "Which of them plays more skillfully?", And in response, say - they have a different gaming reality.

The only criterion for their "rightness" will be the feasibility of their games. And if one of them is not able to carry out his game on the general cashing out of culture, then he will simply carry nonsense. But if he still finds a way, by complicating his structure of interpretations, to play on all cashed game connections, then he will again be "right".

The case of Freud, Adler and Jung is quite simple, since they have a common cultural tradition of understanding, i.e. they can read the same text and understand each other, but this, on the other hand, creates the illusion of the existence of a common language game where they could talk about their rightness (including pragmatism). True, over time such a language game can be created as a general syntax for their three syntactic games, but this does not mean that this general syntax is somehow better than the previous ones.

In my opinion, Jung is in a more advantageous position, since he is based on the semantic structures of our mythology and has the largest field (topos) of interpretable game connections - his structure of authentic coincides with the structure of culture that has been exposed.

What the construction of syntaxes leads to syntaxes - this will be the subject of the entire third part of the book. But here it makes sense to note that when the considered interpretations of the form of memory coincide with the interpretations of the syntactic consideration, i.e. syntax in its implementation represents the same semantic structure, which it interprets as "reliable-true", then the structure of the authentic will reveal the logical forms of our thinking. That is, syntactic

interpretations lead to the demonstration of their logical forms, indicating their own game implementation. But this does not say at all that logic “objectively exists”, since its meaning is interpreted in terms of game convention, excluding the “objectivity” of preexistence. Logic can be expressed in mythological structures: Proteus - the reflexivity of memory, etc. , but it is unlikely that myth, like the world, is objective.

But isn't the "structure" widely used in the present study such an objective attribute? - If yes, then only as a form of cashed out syntactic relations , but not as something represented at all. "Structure" can be interpreted as a pointer to the demonstration of the hermeneutic circle as a single meaning (synchronism), whose meaning is represented (syntax) by the demonstrated semantic connections (diachronism).

The phenomenon of philosophical structuralism of the 20-th century was a sign of the secondary nature of Western culture of this period (its demonstrability), when the syntactic constructions of the Western tradition, once again burying themselves in their own metaphysical foundation of the meaningless, were forced to show their syntactic relations in the “production of meaning” (R. Barth), expressing them in the concept of “structure”.

7.4 Language game and judgment.

The syntactic interpretation of a language game is tantamount to interpreting its judgments as true or false.

The subject of the judgment of the syntactic game, pointing to the demonstration of the hermeneutic circle of the game in question, also points to the circle of syntax itself, to the self-reflexive realization of the demonstration. The outlined hermeneutical circle through the index of “truth” acquires its play value in the implementation of the demonstration of syntax, as a result of which the implementation of the syntax is interpreted by the reliable judgments under consideration. That is, the judgments of syntax perform a playful interpretation of their external implementation as the meaningless significance of the demonstrated hermeneutic circle.

In other words, when the non-significant verb of syntactic judgments is demonstrated by the hermeneutical circle of the game in question, then "truth" will receive its meaningful interpretation of some realized meaning.

If in an ordinary language game the verb of its judgments is not interpreted in a subject-predicate structure, then in a syntactic game its verb is interpreted, but as a demonstration of the hermeneutic circle of another game.

Thus, the interpretation of a language game as reliable (true) is a propositional demonstration of its form, a language game becomes the form of its authentic , which is affirmed in the meanings of the demonstrated circle. Then the structure of semantic relations in which the hermeneutical circle is demonstrated will be considered a language game.

Note that when we talk about a language game and its syntax, we are forced to talk about a “represented” game and a “considering” syntax. Isn’t this a proposition of ”subject” and ”object”?

No way. What does the presented game mean? - That we remember her in the implementation of this syntax, i.e. that we are to it in the reflection of syntactic relations. And since we separate the language game and the game of its syntax (I note that this is a game separation), their syntactic relations are relations of the past (I do not say time), chapter 4, §5. The subject and object in our case are not the metaphysical structure of the world, but interpretations syntactic relations expressing the externality of the implementation of the language game to its content.

7.5 The player and the game.

What is a game player? - Interpretation of its reliable.

The meaning of this can be explained by the example of a “physical observer”.

Let us ask: what is a physical observer? - There is only one answer: something that can perceive (recognize) “physical objects” and interpret them in some game, i.e. the physical observer is some perceiving unity. But the “perceiving” is only the interpretation of our play as realized, there-fore, the “physical observer” is the certainty of our play, the interpretation of meaningless significance as its unity. Let us ask, what is the meaning of the “unity” of a physical observer? - And we will not get anything but an empty index to the “single” (empty) of the physical system: the observer’s unity is that it points to the unity of the physical object, and the unity of the physical object in the unity of the observer. We are not able to describe in physical attributes the meaning of “single” or “empty”, we are unable to construct from these attributes a syntax for the logical meaning “empty” and, therefore, are forced to realize the meaning of “single” in demonstrating the meaningless significance of the circle of our game. In the latter, the essence of oblivion of the externality of our memory as an empty index is the essence of playful oblivion .

- You can ask me again: what have we forgotten here?

And we have forgotten what makes an observer an observer. We take this as a “for granted” (forgotten) metaphysical property of the observer, but such an answer is a departure from the answer in the way just described. If we are talking about the observer, then we must indicate its meaning, but its meaning is in the implementation of the observation, which is determined through the unity of the observer. The observer is defined through observation, and observation through the observer is the demonstration of the empty in the circle of our game. Our player is just a pointer to the circle of “observation” and “observer”. Strictly speaking, in the usual sense, we do not know what an “observation” is, nor what an “observer” is, but only carry out our game interpretation with these pointers, closed in a hermeneutical circle .

The reliability of the physical observer in the interpretation of this circle is an inevitable and meaningless given to us of our existence. Its reliability is the impossibility of doubting it, the impossibility of constructing a syntactic game in the existing game connections, where these doubts would make sense.

If we find a game of such syntax, this does not mean that the “physical observer” will cease to be reliable, i.e. to interpret the proposition of meaning in their game connections, this means that we have found a new approach that excludes the dichotomy of subject and object (I and not-I) in the description of the “physical system”. This means that we have found a way of logical reflection on the epistemological tradition of the West (outside of it), but such reflection is hardly possible in the old paraphernalia of metaphysical formalism - the formalism of the sign, and not the formalism of understanding. At best, “our formalism” will allow one more observer to be added to our “physical observer”, as happened with Bohr’s principle of complementarity, as happened with Russell’s logical types.

The failures of the above attempts to “mean the unmeaning” indicate that the forgettable of the game is the basis of its certainty : by revealing the first (logical types), you lose the second (the axiom of the reduction of all types to the first) - the significance of the player.

Chapter 8

Reliable.

8.1 The meaning of truth.

Arguing about the truth of something, we are not talking about the considered meanings of the language game, but we are trying to implement a different game, syntactic to the first one (Chapter 7, 3), §interpreting the “truth of values” with the game sense of “these same values”. The “truth” of a meaning and its “meaning” are thus found in the syntactic relations of the past (Chapter 4, §5), expressed by the “representability” of the language game in question.

Usually they do not distinguish between the “meaning of the meaning” and the “truth of the meaning” as meaningful moments of the syntactic game. They are either identified with each other, or they are separated as two different classes of statements (G. Frege), which is one and the same - “class” - a game unity of difference. But in any case, both there and here, in the course of understanding the truth, we will be forced to reveal the syntactic nature of “truth” in the form of a question about it, without which no reasoning about any truth is possible.

It is with the question (chapter 3, §6) that syntactic consideration begins, outside of which “truth” is meaningless, and in which it realizes its meaning. What is the meaning of truth?

The interpretation of “truth” is carried out in syntax, moreover, by interpretive meanings of another language game considered by the syntax. Truth will therefore, on the one hand, be a pointer to the feasibility in the presented meanings of the game in question, i.e. on its certainty, and, on the other hand, the meaning of truth will be the realization of the game of syntax, in which the certainty of the first game is demonstrated. Truth will thus be a meaningless index linking the game of language and the game of its syntax into a single interpretation of the meaningless significance demonstrated by the content of the game in question.

This is precisely the meaning of truth - in the meaningful and interpretation of the meaningless, when the content of the game demonstrates the meaninglessness of the implementation of its syntactic consideration.

8.2 Reliable.

We saw in the previous paragraph that truth interprets the certainty of one game as the certainty of another. The empty meaningful realization of the demonstration itself is interpreted by the demonstrated content, which we are trying to comprehend as true. The interpretation of the “truth” of meanings will be considered complete if we eliminate the difference between these two valid values from the syntax (“let’s forget about it” - the meaning of play oblivion), remove the play difference between the emptiness of the demonstrated circle of the game and the empty significance of the very implementation of the demonstration.

That is, the syntax will be realized when it is eliminated (forgotten) behind meaningful interpretations the vacuity of the indexal “truth”. The certain is thus the realization of forgetting one’s own meaningless significance.

What is the forgettable of the syntactical game expressed in?

In an attempt to restore this difference, or, rather, in the semantic structure that fails to materialize these attempts.

Let’s ask the question again: what is the meaning of truth in this syntax? - In a meaningful interpretation of a meaningless index on one’s own exercise. But the latter is not signified in the content of the game itself, how then can such an interpretation come about? - Only through a game demonstration of the emptiness of the index “truth” by the hermeneutic circle of the game in question.

In other words, when we try in syntax to interpret a meaningfully interpreted “truth” as the truth of “these meanings,” we will inevitably outline an empty hermeneutic circle in the meanings of the game. Indeed: “these meanings are true because they have such and such demonstrated meaningful interpretations, while the meaning of the demonstrated content lies in its truth,” the hermeneutic circle is formed by the closure of two meaningless indexes “truth”.

8.3 Judgment and certain. The law of identity.

Let us turn to the judgments of syntactic games of “truth of meanings”.

The judgment is a trinary index structure (Chapter 6), reflecting through the index of the verb over the meaningful connections of the game, the subject of which points to the unity of the language game, to its circle, and the predicate -

to the meaningful interpretation of this unity in the game. But since the syntactic game considers the certainty of another game, the subject of syntactic judgments points not only to the unity of syntax, to its circle and the game, but also through the predicate to the demonstrated range of meanings under consideration, to the certainty of the present-ed game, without which a meaningful interpretation of “truth” is not possible. . How is this possible?

The only thing is if we interpret the implementation of syntactic judgments (verb) as a demonstration of the implementation of the game in question, i.e. the play connections of the judgments under consideration should express in their structure the proposition of play significance - the proposition of “identical and its other”. Therefore, it remains for syntactic judgments in their reflection to interpret the presented game connections as a demonstration of the proposition of meaning, i.e. to carry out in the presented senses a demonstration of meaningless significance - the circle of the game. For this it is necessary: 1) that the judgments of syntax also in their connections represent the proposition of meaning; 2) that the syntactic demonstration should interpret the propositionality of the semantic structure presented for consideration.

If the first condition is satisfied in any case, as long as the syntax turns out to be a language game, i.e. had a semantic unity, then the second condition requires some mechanism for implementing the “confirmation” of propositionality. Where can we get it and why should we trust it?

Let us recall the structure of the judgment as a reflection of the proposition of the game connection (“and-or”) over the proposition of the game significance (“identical-other”) - this reflection of two propositions will be the desired “confirmation mechanism”. The very form of propositions provides us with such a mechanism, and we can only trust it to the extent that our syntactic interpretations are feasible.

The propositions of syntax must therefore interpret by meaningful connections (subject-predicate structure) the verb’s own reflexive indexal, demonstrating its contentless significance (non-significance of the verb in the proposition) by the hermeneutic circle. And if within the framework of the syntactic language game such a hermeneutic whirl can be carried out, then the presented judgments are said to be “true”, the reliability of which is the reliability of the demonstrated hermeneutic circle.

The last question remains: why should the empty significance of the demonstration of the hermeneutic circle be related to the significance of the content that forms it?

The fact is that the very demonstration of the hermeneutic circle is carried out within the framework of a language game and, therefore, is the elimination (oblivion) of its empty implementation in its content, identifying the verb of syntax and the verb of the considered judgments in the form of tautologies ($A=A$) as equally empty. This is the meaning of the law of identity - in the interpretation by the syntax of its own implementation as the implementation of the meanings it considers (the action of pointing to the sign A as the significance of the sign A itself, which is simply the disclosure of the meaning of “the identity of the sign to itself”), what we previously called demonstration.

8.4 Approval authentic.

The interpretation of the demonstration of the hermeneutic circle by the “truth” of game meanings is reduced, as we showed above, to the interpretation of the verb of the judgments under consideration by the verb of their syntax, the reflective structure of which allows us to identify the first with the second. We will call such a verbal interpretation of judgments a form of assertion of certainty, demonstrating the vacuity of the non-significant verb in the circle of subject-predicate interpretations. To affirm means to point out the empty content of the verb as the presentation of the hermeneutic circle of the game. Actually, the verbal interpretation and the demonstration of the game circle are one and the same.

The verb of the judgments under consideration becomes the subject of the question of their truth. This is expressed in the fact that we do not simply point to the play meaning, but try to interpret it as a play connection, as something that implements its meaning. The verb thus becomes itself a meaning of syntax, requiring its own interpretation. What form can be the meaning of the verb in the syntax? - Of course, only the forms of the syntactic language game are the forms $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, there is no other form of syntax. But syntactic interpretations must demonstrate in their content the proposition of meaning, i.e. to identify how the game significance is interpreted in the game under consideration - identical to the game connection (“and”) or its other (“or”), so we will talk about the interpretation of the verb as the forms of the authentic $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$ or $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, respectively, as well as about the meanings of the games in question, despite the fact that in the syntax itself the meanings can only be of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$.

On the other hand, the verb of syntactic judgments before the demonstration of the circle of the game can be interpreted by the indefinite verb “to be”, since the subject-verb of the truth question, which is indistinguishable from it, does not yet indicate the circle of the game. The task of the valid statement form is to interpret

this verb as the verb “is”, i.e. to demonstrate its meaningless significance in the circle of the game. This will be possible if the significance of the interpreted verb, together with the significance of its interpretations of syntax, fully represents the proposition of the meaning, that is, if the verb was the meaning of the form $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$, then its syntactic interpretations, which together form a hermeneutic circle, must interpret the significance of the form with their content $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ and vice versa. In what follows, we will call these value forms that form the circle of the game heteronomous forms (Chapter 12).

A more detailed study of the structures of the assertion of certainty will be carried out in the next, ninth and tenth chapters. Here we note that in traditional reasoning about the truth, the hermeneutic circle, as a rule, is not explicitly revealed, the proof of truth is reduced to one or another open (narrative) pattern, the meaning of which is precisely in the possibility of revealing the hermeneutic circle. The latter becomes explicit in the philosophical question of truth itself.

Questioning about the truth is quite legitimately accepted by everyone, but when, as a result of possessive interpretations, “truth” rests on a certain meaningless circle, the answer received is also rejected by everyone. At best, they talk about the incomprehensibility of truth, not noticing that they have already stepped over the essence of truth as meaningless significance and through truth itself as the realization of the hermeneutic circle.

One can again ask the question: but this circle exists, so it represents something ?

But what does this “presentation” express? - Elimination of the meaningless significance of the form of memory in the content of its interpretation, i.e. elimination of the very significance of our questions. And this suggests that the subject of our questioning is not an “object” and no “is”, rather it is “to be”, whose essence is in the aloofness behind the “is”.

What then are we?

Escaping in the implementation of their own game masks.

Therefore, when we ask the question “what are we?”, we do not need to look for a source of absolute certainty of our existence, “the beginning of all beginnings”, but directly refer to what “is” in our games. Of course, such an appeal to the game does not allow one to forget in “Absolute”, but on the other hand, it reveals the very meaning of life, reducing the absolute to meaningless and indexal in the labyrinth of game structures.

8.5 The path of truth. Life form.

Reflective consideration can be built to any syntax that interprets "truth": what is the meaning of "the truth of these true values?". With this question, we move on to a new meaningful interpretation of "truth", in meanings that interpret "truth" itself. A series of interpretations of the meaningless index "truth" is formed - how far can it continue?

As soon as the interpretations of the syntax coincide with the interpreted content of the "true" meanings, the series of syntaxes closes in the demonstration of the logical forms of our thinking. The hermeneutic circle of the game of "syntactic sequence" will demonstrate its own implementation of the demonstration. Logical judgments will point to one's own implementation of the demonstration.

Any way of syntactic constructions ends with the same revealedness of the logical form. Is it possible to conclude from this that behind any games on the path of syntactic reflection there is one and the same logical form, one and the same demonstration of the structure of understanding?

No. Behind all games there really is one form, one and the same meaningless significance of our existence, but not the same interpretative structure of the meaningless. All logical forms form a hermeneutic circle, but for each of them it is described in different meaningful interpretations. The logical form in its meaningful demonstration will be the only one for each group of language games that build one tradition of syntactic sequences, a tradition that we call a form of life or a form of thought.

For the language games of our culture, such a path will be through the desacralization of the idols of the "meaning of life", the idols of the "sign", leading with logical necessity to the depreciation of the basic values of our form of life, revealing their meaningless significance.

It is possible to make a more radical assertion that any form of life, any structure of understanding realized in language games, with logical necessity, must come to an empty meaninglessness of meaningful interpretations of existence, its value (game) idols of "truth". Everything - God, Law, meaning - everything becomes empty indexes for its own implementation in the demonstrated game connections, everything that used to be significant in meaningful interpretations becomes meaninglessly demonstrated in the cashed out representation of the experience of culture. Language games cease to fulfill the playful meaning of the masks of their "playing selves", an empty space opens up behind them; games, like life, become meaningless, and this meaninglessness is logically unavoidable.

But what's next? - In place of the old form, a new form must come, or the life

of the reflective consciousness (man) must disappear into meaningless meaninglessness. The question of life or death becomes more tragic also because nothing can be said about the new form of life before its realization, since its realization will be its understanding.

Chapter 9

Validation of the valid form $\delta\alpha\xi\alpha$.

9.1 Verb as an identical game connection.

We will consider the doxic language game. What does it mean that we are considering the play of this form? - From the very implementation of the issue of syntax about the truth of values, demonstrating the considered significance of the identical game connection. The meaning of such interpretations was explored in Chapter 4. What is important for us is that such an interpretation presupposes knowledge of the meaning of the meanings in question, i.e. their mere presence, the fact of representation, is already the realization of their meaning.

The above words, as already noted (chapters 3 and 4), are a formal interpretation of the concept of “will”. “I want it that way”, “let it be so” - the very nature of these statements does not allow their meaning to differ from their representation by us, from their very expression of will (statement). If this is not so, then I want something that I have no idea about, which, of course, is absurd.

The verb of the considered meanings is a demonstration of their meaning, which allows the syntax to carry out the assertion of the authentic, interpreting the verb of the consideration itself considered by the verb.

But if we know the meaning of the presented values, why should we go further and investigate their truth?

Then, that the “truth” of the presented judgments of the form $\delta\alpha\xi\alpha$ is not the meaning of their language game. Asking about truth, we enter into another language game, reflecting on the first, including it in itself, but not being it. The meaning of “truth” requires a syntactic interpretation of the proposition of meaning.

The question of the “truth” of the doxic game therefore does not come down to doubting what I want in my will, but to the implementation of a verbal interpre-

tation of the assertion of certainty, leading to the demonstration of a hermeneutic circle.

9.2 Interpretation of the verb in a different game connection.

In order to reveal the hermeneutic circle of the doxic game, it is necessary to interpret its verb as the verb of the syntactic consideration itself (Chapter 8, §4), which speaks of the volition of judgments as their presence in the syntactic demonstration. In other words, we must interpret the meaning of the presented doxic meanings by the significance of interpretations of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, closing the interpretation in the form of tautologies.

That is, the verb of doxic judgments (“and”) is interpreted in a different game connection (“or”), revealing the desired hermeneutic circle (“and-or”).

All this will be more evident in the language of our “will”.

Let’s start the doxic game with the judgment - ”I want to raise my right hand.” The question of syntax about the feasibility (truth) of this desire ($\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$) points to really (significance of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$) “raised right hand”. Thus, the truth (feasibility) of the desire to “raise the right hand” will be the given fact of the raised hand, the meaning of which is different from the desire to raise the right hand, namely: in the ability to see, feel, know which hand is right and which is not. All these abilities and conventions are interpretations of desire ($\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$) meanings of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$.

Again we ask: “Is it true that I want to raise my right hand?”

I want to raise my right hand - and I raise it; I want to raise my right hand - and I can not lift it - in the first case, the desire came true, in the second - no. In the first case, I demonstrate the meaning of desire, in the second I do not demonstrate it. What does this follow from?

From the realization or non-realization of the following tautologies. “I want to raise my hand” - and “raise it”, because I can always raise my hand and know that I did it”, which means “I can desire and fulfill the desire to raise my hand”, therefore, if “I I want to raise my hand, then “I will raise it”... and so on. We, in the interpretation of the “truth” of desire, outline the circle of our game, when the desire makes sense insofar as it is feasible (wish a round square - and you will not succeed), but it is feasible insofar as it is desirable: if something happened without my desire, then this something can hardly be considered its implementation.

9.3 Circle of play.

As we can see, the verbal interpretation of the meanings presented in a different way in the game connection of syntax cannot be any, but only forming the structure of the hermeneutic circle of the game, revealed by us in the fact that “a desire makes sense if it is feasible, and it is feasible exactly as much as desired”. Let’s test it by wishing the impossible.

What is the meaning of this desire? - In the fact that it is never carried out, i.e. it points to its own impossibility of realization, which excludes the demonstration of desire in syntax, therefore, such a language game of “desire for the impossible” does not exist. Desire for the impossible is meaningless, since we cannot demonstrate the circle of this game in meaningful interpretations - it does not exist.

It can be objected that “wishing for the impossible” appears here and there in literary texts as a completely meaningful expression. - Yes, it is, the very “wishing for the impossible” may make sense, at least as an example on these pages. But we are not talking about the meaning of “desire the impossible” in general, but about the meaning of its truth, which, you see, is not the same thing. The truth of this statement lies in its feasibility in the language game of the form $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$, which represents the form of memory reflection, and, therefore, requires a syntactic demonstration.

Identification of the hermeneutic circle of the game of the form $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$ can be carried out in the language not only of desire and will, but also in the meanings of other doxic games, for example, in the language of time relations. In the semantic structure of syntactic interpretations, nothing will change, just the circle will be formed by other meaningful judgments: “time makes sense as the unity of the ongoing connection, any implementation of the connection makes sense as its unity - time”. In other words, in order to find out what time it is, we must look at the clock face, and in order for the connection of the hands and the dial to make sense, it must be carried out in semantic unity - in time (the work of the watch mechanism is “truth”).

In any case, the interpretation of the language game of the form $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$ will be carried out if the verb-subject of the question of truth (identical game connection - “and”) is interpreted by the verb of syntax judgments (other game connection - “or”) in demonstrating a hermeneutic circle.

9.4 Lack of content - the assertion of the authentic.

The meaning of “truth” is in the interpretation of the meaninglessly meaningful implementation of the hermeneutic circle by the significance of the game content that forms this circle. How is this interpretation of contentless content carried out?

Let us choose as interpretive meanings “time” with its hermeneutical circle of play: “the meaning of time is in the implementation of the connection of meanings, the meaning of the connection is in its unity of implementation - time”.

We must understand the meaning of the meaningful interpretation of “time” as the meaning of pointing to one’s own implementation of the interpretation.

Consider the interpretation of the meaningless using the clock as an example.

How do we know that the clock shows the time (not the correct time, but just the time)? - From the interpretations of the temporary exercise by the work of the clockwork. - And why did we get the idea that the work of the clock mechanism can tell about time? - From the interpretation of any action (connection) by the unity of implementation - by time. What does our “time” point to? (Or - what realizes the meaning of our “time”?) - Time points to the implementation of our closed interpretations, to the implementation of our own interpretation in our hermeneutic circle of the game. The authenticity of the clock showing “time” is interpreted by the demonstration of the emptiness of the circle: every action takes place in time, every temporal realization is expressed in action. To the question: what is time? - we respond by demonstrating this round of the game in one way or another. The impossibility of a meaningful way out of this circle, i.e. the impossibility of presenting an empty significance without a sign that signifies it, makes us “believe” the clock, being the necessity of the game content.

What is our “impossibility”? - The same “inconsistency”.

In fact, it is unlikely that anyone will say that he believes the clock, referring to the hermeneutic circle, rather, he will immediately point to some meaningful interpretation, implying a circle, but clearly not demonstrating it, forgetting about meaningless significance.

What allows such oblivion to take place?

A pre-interpreted meaningless index, implying our interpretation of the meaningless. This index is “I”. “I” as the subject of the implementation of our language games, as a pointer to their external implementation. I do not need to fully reveal the emptiness of the hermeneutic circle of the game, because there is already an interpretation that the game is played by its player, that the “I” comprehends time, and therefore demonstrates in this “I” the empty significance of the form

of memory. All the contents of our games and our "I" form their own hermeneutical circle, where "I" is both the meaning of the circle and the pointer to the implementation of its demonstration (the indistinguishably) of the verb of the meanings under consideration and the verb of syntax).

By pointing to such an "I", the oblivion of the emptiness of existence in the content of games is carried out.

In other words, I believe that the clock tells me the time because the content of my games affirms the unity (quantitative interpretation of the contentless) of their player, my "I", my games say that "I" is realized in the interpretations of my life as a subject its implementation, as the unity of its "I", capable of its "will" to show the "single" as understood. That is, to indicate in the game the operating mechanism of the clock as the realization of my "I" in this indication, interpreting the unity of "I" with the understood meaning of "time".

A meaningful interpretation of the living and willing "I" allows us to forget, to obscure the meaningless significance of our existence, our form of memory, and thus to carry out our games. The illusion of my "I" as a subject of existence allows memory to come true as "willing", "desire", "time", etc., forming a game reality.

But what is the meaning of this "illusion" and this "game reality"?

In the fact that meaning is realized only in the hermeneutic circle of games, outside of which significance is meaningless. "Illusory" points to the reflexivity of interpretations and greyish reality, to their meaningless significance of implementation. But we must not forget that the very meaning of the relationship between "illusory" and "real" also takes place in the language game, therefore, casting doubt on the reality of the world, we also doubt its illusory nature . Where is the meaning of these correlations? - In meaningful interpretations, called human culture, the human "I".

On the other hand, understanding the "I" as "will" is necessary in doxic language games, but this does not at all imply the inevitability of life itself as the life of a willing person. "Game reality" questions the "subject of existence" itself, interpreting "I" as a logical attribute through which life interprets itself in the content of its games. The human personality is just a playful means of understanding life and the realization of life itself in this understanding - and here we are waiting for the closedness of the hermeneutic circle.

9.5 Deduction.

The most famous language game of the form $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$ is the language game of deductive inference. However, it can be easily confused with the play of its syntax - syllogistic, which is not about the meaning (truth) of a deductive conclusion, but about the meaning of the truth of this meaning. Our consideration will be the syntax for the deductive conclusion itself, for the play of the form $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$, the syntax of syllogistic is already built on the given “truth” of deduction, on judgments of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, interpreting them in its own rules.

Why do we consider deductive inference to be a language game of the form $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$?

Deduction begins with judgments of premises; it is the premises that are interpreted in deductive inference. The very premise of the deduction is groundless: “let everyone...”. What does it mean? - That the meaning of the premise is known to us before any conclusion, the meaning of the premise is true, i.e. we can realize its meaning by assuming its content - “let” - its truth becomes the fact of its manifestation by us. The premise of the deduction, therefore, is our will, the demonstration by the verb of an identical game connection, and its judgments are judgments of the form $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$.

But deduction makes sense only in its conclusion, which interprets the meaning of the premises - the word “inference” speaks of this. The conclusion interprets the verb of premises (manifestation of meaning) by the verb (realization) of the interpretation itself. The meaning of the premises ($\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$) must be interpreted by the givenness or necessity of the demonstrable conclusion ($\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$).

Consider the above reasoning on a specific example.

“All men are mortal” ($\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$), hence ($\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$), “Socrates is mortal.” The first is sup-posed, the second is an interpretation of the first. Why is Socrates mortal? - Because he is a person (we know this ($\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$), i.e. we interpret the message in a different game connection), and all people are mortal (demonstration of belief) - the circle is closed. The positing verb is interpreted in the game circle by the verb of the most syntactic demonstration of the game circle, the sending verb is interpreted (demonstrated) by the output verb.

The meaning of the evidence of Socrates’ mortality, like any proof, is in demonstrating the meaning being proved as the meaning of the realization of the proof itself, whose meaningless significance is interpreted by the necessity of a proven conclusion, which implies a tautological closure of meaningful interpretations in a hermeneutical circle.

So, the will of the premises is interpreted by the demonstration of the conclu-

sion, and the meaning of the demonstrativeness of the conclusion - by the will of the premises - this is the hermeneutic circle of the deductive conclusion. Needless to say, this semantic structure is exactly the same as the hermeneutic circles presented above, formed by the meanings of “will” and “time”.

It is noted that the deductive conclusion is a disguised tautology ($A=A$). Now it is clear that the meaning of tautologies is not in a banal pointing to the same thing, but in demonstrating the closed nature of the hermeneutic circle, when the verb of premises (A) is interpreted by the verb of conclusion (A) in one circle of the game ($A=A$). (A is a pointer to the emptiness of both verbs.)

One misunderstanding or one imaginary paradox is connected with the misunderstanding of the meaning of the law of identity. It is connected with the following bewilderment: how could it happen that the barren tautology of deduction became the cornerstone of our culture? How does mathematics still get “new results” from the rather banal axiomatics of number theory? After all, there is nothing new in tautologies.

Where is the new in tautologies? - From their outside exercise of the demonstration of the hermeneutic circle. The closure of tautologies is open, i.e. outside (reflexive) to itself.

Deduction appears before us in the form of explicit tautologies, in the form of an explicit circle of understanding only in its syntactic consideration, while the game of deduction itself is carried out by eliminating meaningless significance from the content.

When we ask “where do new conclusions come from in deduction?”, our question is directed to the source of the meaning of the deductive game, to its forgettable form of implementation, our question about the “new” rests on play oblivion as a logical form of existence, which always remains meaningless for any syntactical games. And as long as we keep talking about the “new” in game interpretations, and nothing else is given, the “new” in games will come from “nowhere”, from the game oblivion of the form of memory. The metaphysical interpretation of this is the well-known mythology about the creation of the world out of nothing.

Chapter 10

Validation of the valid form

επιστημη.

10.1 Verb as another game connection.

Turning to the games of the form *επιστημη*, we by the very appeal to the “truth” of their judgments interpret the game significance of a different game connection, which requires for the implementation of understanding “other” from the one presented for consideration. The meanings of the game in question are pointers to the possibility (another game connection) of realizing one’s understanding, the interpretation of the meaningless significance of which leads us to the epistemic space-receptacle of all the realizations of language games (Chapter 4). Our task is to interpret the presented structure of meaningless indexes (signs) by the “truth” of their meaning, which says that we have understood the meaning of the structure under consideration; otherwise, we must interpret the meaningless givenness of signs (*επιστημη*) as a pointer to our understanding (*δοξα*) of their meaning, - the verb “presence” (“it” - *επιστημη*) the verb of demonstration of understanding (“I” - *δοξα*). - What does it mean to demonstrate meaning as understood? - To assume (*δοξα*) it is understood in the sense expressed by us, since nothing can force me, except my “will”, to admit that “I” understood “it”.

Imagine that in front of you is an unknown word in an unfamiliar language. You want to know its meaning, for this you take a dictionary, thereby assuming the existence of the desired meaning in the space-receptacle, find the desired rubric and read the desired interpretation, having carried out the interpretation of the translation.

What have we done from a formal point of view?

We interpret the presented judgments in a different game connection (*επιστημη*),

which makes us look for the meaning of an unknown word in a different from it - in a dictionary, but not in any other, but in that which carries out the meaning of the unknown, which carries out our game of understanding. What is its essence? - In the fact that the dictionary gives a translation of an unknown word. How do we know the translation is correct? - We believe in it, i.e. we assume ($\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$) the accuracy of the translation of the dictionary, we do not need anything other than the dictionary to know the meaning of its words. And this is nothing else than the will of the truth of the dictionary, i.e. judgment of the form $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$. As a result, our understanding of the unknown word is the interpretation of the verb-other game connection (“or”) by the verb-identical game connection (“and”) (significance $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ is interpreted by the significance $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$) in demonstrating the hermeneutic circle (“and-or”) (chapter 8, §4).

Let’s see how this happens.

10.2 The interpretation of the verb is identical to the game connection.

We want to interpret the verb of the presented judgments as identical and thunderous connections, i.e. the meaning of the act of interpretation itself must be identical with its demonstration in the game of syntax. The meaning of the demonstration, therefore, should lie in the volition of what we understand, in the judgment of the form $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$, which closes the hermeneutic circle of the game.

What does it mean that we understood an unfamiliar word?

”How do you know this hand is right?”

“What makes you think your name is Ludwig Wittgenstein?”

From nothing, we simply assume it, but our volition in the game $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ cannot be arbitrary, it must demonstrate an understanding of the “unknown” in the propositional closure of the hermeneutic circle: “I know that this hand is right, because that it is precisely this understanding of the “right hand” that makes the demonstration of my circle of play possible, otherwise, neither you nor I will understand myself”, the same applies to the name of the philosopher. The volition of the understood meaning is interpreted by the possibility of implementing game interpretations - this closes the circle of the game of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$. In full form, the hermeneutic circle of the game $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ looks like this: “the meaning of the feasibility of understanding lies in the volition of the understood, and the meaning of the volition of the understood lies in the feasibility of understanding.”

10.3 Circle of games $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ and $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$.

The meaning of “understanding”, the meaning of the existing possibility to find the “true”, leads , as is known (Chapter 4), to the interpretation of the space-container of all interpretations of language games. When we are looking for something, we are looking in “something” and “some-where”. Games $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ interpret space as a meaningful demonstration of the form of reflection of memory, interpreting the closure of the circle by the closure of space - the “volume” of the displayed content.

Starting the game $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, we begin with the pre-givenness of the space-receptacle of all that exists, usually called “God”, “Universum”, “World”, the meaning of which is the meaning of the implementation of games of “understanding” as a given to us of our existence. The possibility of “understanding” must be realized in the necessity of volition of the understood meaning.

It is easy to see that the structures of the circle of games of the form $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$ and the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ coincide and are variants of one thing: “the meaning of realization is in the realized, and the realized in the realization”. The difference in the beginning of the demonstration of the circle: for the game of the form $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$, the circle begins with the realized as an identical game significance - “the meaning of desire is in its feasibility ...”, and for the game of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ with the implementation as an action of interpreting (other meaning) - “the meaning of understanding in the understood...”. The choice of two demonstrations of the circle is determined by the question of “truth”.

Language games of two forms are different demonstrations of the same hermeneutic circle - the circle of existence, they are two ways of breaking the meaningless circle in the meaningful interpretation of the game. In other words, the circle of the game is the finiteness, the isolation of any meaning in demonstrating its beginning and end, expressed through tautologies.

It is important that the meaning of this finiteness is the reflexivity of our memory, only for the reflexive consciousness “the end and the beginning” make sense, only for the reflection of thinking is it possible to understand “death”.

The circle of the game $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ was brilliantly expressed by J.E. Moore through its destruction - the denial of the form $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$ closing the circle of the game, not allowing the game $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ to come true: “It’s raining outside the window, but I don’t believe it”. Denial of the “desire” ($\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$) to believe in the fact of rain makes the phrase meaningless, since the “fact” itself requires the “will” to understand it as such.

For games of the form $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$, their circle can be expressed a la Moore as follows:

“I believe it, although I know it is not so.” - “Faith”, its supposedly unlimited arbitrariness, is conditioned by the “fact” of its feasibility, without which faith is meaningless.

10.4 Empty significance and the ”playing self”.

The significance of what is understood in the game $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, as well as the significance of the will expressed in the game $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$, demonstrates the impossibility of a meaningful exit from the circle of the game (the aporias of J.E. Moore, see above §3). On the other hand, the impossibility of leaving the circle is interpreted by oblivion (removal from the content) of the difference between the verb of the game in question and the verb of the syntactic consideration itself, the meaningless significance of which, in turn, is interpreted by the player of the game, its “playing self”.

What is the meaning of the “playing self” of the game of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$?

The meanings of the language game of this form are meaningless indexes to the possibility of implementing their interpretations, to the space-container of everything that exists, but not just to the meaningless unity of space, but to the unity addressed to us by its content, understood by us, having its own playful meaning. In other words, the space-receptacle acquires the features of “Being or God speaking to us”, what we called the objectivity of the existing and accessible to our understanding. This is the essence of the amazing correspondence of the “objective” being of the world to those logical laws in which it is known, since “objectivity” itself, i.e. “playing self” of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, suggests interpretability in the volition of the understood. Consequently, “objectivity” is the meaningless significance of the volition of the understood, and vice versa.

“I know that this hand is right, because in the objectivity of communication it has “this” meaning, and I can participate in communication because I know (I suppose) the meaning of which hand is right.”

“The understood is based on the understanding of the “objectively” existing, and the possibility of understanding the “objectively” existing is based on the knowledge (positing, axiomatization) of the understood”.

“In order to understand, one must know the words, and in order to know the words, one must understand them.” - Everywhere the same hermeneutic circle is outlined, which makes it possible to interpret the contentless significance of existence by the content of language games.

The “objectivity” of the existing becomes the same means of implementing the games $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, as well as the “subject” of our personality for the games $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$.

The "objectivity" of the world or the "transcendence" of God obscures the emptiness of our existence; or, in other words, the "objectivity" of the world and the "subjectivity" of the self - the oblivion of our existence, which gives meaning to everything meaningful.

The mechanism of such oblivion, as has been repeatedly noted above, is the inevitability of whirling in the hermeneutic circle of the game, and this circle itself is not the oblivion of the form of memory itself, but only its syntactic interpretation. Existence itself will remain unrevealed as long as it is "comprehended", since life is its own (reflection) elimination (oblivion) from the existing. And no matter what semantic structures we take to understand "forgettable existence", all the same, our understanding will ultimately be a demonstration of an indefinite and meaningless index on our own implementation of pointing - "this" turned to nowhere as to the very addressing.

10.5 Induction and its paradox.

Let us consider a language game of inductive inference, which is the most formalized example of a language game of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, the purpose of which is to find an inductive generalization - the "objective" meaning of particular interpretations.

Before us is some content, the meaning of which we must understand as "true". To do this, we consider a number of other judgments in the chain of their mutual interpretations (demonstration of a different game connection), leading to the identification of the true meaning.

The question arises: to what extent must the inductive series be continued for the conclusion of the induction to be "true"? When will the valid language game of inductive inference be asserted?

The meaning of the inductive game (as the game $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$) is in the interpretation of the verb-other game connection ("or") by the verb-identical game connection ("and"), therefore, the series will carry out the assertion of a reliable induction when the meaning of the inductive series will indicate the significance (identical) of the implementation of the meaning in the demonstrated series: the identical game significance will indicate the identical game connection ("and-or"). And this will be possible when all the interpretations demonstrated in the series will have no other interpretation than those already presented in the induction series, i.e. the demonstration of the series will thus indicate an identical game connection, since there are no other interpretations other than those already carried out in the game series, the values will point to themselves in the demonstration of

their implementation (form $\delta\sigma\xi\alpha$). An interpretation that closes the series in a circle of tautologies will be the desired “true” meaning of the inductive inference.

The fact that “all” semantic interpretations are revealed in the series is our volition of the understood, the meaningless significance of which is interpreted by the “fullness” of induction, i.e. demonstration of the hermeneutic circle formed by meaningful interpretations of induction.

In other words, the hermeneutic circle of induction can be expressed as follows: “the meaning of the inference is in the unity of the interpretations of the series, the meaning of the interpretative series of induction in the sense of the unity of the inference.”

When a series of induction cannot list all possible interpretations (incomplete induction), then the empty significance of the volition of the understood is interpreted by the incompleteness (emptiness) of the series itself, expressed in a chain of repetitions of the same in all the following interpretations, the meaning of which is the demonstration of the hermetic circle of the game through the emptiness tautologies.

Let me explain this using the example of the so-called paradox of induction, when the conclusion of an inductive generalization is made on the basis of a single interpretation: a single chemical experiment makes a generalizing conclusion about the substance involved in it.

The paradox is explained by the fact that already in the interpreted meaning of “substance” our tautology of the series is contained: the substance is that which is identical to itself in all experiments, in all interpretations of induction, and since the conditions of the experiment contain the same tautology, the implementation of one interpretation of the experiment is immediately and completes the series of induction by demonstrating the hermeneutic circle of the game.

Where the interpreted meaning does not carry the tautology of the game interpretation, for example, it is not known which substance is involved in the reaction, then the paradox of induction will not take place, induction will turn to a series of experiments that reduce the interpretation of the “unknown” substance to other tautologies of the inductive series.

10.6 Syllogistic.

Consider the language game of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, which is itself a syntax for the language game of the form $\delta\sigma\xi\alpha$ - syllogistic interpreting the meaning of the “truth” of deductive inference in the rules of syllogistic. The present consideration is a syntax for the syntax of a deductive game, this should always be kept in

mind and remembered that any consideration of deduction as the meaning of its derivation is already a syntax for it, but we agreed to refer the derivations of the syntax to the game itself.

So, syllogism deals not with doxic judgments of deduction, but with the demonstrable relation of premise and conclusion as "true" given to our consideration, as requiring an understanding of the meaning of their "truth," i.e., syllogism deals with judgments of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$. As an epistemic game, syllogistic must interpret the meaning of its realization of understanding by the will-intent of the understood, the verb-intent of the game connection interpreted by the verb-identity.

The considered series of "true" (realized) deductive conclusions must be interpreted by a single (closing the circle of the game) list of syllogical rules that form a hermeneutic circle with the deductive conclusions themselves.

Why do we have 19 true modes of categorical syllogisms? Because only they form a single list of interpretations of the "truth" of all available deductive conclusions and, together with them, close the circle of the game. The meaning of the rules ($\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$) of syllogistics lies in demonstrativeness (in considering them as such - $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$) of the presented deduction conclusions, and vice versa. In the circle of the game, syllogistics does not distinguish between the "truth" of the rules (the feasibility of its interpretations) and the "truth" of the deductive conclusions presented, equally demonstrating the implementation of the hermeneutic circle.

The question of the truth of syllogistics itself belongs to the next stage of syntactic consideration, in which the absence of different meaningful interpretations from the interpretations of the previous stage leads us to consider the rules of syllogistics as a demonstration of the logical form of deductive inference.

Possible confusion, identifying the very conclusion of the deduction of the form $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$ with its syntactic demonstration in the rules of syllogisms - $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, the confusion of mixing language games of different forms that are in a syntactic relationship, which inevitably leads to a paradox of syllogistic, which will be discussed in Chapter 12, which explores heteronomous forms of language games.

In conclusion, let's pay attention to the axiom of syllogistics: "everything that is asserted about a class of elements is asserted about each element of the class." It is easy to recognize the hermeneutic circle of inductive inference in it.

Indeed, "everything that is affirmed regarding the class" is the will of the inductive conclusion (let everything be like this - $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$); "refers to each element of this class" - the implementation of inductive interpretations of the series (the whole class is the completeness of induction), as a result we get: "the meaning

of a class element ($\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$) is in the interpretability of a single class attribute on it, the meaning of a class attribute in its interpretability on each element (we assume ($\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$) that we can select elements from the class) ”.

Chapter 11

Lie.

11.1 What is a lie.

After a long discussion about the truth, it is necessary to ask - what is a lie? We think of truth as the feasibility of a language game, therefore, as long as we keep a meaningful speech about non-truth, about “lie” as about the impracticability of language games, then the subject of our reasoning will not make any sense: since if a lie is the impracticability of a game, then talking about it speech, by realizing unfeasibility, we go beyond the framework of the meaningful .

The seeming misunderstanding can be overcome if we remember that “falsehood”, like “true ”, is an interpretation of the syntactic relations of language games - their reflection. Speaking about the falsity of judgments, we mean that the proposition of meaning is not represented in the presented structure, however, the very language game of the syntax of lies, where untruth is comprehended, is carried out as a form of assertion of the authentic and outlines its hermeneutical circle, i.e. falsity of judgments has a true (feasible) meaning. The lie, pointing to the meaninglessness of the presented judgments, is itself carried out as a playful interpretation, the “truth” of which we can talk about.

But is “false” the same playful interpretation of the impracticability of the game in “these values” as the “truth” of feasibility?

“Truth” can always be interpreted in terms of meanings presented for syntactic consideration, since according to the meaning of “truth”, such meanings “are”, they are implemented in their language games. “Lie” does not have just such a game interpretation, it is the impracticability of the game, it is impossible to form a hermeneutic circle from the judgments of the unrealized game and its syntax, due to the absence of its components. Therefore, if “false” and “is” something in the game, then this “is” is not the same as “truth”.

This difference can be seen in the impossibility of finding independent words for negating meanings in our language - “impossibility”, “non-existence”, etc. All of them are formed from the meanings of “true” (realized) game interpretations, through the index “not”, indicating their special place in the semantic structure. The language has the verb ‘is’, but not the verb ‘not-is’.

As we can see, “lie”, if it has a playful meaning, then it is formed from the meaning “and truth” by the negating index “not”. So the meaning of “lie” is in the negation of “not”. But to say this is to say nothing for us. We must understand the meaning of “negation” and “falsehood” as moments of the proposition of meaning.

11.2 Meaning of “lie”.

It must be understood that “denial” is not a propositional attitude of our thinking. “Negation” cannot be demonstrated as an empty significance, since the demonstration would have to negate itself (“nothing” is demonstrated, chapter 2, §5). We have the proposition of “the same and its other,” but we do not have the proposition of “the same and its negation.” Unlike the dialecticians, for me “denial” is not a self-evident action of thought necessarily demonstrated in all the implementation of language games, but a conditional game interpretation of the propositional demonstration itself, namely, its reflection.

“Negation” in itself does not demonstrate a hermeneutical circle, but, as mentioned above, the understanding of judgments as “false”, i.e. not representing the proposition of meaning, just as for “truth”, must be carried out in the circle of the language game, otherwise “falsehood” and “negation” will not make sense.

But the demonstration of such a circle in meaningful terms is impossible, however, it is nevertheless carried out through the inclusion of the “negation” index in it. It is in this formation of the hermeneutic circle that the meaning of “lie” and “negation” lies.

Let us first consider the meaning of the openness of the hermeneutic circle of the game. What does the failed attempt to close it in game interpretations mean for us? - The fact that the contentless significance of the implementation of memory is not interpreted by the game content, but is realized as a meaningless pointer to its implementation of pointing, as a meaningless index “this” turned into “nowhere”, again returning us to the very beginning of syntactic consideration. Simply put, the hermeneutic circle of this open syntax is nevertheless closed, but not through game interpretations presented for syntactic consideration, but in the next stage of syntax through the “negation” index - the indefinite index “this”, which expresses

the very reflexivity of syntax.

Attempts at a meaningful interpretation of this indefinite index lead us to the playful meaning of “false-negation”.

The meaning of “lie”-“negation” is in the interpretation of the implementation of the hermeneutic circle as its “other”, “other” from the meanings demonstrated in the circle, in the interpretation of its reflexivity . Therefore, the meaning of “lie” is not some kind of meaning in the game, but the very implementation (demonstration) of the reflection of the game pointing in the endless sequence “not this, not this, not this ...”, which speaks of the outside and, consequently, of the lack of content. any indication (memory form) to any hermeneutic circle of the game. Interpreting this endless reflexive possibility of indicating by “negation”, we include in the considered “false” structure an index to the emptiness of the very reflection of memory (to the other of “this circle”) and thereby close the infinite sequence in our hermeneutic circle, carrying out the interpretation of “false” by “negating ”.

As a result, the lie is conceived as a “denial” from the presented meanings in “this” circle of the game, a denial from “this”, and not as an endless demonstration of reflection.

11.3 Circle of “falsehood” and “truth”.

“Lie” is false to the end, asserting by “negating” from what is presented that its meaning is realized in the same hermeneutic circle along with “truth”, although “negation” acquires its meaning in the next steps of syntax (in the interpretation of the infinite sequence “not this ... ”), demonstrating the reflexivity of the indexal “not” to everything significant, and not only to what is presented.

To know the meaning of “this” in this or that game does not mean to know the meaning of “not this”, the meaning of difference from everything cannot be expressed, for “not this” a demonstration of what is presented for consideration is needed. The dichotomy of “this” and “not this” is meaningless (it does not exist) outside of the playful interpretation of “negation” as a difference from the presented meanings. Try to describe the falsity of incorrect chess moves - “the knight strikes diagonally” within and only within the framework of a chess game, nothing will come of it: chess is played only by correct moves. A lie is not always a non-truth, in order for it to be such, a meaningful interpretation of the index “not” is necessary, it is necessary to identify the infinite sequence “not this ...” with “this” hermeneutic circle of “truth and falsehood”.

If the meaning of the “lie” index is not signified in anything, since it indicates

the outwardness of its implementation of pointing (the infinite sequence “not this...”), then its game interpretation (the identification of the infinite “not this...” with a circle game of “falsehood and truth”) is possible as different from something presented, but this will no longer be the propositional meaning of “not”, but its conditional meaningful interpretation. It is precisely this replacement of “denial of everything” by “denial of what is presented” that forms the circle of “truth and falsehood”: “a lie is that which is not truth; truth is that which is not a lie.”

Let’s consider this circle from the point of view of language games. “False” is something else, a reflection of the idea; truth is what has been realized and presented for consideration. We get: “implementation - that which is not realized, realized - that which is not a realization.” At first glance, we have received a simple banality, but the implementation in the “not” is thought of as a “representation” in this circle of syntax, i.e. everything that can exist must be an interpretation of the presented (past syntax), therefore, we cannot distinguish between games and syntaxes reflecting on them, since reflection itself must already be presented in order to be realized, which is not true, i.e. it turns out that there is no reflection at all.

Closing the circle of “truth and lies”, i.e. interpreting “falsehood” as a difference from what is presented in the game, and not as a demonstration of infinite reflection - the meaning of “difference”, we eliminate reflection from our language games, taking the meaningful interpretation of the indexal “lie” as an insignificant realization of the form of memory.

Such elimination of reflection from the content of games can lead to some difficulties, because the content is still realized as a reflection of memory, namely, when in the circle “truth-falsehood” “truth” points to this circle itself as the realization of its meaning, which through the demonstration (!, the outside of the realization of the circle) of the reflection of “falsehood” will be different itself from itself, - both true and false at once, - what we call a paradox, since the reflection of “lie” as the meaning of the circle will be outside its content - the circle is false, and at the same time, carrying out game interpretations of the false, the meaning of the circle will be true.

11.4 Paradox. Resolvability of logics.

So, “lie” in the game interpretation is a hypostatization of the realization of the form of memory, interpreting the index “not” (reflection of the realization) as a meaningful difference from the one presented for consideration. On the other hand, the game interpretation of “lie” (the meaning of “lie”) is carried out as

a demonstration of memory reflection (an endless sequence of “not this...”), i.e. “lie” can include in the game the very reflection of the implementation of the game, eliminated from its content. What does it mean? - The fact that in the circle of the game judgments that are not included in the dichotomy “true-false” are possible (see above, end §3).

How can we find such judgments, what should they point to?

This is already clear to us - on the very implementation of the interpretation of the false and true, on the very circle “truth-falsehood”, which includes its own reflexive implementation through the “negation” index in its content. This is the paradox of the liar, in fact, it is the only paradox:

The statement written here is false.

If this proposition is false, then according to its content (to the realization of the game) it is true; if this proposition is true, then it is false in content (by the reflection of the realization of the false). The hypostatized washed away the “false” both in the game and outside the game. The paradoxical judgment is clearly not included in the dichotomy “truth-false”, since it points through the index “falsehood” to its external implementation, which is eliminated by the meaningful interpretation of “falsehood”.

In other words, “lie” (reflection) is interpreted by the difference from “represented” for consideration, but what is presented for consideration is itself considered as the realization of the meaning of falsehood - the meaning of reflection (difference) of “representation”, i.e. the presented be-comes different from itself, which prevents the completion of the circle “truth-false” in the form of an ordinary tautology - a reliable statement, forming a circle of paradox.

It follows from the meaning of the paradox that it is possible to speak of “truth” and “false-hood” only within the framework of a syntax that does not indicate in its content the reflexivity (“not”) of the implementation of this content.

In this connection, it is interesting to consider the question of the decidability of logics.

First: what does it mean to raise the question of the decidability of logics? - Think of all (pointer to the very circle of the game of syntax) statements of the language of logic as true or untrue, as feasible or impracticable. That is, the problem of the decidability of logics is equivalent to revealing the hermeneutic circle “true-false” in logical statements. And if in this circle there is an index similar to the “meaning of lies” index - an index on the reflexivity of the implementation of the hermeneutic circle, then the problem of solvability, forming a well-known circle of paradox, cannot be determined, leading to a contradiction - logic becomes

unsolvable.

What indexes can perform the functions of “falsehood” in our case?

For the logic of predicates, such indexals will be semantic structures pointing to something else (reflection) of the significance of logical variables, to the significance of the game connection as a realization of the meaning of game values (other, Chapter 2), i.e. they will be binary structures of the predication function (predication - indexal to the implementation of the game pointing - reflection) aPb , expressing the meaning (P) of the game connection (a “and” b). Therefore, the logic of first-order predicates, in which such structures are present, is undecidable.

Interestingly, if binary or higher predication relations expressing the reflexive significance of the play connection, the case of monadic logic, are removed from the language of logic, then the relation Pa will not indicate the implementation of the meaning of the play connection (a “and” b is not denoted in P) and, in a consequence of this, monadic logic can be interpreted as being decidable. Such indexals are also eliminated from the language of classical propositional logic, due to the “propositionality” of its variables and logical connectives (Chapter 13, §3), which also entails the decidability of propositional logic.

Moreover, it should be noted regarding the undecidability of the logic of predicates that the sign P should be considered as a symbol in general (symbol structure, part III), and not as a specific meaning of the game connection a “and” b, otherwise it will not indicate reflexivity (it can also be interpreted as indeterminacy) of the implementation of the very syntactic interpretation of the “decidability of logic” and does not form a circle of paradox. If we concretize P as addition (+), then such a cashed relation $a + b$ will only indicate the meanings of a and b under consideration and their interpretations presented for consideration by addition (+), and not the reflexivity of the “representation” (predication) of meaningful content itself. . By virtue of this, arithmetic without multiplication is decidable, but if we introduce multiplication, which, as will be shown in Chapter 18, is a syntactic interpretation of addition and together with it forms a well-known index on the reflexivity of the implementation of statements of arithmetic, then the circle of paradox is again formed, and such arithmetic becomes insoluble.

I note that the equivalence of the meaning of “undecidability” and the meaning of “paradox” was clearly illustrated by J.R. Buchi in his proof of the undecidability of first-order predicate logic (see Chapter 18, § 6).

A consequence of the violation of the conditions for removing the syntax itself from consideration of the reflexive implementation is the famous incompleteness theorem of K. Gödel, which essentially reinterprets the meaning of our paradox:

there are true judgments in some axiomatized and consistent theory, including arithmetic, the truth of which cannot be deduced from the axioms of the theory (Peano arithmetic). That is, there are judgments that are not interpreted in the “true-false” circle: if we cannot interpret the truth of the judgment, then we cannot realize the named circle. This means that Gödel, in his study, allowed a playful interpretation of the reflection of the “false” (the requirement of consistency) and pointed to his own implementation of his playful conclusions. Indeed, what is the semantic structure of the Gödel proof: judgments, Gödel numbers of judgments (their reflexive interpretation) and diagonalization - Gödel numbers of Gödel numbers (more precisely, the truth of the judgment on its Gödel number); its essence lies in the interpretation of one’s own reflective implementation of Gödel’s proof of incompleteness (a judgment that speaks of one’s own unprovability is reflection). Through the structure of the Gödel numbers, the very realization (meaning) of the proof of Gödel’s theorems becomes the meaning considered in them, i.e. as a result, our paradox structure is formed (see chapter 16, §5).

Such difficulties can be removed if in the syntactic consideration we explicitly point to the reflexion of the realization of syntax as “represented” and distinct from the realized reflexion of game significance, i.e. if we break our syntax into a double syntax - syntax to syntax.

Let me explain that the incompleteness of the formalization (undecidability) of logic (arithmetic) of the first order can be expressed by Tarski’s well-known theorem on the indefinability in arithmetic of the set of Gödel numbers of its true sentences. On the other hand, second-order logic, also undecidable for the same reasons, is a syntax for first-order logic (a syntactic generalization of predication as a variable), and therefore it can be considered the implementation of sentences of first-order logic without revealing the circle of paradox, since we are referring to the implementation of another game, not to the implementation of the syntax itself. And, indeed, the set of Gödel numbers of sentences true in arithmetic is definable (!) in “second-order” arithmetic, where the defining sentence can be a second-order logic sentence.

Can we say that the paradox violates or cancels the law of the exclusion of the middle? - No, he only points to the place where this law makes sense, to the area of the playful interpretation of “false” as “negation of what is presented.”

The paradox thus demonstrates the “other” of the meaningless significance of the hermeneutic circle, i.e. demonstrates the very reflexivity of our thinking (the endless sequence of “not this...” is identical to the endless whirling of the circle of paradox), and not its empty significance of tautologies, - the circle of paradox

is the “other” of the circle of tautologies. Moreover, the paradox shows that it is possible to speak about “truth” and “falsehood” only within certain limits of the game interpretation, “truth” and “falsehood” are not propositional meanings, which are necessarily demonstrated by all language games - the paradox is neither true nor false - it’s feasible. There is no logical proposition (and dichotomy) of ”truth and falsehood”.

Attempts to think of “truth” and “falsehood” propositionally, as a form of judgments present in games, will sooner or later lead to paradoxical judgments, as soon as we try to identify the logical form of games, which implies a reflexive interpretation of our own implementation. The meanings of ”truth” and ”falsehood” will point to the realization of their meaning in the content of the games, and thereby render themselves meaningless. Gödel did not find true and unprovable judgments, a judgment that speaks of its unprovability has already been proven (realized) by us as understood as such; Gödel showed in the language games of mathematical logic the playful boundaries of ”truth” and ”falsehood”, revealing their playful rather than formal nature.

If ”true” and ”false” are meaningful meanings of language games, then their ”playing self” must stand behind them. What is it like?

The meaning of ”negation” in contrast to ”represented”, i.e. in some semantic correspondence with it. This ”correspondence-difference” of the presented is usually called empirical judgments, placing (always in the next stage of syntax) a pointer to the implementation of the language game among the presented values, i.e. the subject of the game, its player, the same meaning given in the presentation of the game, therefore, everything that exists exists exactly as much as it is presented for consideration by the game. In other words, ”false” and ”truth” speak of the objectivity of our existence. But then the paradox points to the playful limitations of this “objectivity”, one has only to question the very consideration of the meaning of “objective” as a way of considering oneself. This is expressed in the following aporia: “we know about the “objectivity” of the world from the subjectivity of our sensations and thoughts (a way of understanding), but what then will be the objectivity of our sensations (perception), from which we learn about any objectivity?” If sensations (perceptions) are not objective, then the very meaning of “objectivity” is not objective, and if sensations (subjective) are objective, then why is the division into objective and subjective necessary?

11.5 Proposition of silence.

“Negation” is a demonstration of the “other” from what is presented, the other, in its turn, is the reflexivity of the vacuity of the implementation of our games. Consequently, negation interprets the very outsideness of the implementation of games, i.e. points to something else (reflexivity) of the meaningless significance of the hermeneutic circle - “nothing”, in contrast to the index “I”, indicating the identical meaningless significance - tautology. But for such a difference, the form of memory must have (demonstrate) the significance of the “other” of its reflexive emptiness that exists outside of language games. Memory must be exercised outside of game interpretations, i.e. memory must be silence, whose meaning is always other than its realization, meaningless in nothing and nowhere.

It goes without saying that such an extra-interpretative significance of silence cannot be a game moment, but only the very realization of memory, demonstrated in one’s own accomplishment - what we previously called the proposition of silence. We expressed it by the implicative connection of the external-other (false) with the external $L \rightarrow L$, the connection of the contentless significant with another meaningless significant in demonstrating silence.

‘Negation’ thus interprets the proposition of silence, expressing the outside of significance in the infinity of the sequence ‘not this, not this...’ or in the endless whirl of the circle of paradox.

Conclusion - if there were no silence, then there would be neither “lie” nor “truth”.

Chapter 12

Heteronomic forms of the authentic.

12.1 Two closed circles of the game.

The ninth and tenth chapters identified the hermeneutical circles of the linguistic games of the forms of authentic $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$ and $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$. In the interpretations of existence they sound like this:

for $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$ - “the meaning of the being is in its existence (realization), and the meaning of existence is in its being”;

for $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, on the contrary - “the meaning of existence (understanding) is in its being (understood), and the meaning of being is in its existence”.

As you can see, this is the same circle of tautologies started in different ways, i.e. broken into narrative (affirmative) form (ch. 10, §3). For doxic games, the demonstration of the hermeneutic circle begins with an indication of the identical proposition of the game significance, demonstrated by the identical game connection, for $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ - with an indication of another game significance, the realization of the meaning of the meaning, which is also determined by the form of demonstration.

The demonstration of the game circle interprets the syntactic relations of the form of memory, expressing them in the “beginning” and “end” of the demonstrated circle: how and from what the demonstration begins determines the form of the considered meanings, the form of the demonstrated in the syntax language-play. Therefore, the hermeneutic circles presented above are not hermeneutic circles without the implementation of their demonstration by the “reader”. The hermeneutic circle, like the indexel, is not a sign, but a demonstration of o-meaning. (This pragmatic moment of logic is essential to the whole study.)

The end of the demonstration of the hermeneutic circle of the game ends with a tautological closure of the content, indicating that the empty significance of the demonstration of the circle is interpreted by the significance of the play content that forms this circle. For $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$, the meaningless significance of demonstration is thought to be the groundlessness of the volitional, for $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, it is an a priori given of the space-receptacle (objectivity of the world) of all game realizations. Both interpretations of game significance are carried out in the form of tautologies. In the case of the circle of paradox, meaningless significance is not identified with the significance of its content, and the content of the circle demonstrates the very reflexivity of implementation in the endless whirling of the paradox.

The beginning of the demonstration of the circle of play determines its form, but we can begin a new demonstration of the hermeneutic circle in the context of the already begun one, i.e., for example, from the "semiddle" of the circle of play $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$ in its own playful meanings and connections reveal the circle of play of form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ "... the meaning of existence in being, the meaning of being in existence...".

What follows from this? - The fact that for a language game in its own game connections it is possible to carry out a language game of a different form of asserting the authentic. We will speak of such games, formed on the same play connections and meanings, but in different forms of authentic assertion, as heteronomous forms of language play.

The possibility of the formation of heteronomous forms lies in the syntactic consideration of the very syntactical demonstration of the circle of the game (syntax to syntax), in the consideration that forms its own circle, but not the circle of the certain, closed in tautologies, but the well-known circle of paradox, revealing purely reflexive relations of memory, since mutual interpretation two heteronomous forms (two mutual syntaxes) does not imply an exit to another, different from them, stage of syntax, and, therefore, we cannot speak of judgments of heteronomous forms as "true" or "false". Their judgments become paradoxical. In other words, the play meanings of heteronomous forms are meaningless, therefore, the implementation of the language game of one of the heteronomous forms involves forgetting or eliminating interpretations of the other heteronomous form from the content. The language game is realized as the oblivion of its own game of the heteronomous form, the revealing of which leads to a circle of paradox that does not allow any of the games to be affirmed.

12.2 Oblivion in $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$ its $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$.

The doxic game (Chapter 9) is carried out as an interpretation of volition. The meaning of “I want so” is that “it should be so”, at least as a verbal interpretation. Groundlessness of volition expresses in the game the lack of content of its implementation.

I want to raise my hand - and I raise it, or I always have the opportunity to do so, thereby I carry out my will, this completes the assertion of the reliable form $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$. But in order for me to carry out my will, I must “understand” when the hand is raised and when it is not. Understanding is a game of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, which assumes the pre-giveness of the “raised hand” as an “objective”, independent fact. The “raised hand”, therefore, must be understood in the implementation of the game $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, and this understanding is a necessary condition for the implementation of the game $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$. Without understanding the will, I cannot demonstrate it in syntax.

Then the will can be realized only in the pre-giveness of its own meaning, the will can be realized as the conditionality of the knowledge of the “right hand”. But this is no longer will, the will cannot be conditioned, it is compulsion.

However, we can express our will, therefore, in this expression we must eliminate the revealed conditionality of will from the content of the game, forget it behind the tautologies of the hermeneutic circle and thereby interpret the meaningless significance of the implementation by the groundlessness of volition, eliminating from the content the interpretation of the heteronomous form.

The meaning of the elimination or oblivion of the heteronomous form is that we refuse to reflectively comprehend the meaning of “will”, from considering the outsideness of the implementation of the game. To ask the question “what is the reason or the meaning of the arbitrariness of the will” means to make the will meaningless.

What does free will mean? - The fact that its implementation can be anything, i.e. be irrelevant. Consequently, the meaning of “will” indicates the significance of the hermeneutic circle, which is eliminated by the content of the game. Revealing the eliminated implementation of the game, we make its content meaningless (paradox).

12.3 Oblivion in $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ its $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$.

The games of understanding interpret their realization by the predetermined significance of the space-receptacle of all play possibilities. The meaning of under-

standing is in what is understood (Chapter 10). The language game of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ ends when its implementation of understanding indicates the devotion of the understood. But how do I know that I "understood it", more precisely, how do I know that what I understood has a meaning? Why don't I continue understanding ad infinitum?

"I understood it this way...". But is this the meaning of what was understood, did I under-stand it correctly, and did I correctly understand the "correctness" of my understanding?...etc. to infinity. It is clear that such a sequence can only be interrupted by volition of its end - understood correctly! This means that the language game $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ can be carried out if I myself assume the correctness of my understanding in it, i.e. I play the form $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$. My ability to understand the pre-given meanings of the space $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ is an expression of my arbitrariness - it is anything, but not a game of understanding.

Therefore, in order to realize the play of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, I must eliminate from its con-tent the volition of the correct realization of understanding, otherwise, if I begin to doubt the realization of understanding, then no understanding is possible at all. The play of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ should eliminate interpretations of its heteronomous form from its content: the baselessness of the volition of the understood is interpreted by his "objectivity".

What does it mean that the world we understand exists? - The fact that it has some content of its own given to understanding, the ability to understand which is interpreted by the "objectivity" of the world, the meaning of "objectivity" itself is in its volition by us, in the axiomatization of the sign.

I can only understand something if it has a meaning independent of my understanding as my will, or, more precisely, I can understand only if I forget about the correct implementation of the understanding itself - that is, I forget, eliminate from the content, interpretation of the heteronomous form of the language game $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$.

"Arbitrariness of will" and "objectivity of the world" are two indices for their heteronomous forms, forgotten in language games. The games $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$ and $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ are feasible only when these indexes remain meaningless, not interpreted in these games.

But what will happen if we try to form one game from two language games of heteronomous forms, i.e. mutually interpret them?

12.4 Heteronomic circle is a paradox.

First, how is such a mutual interpretation possible? How is it possible in games to bring out their forgettable exercise?

There is only one way - demonstrating meaningless indexes of “arbitrariness of will” and “objectivity of the world” in one circle, this will be the interpretation of the outside implementation of the game.

But, in interpreting these meaningless indexes, we will eliminate the authenticity of the games themselves, moreover, of both equally, which will lead to an unapproved (out of tautologies) non-stop circling in the hermeneutic circle of paradox. Rather, there will be two circles, mutually demonstrating the emptiness of the other circle.

The mutual interpretation of “arbitrariness of will” and “objectivity of the world” will be reduced to the following statement: “in order to understand, I must volition of what is understood, and in order to volition, I must understand” - as a result, following the specified requirements, I can neither understand nor volition. Consequently, each of these games will turn out to be both false and true (realized and unrealized) - paradoxical. False in the implementation of the content of the heteronomous form (I can’t volitionalize the will itself), true in its own implementation of mutual interpretation (I still understand the demonstrated paradox).

Is the hermeneutic circle of paradox a language game? - Of course no. Since in it the content-less significance is interpreted not by the significance of the game content, but is demonstrated by the meaningless significance of another circle of the game - a demonstration of reflection in the end-less whirling of paradox. In the circle of paradox there is no meaningful interpretation of the form of memory, but only the implementation of a demonstration of reflection. Note that the liar’s paradox “I’m lying” is not such in its representation on a piece of paper, in order for it to become a paradox, it is necessary to show its paradox, i.e. demonstrate it.

Mutually interpreting heteronomous forms, we interpret their own implementation and lose the significance of their game content, since each of the forms is a syntax for the other, - the play of the form $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$ as a “syntax” of the paradox has the meaning of demonstrating (not asserting in content) meaningless significance implementation of the game of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$. But then the circle of paradox can be formed from the language game and the game of its syntax, if the first game is of the form $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$. You just need to build the next step of syntax in the game connections of the first game and close the desired circle of paradox,

as a result of which the language game becomes a syntactic demonstration of its implementation.

Let's show this on the example of the language game of deductive inference ($\delta\alpha\chi\alpha$) and its syntax - syllogistics, the game of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$.

12.5 The paradox of syllogistics.

Our task is to find a syllogism that forms, by its content and form, revealed in the rules of syllogistics, a paradox.

Syllogistics - syntax ($\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$) to the language game of the form $\delta\alpha\chi\alpha$, the form that is eliminated by the content of the syllogistic rules. Therefore, in order to reveal the circle of the paradox, the desired syllogism must speak of the “falsity” (elimination) of its implementation as a deductive conclusion of the form $\delta\alpha\chi\alpha$, but the interpretation of “falsity” must be carried out in the rules of syllogistics, i.e. in a game of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$. Consequently, the desired syllogism in its premises must have a general negative judgment (E), which speaks of the falsity of its implementation as being eliminated from the content, since it is the “lie” index that indicates the elimination (reflection) implementation of the language game, and therefore, according to the rules of syllogistic, general negative conclusion (E). On the other hand, the desired syllogism in its premises must have a universally affirmative judgment (A), which speaks of “truth”, i.e. about the implementation of interpretations of the “false” form according to the rules of the game $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, - point to its own mode. To fulfill all these conditions, our syllogism must be of the form AEE mode or EAE mode. Suitable modes are in the first, second and fourth figures - these are the modes: Celarent, Cesare, Camestres, Camenes. I note that since “truth” and “falsehood” express the reflexive relations of language games, they should take the place of the middle member of the syllogism, connecting heteronomous forms into a single circle of play. Let us consider the meaning of the paradox on the example of the mode Camestres.

So we get a paradox syllogism that is both true and false:

(A) All syllogisms of the Camestres mode are true.

(E) This syllogism is not true (false).

(E) This syllogism is not of the Camestres mode.

If the pointer “this” points to the syllogism written above, and this will be an interpretation of one's own game realization, then this syllogism will be false in its meaningful conclusion, and true in the form expressed in the rules of syllogistic,

since it is the Camestres mode syllogism written here. If the index “this” points to some other syllogism, then our syllogism will only be true, since it will cease to interpret its own external (reflexive) implementation, and thus will not reveal the heteronomous forms of its language game.

Let us consider more carefully how the mutual interpretation of heteronomous forms takes place here.

1) The form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ interprets the form $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$.

The syllogism ($\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$), being the syntactic rules of deductive inference, interprets the realization of the inference (the form $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$ - the assumption of the untruth of “this” syllogism) by its structure of the categorical syllogism of the Camestres mode, speaking about the truth of this mode. At the same time, the second premise ($\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$) points to its implementation as false (reflexive), eliminated from the content of the language game.

2) The form $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$ interprets the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$.

In the second premise, the untruth (falsity) of “this” syllogism is assumed (as a game of deduction - let) , therefore, for the implementation of the game $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$, the groundlessness of such a belief (it determines the paradox) must be interpreted by the “objectivity” of the deductive conclusion, i.e. . by the fact that the conclusion is correct, true, made according to the rules of syllogistics ($\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$). Thus, the groundlessness of the form $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$ interprets the “objectivity” of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$.

The mutual interpretation of the meaningless significance of one play by the meaningless significance of the other shows a paradox in the heteronomous forms of the authentic.

As for the other three modes, all of them, including Camestres, can be reduced to one syllogism of the first figure, therefore, all of the above applies to them, they do not differ in any way from the mode of Camestres. But I will not be lazy and will explicitly write the remaining modes of the paradoxical syllogism.

Celarent mod:

(E) No true syllogism is this syllogism.

(A) All syllogisms of the Celarent mode are true.

(E) None of the Celarent syllogisms are this syllogism

Cesare mod:

(E) This syllogism is not true.

(A) All Cesare mode syllogisms are true.

(E) None of the Cesare mode syllogisms are this syllogism.

Modus Camenes:

(A) All syllogisms of the Camenes mode are true.

(E) No true syllogism is this syllogism.

(E) This syllogism is not of the Camenes mode.

12.6 Dialectics is the interpretation of the circle of paradox.

In this section, we will interpret the very structure of the circle of paradox.

The paradox assumes its truth (fulfillment) only when its implementation, which is eliminated from the content, is revealed in it, i.e. when its falsity is revealed, therefore, the paradox cannot assert anything in its content, but, despite this, the very circle of the paradox, its demonstrated semantic structure, can be the meaningful meaning of another language game, the next stage of syntax, interpreting the unceasing whirling of the paradox.

How can syntax interpret the circle of paradox?

First, the reflection paradox's demonstration of meaningless significance must be defined as something significant, unified, demonstrated in the sign of syntax. The mutual exclusion of "true" and "false" as the presentation of the structure of the paradox in the sign, secondly, should be interpreted by "negation" or "contradiction" - a meaningful interpretation of "other" (reflexively eliminated) from the circle demonstrated in the structure, showing the unassertion of the paradox circle - its isolation is beyond the form of tautologies. Thirdly: this entire unified and self-denying structure of the paradox must have its own meaningful interpretation in the syntax, since this syntax interprets the demonstration of the paradox itself, and does not participate in it.

In all this it is not difficult to recognize the dialectical triad: the thesis is the unity of what is being demonstrated; antithesis - reflection of demonstration; synthesis is a meaningful interpretation (mediation) of a paradox by new connections of syntax. New connections appear from the interpretation of the eliminated (false or contradictory) realization of the circle as true - represented in the sign structure of our dialectical syntax.

Thus dialectics is an interpretation of the circle of paradox. The ika dialect demonstrates the reflection of the form of memory through the syntactic relations of language games, revealing their heteronomous forms. Dialectics does not carry any other content, except for demonstrating the lack of content of reflection. It

does not add anything to the content, it is a way of interpreting it in more complex structures.

Interestingly, dialectics, as noted many times, is completely useless in empirical sciences - this is understandable, since it is impossible to identify heteronomous forms in meaningful interpretations, they have not yet been found, and therefore dialectics are not available. All that remains for dialectics is to retroactively reinterpret the “obtained research results” in their own way.

Oddly enough, dialectics does not reveal the “dialectically connected”, it only demonstrates the reflection of the consideration of the index “this” in more and more complex game connections, as if lengthening the game circle. I can understand not because I am able to carry out dialectical chatter, but because I can point out empty content (the index “this”) and reflect on pointing, further understanding of which will lead me to an interpretation of the empty significance of my existence, to the creation of language games. The purpose of which is to interpret existence by some subject, i.e., my ego.

Chapter 13

Semantic connection.

13.1 Communication and sign.

We were moving towards understanding the meaning, significance, understanding the under-standing itself as reliable - and what is the result? - Truth turned out to be an interpretive moment of the hermeneutic circle, a tautology leading nowhere. Our path turned out to be a meaningless circling in place, circling around the meaningless index “this”, pointing to its pointing. But it is hardly possible to say the same about our life, about its understanding by us. In life, something always happens, something happens, it comes, it always moves towards something, life is a path leading from the “beginning” to the “end”, from something to something. So, perhaps the meaning of life and the meaning of understanding are this semantic connection of “beginning” and “end”, and not tautologies of whirling?

But what is a semantic connection? - The question posed leads us to a game connection, which points in the meanings of its game to its “other”, to the implementation of the game as different from what is presented in it, - the connection always differs from what we connect, therefore, the semantic connection interprets the external implementation of the language game, separating it from content.

Now we ask about the meaning of this indication. The answer is just as clear - the meaning is in the reflection of memory, interpreted by the syntactic relations of language games. The meaning is always how it is carried out. This means that the semantic connection is an interpretation of the “other” significance of the game, it is a demonstration of the proposition of the game significance as the “beginning” and “end” of the language game (Chapter 3).

The meaning of the “beginning” is in the meaningless significance of the implementation of the game, i.e. in the reflexivity of playful fulfillment, what we call

the possibility of starting a game. The meaning of the “end” is that the reflection of the beginning is carried out as a game demonstration, the content of which is fundamentally different from its demonstration. The interpretation of the “fundamental difference” leads to the interpretation of the meanings of the game by the “sign” (index of the syntax of the past $L \rightarrow I$) - an index to the place in the game demonstration. Therefore, the semantic connection is carried out as a connection of signs, the presentation ($L \rightarrow I$) of which is eliminated (forgotten) from the game, the outsideness of the implementation of game interpretations. In other words: a semantic connection is in so far as a meaningful connection between something and something, insofar as it eliminates from the content of games the difference between the connected and the binding, considering the latter as an attribute of the presented signs.

Consequently, “beginning” and “end” (whose unity is a sign) as a semantic connection are realized in the indistinguishability of the game and its syntax, i.e. semantic connection can never be considered within the framework of one language game, without identifying syntactic relations. From this it follows that the semantic connection is a way of its interpretation. In other words, the presented content of “cause and effect” does not exist, “cause” and “effect” are interpretations of the syntax of the past, expressing the way of considering the connected signs: the sign itself is connected with itself as a demonstration (syntax) of the proposition of play significance - a demonstration of the way of “presence of ” of the represented character.

13.2 Causal relationship.

What is the meaning of the game convention of causation?

In the fact that its meaning is not in the presented signs of “objectivity”, but in the implementation of the very method of considering the game “object”.

What is the meaning of A being the cause of B and B the effect of A?

First: A and B point to something unified, linking them into a semantic sequence . We say: B happened as a result of A, which means that the connection between “A and B” has the meaning of “happening”, - that which “A and B” points to, and that they do not signify, otherwise why indicate. That is, “A and B” interprets the external implementation of the language game and, therefore, can be considered as its judgment, where A is the subject, indicating the circle of the game as an unfounded reason, B is the predicate, interpreting the meaningless significance of the subject by the play content derived from A The meaningless significance of the given cause is interpreted by the necessity of a cause-and-effect

relationship. But in order for such an interpretation to take place, it is necessary to demonstrate the proposition " $A \rightarrow B$ " by the proposition " A " and " B " in the hermeneutic circle of syntactic consideration. It is necessary to represent this circle in the syntactic relations of the past ($L \rightarrow I$), where the givenness (L) of the representation of " A and B " will be demonstrated by the need for a playful interpretation of (I) " $A \rightarrow B$ ".

Thus, the necessity of causality is a playful demonstration of the syntax of the past, and this brings us back to the playful conditioning of "cause" and "effect," since a language game is necessary for such a demonstration to take place.

By itself, there is no connection "cause" and "effect", without a way of its syntactic interpretation.

Imagine that we are talking about two "unknown" events A and B . Unknowns are an indication that the meaning of events A and B cannot be considered in the syntactic relations of the past - A and B are not represented. Can we say that A and B , as mere given and meaningless signs, form a causal relationship, outside the way they are represented? - Of course no. And not because they are "unknown", but because they do not express the syntactic relations of two different language games, however, the last statement is tautological.

There is no proposition "cause and effect", there is a proposition "beginning and end", demonstrating the reflexivity of play significance, and not the universal connection of "everything with everything".

Then, if cause and effect are playful interpretations of the syntax of the past, then by changing them, we change the causes of our effects. But this is monstrous nonsense! But only at first glance.

The fact is that the change in the interpretation of the syntactic relations of our games contributes to the change in the very form of life (our very " I "), therefore it is so difficult to doubt the propositional nature of the cause-and-effect relationship. But we can detect a violation of the necessity of the connection "cause and effect" in any form of thought, as soon as we reveal its logical forms, - when the language game in question and its syntax will have the same game interpretations, thereby excluding the syntactic relations of the past, since logical forms cannot be presented outside (L) of their implementation (I).

For example, what is the consequence of understanding the law of identity $A = A$? A consequence of the experience of thought, but the experience itself already presupposes the implementation of this law, otherwise no understanding is possible without the implementation of the understanding itself ($I \rightarrow I$). Thus, the law of identity and the beginning of understanding are generally causeless,

since their meaning is interpreted outside the syntactic relations of the past ($L \rightarrow I$).

But this is not the only example of a violation of the need for causation. As soon as in physics the conditions of the experiment included its mathematical interpretation, i.e. when the previously eliminated and uninfluencing observer turned into the principle of complementarity, and the meaning of the experiment began to clearly depend on the interpretation of the object under study, - when the signs of physics began to express the syntactic relations of the present ($I \rightarrow I$), then cause-and-effect conditionality began to disappear from physics. Events have acquired a fundamentally probabilistic character, since it is impossible to “represent” the very implementation of this “representation” (the impossibility of eliminating the observer’s influence on the experiment) and, therefore, it is impossible to interpret the emptiness of the givenness of the “represented” by the need for game interpretation by a cause-and-effect relationship.

The causal relationship disappears where the syntactically relations of the past ($L \rightarrow I$) - presented disappear. Chaos excludes meaningful representation - and bifurcation states, strange attractors, etc. appear in the description of chaotic systems. I think the more knowledgeable reader will be able to find more similar examples.

It remains for me to touch on historical dependencies.

Was the civil war in Rome the result of the assassination of Caesar, or the death of Pompey, or the unknown death of Crassus? Is the power of the Roman Empire an imprint of Octavian’s personality? - The answer depends on the syntax in which you interpret the history of Rome, what is your approach. It is he who will determine the causal relationship in history, and it is foolish to look for the “objectivity” of such a relationship, it does not exist outside of its game interpretation.

Why is there no need for a “cause” in history? - Because “history” as a science (language game) itself presupposes the content of its signs, history cannot be demonstrated again separately from syntactic interpretations ($L \rightarrow I$), its meanings point to the very implementation of syntax ($I \rightarrow I$), i.e. . express the syntactic relations of the present, and not the past, excluding the demonstration of the hermeneutic circle, in which its emptiness of implementation is interpreted by the need for a “cause and effect” connection.

13.3 Logical connection.

A logical connection is a semantic connection expressed in the values of a logical form, therefore, everything that we said about the causal relationship applies to it, with the exception of one thing - the way of syntactic consideration of the logically connected cannot be arbitrary, but only representing relationships logical form ($I \rightarrow I$) as a relation of the syntax of the past ($L \rightarrow I$).

In logical form, its content relations point to the very implementation of syntactic interpretation ($I \rightarrow I$), it is indistinguishable from its syntax (the law of identity). The syntactic relations of the past ($L \rightarrow I$) are not fulfilled for it, but nevertheless we are talking about a logical connection as necessary. What allows us to interpret it this way?

The pointer "truth"- "sign" as a "propositional" representation, existing before logical consideration, is the meaning of the denotative. It allows us to distinguish two identical contents of the language game and its syntax by defining syntactic relations of the past ($L \rightarrow I$) in the propositional variables of logic, since the demonstrated "truth" is meaningfully (I) represented by the "presence" of the sign (the essence of its propositionality), while its meaning is meaninglessly (L) demonstrated by logical connectives.

But as soon as we ask about the meaning of "truth" itself (violating the syntax of the past), we immediately come either to tautologies or to the circle of paradox. Of course, it is impossible to speak of the logical connections of a paradox or tautologies as a causal relationship, since in them the cause and effect are indistinguishable (chicken and egg): the representation of the sign is demonstrated by the meaningless significance of the hermeneutic circle, and vice versa. The logical connection will only remain necessary when the "truth" is not interpreted in its own implementation of the game meaning, otherwise we will get the aporias of Gödel's theorems. This is the essence of the emptiness of logical conclusions. - Lack of content - interpreted by the representation of the sign - this is their content.

A logical connection is often interpreted as an implicational connection, implying some commitment to the connecting relations. But the implication, as I showed in the third chapter, interprets not only the syntactic relations of the past, but also of the present and the future. Therefore, the implication has nothing to do with the logical connection as necessary.

Indeed, in logic, a conclusion is possible only from a true judgment to a true one, i.e. from what is presented to what is represented in the sign (I), where the very implementation of the conclusion is outside (L) to it, which allows us to

talk about the need for a logical conclusion. But if you do not pay attention to the need for a semantic connection, then it can interpret both the syntactic relations of the present ($I \rightarrow I$) and the future ($L \rightarrow L$). Let's turn to them.

13.4 Associativity and analogy.

In the syntax of the present, in contrast to the syntax of the past, the presented signs demonstrate the lack of content in the implementation of the language game that interprets them - their presence is not in the given representation, but in the possibility of their meaningful interpretation. Apart from the fact that these signs require their own interpretation, there is nothing to say about them in our syntax, the way they are interpreted is not represented by their structure of presence, as in the syntax of the past ($L \rightarrow I$), which is able to demonstrate it in the hermeneutic circle. In other words, the symbolic connections submitted for consideration require in the interpretation of syn-tax the assumption of their game structure, since they do not have any other game content before syntactic consideration, their content is not presented for demonstration. Syntactic interpretation begins with this assumption. Consequently, the semantic connection of the present (I) is the very realization of the content (I) of syntactic judgments $I \rightarrow I$.

If in the syntax of the past interpretations reflect (demonstrate) over the presented content ($L \delta o \xi \alpha \ I$) and, therefore, they can interpret the meaningless significance of the implementation of the hermeneutic circle by the need for a semantic connection, then in the syntactic relations of the present, when the sign indicates the self-removed implementation of the syntax outside of reflection ($I \rightarrow I$), of course, there can be no demonstration of a hermeneutic circle, a self-eliminating demonstration is impossible, and a semantic connection cannot be necessary. It is as reliable as its game interpretation (any interpretation!), i.e. the reliability of the semantic connection of the present is the reliable form $\delta o \xi \alpha$ - volition.

An example of such a relationship is an associative relationship.

We say: "A causes us an association with B." Causes, but does not represent, as such association without our consideration of A is not present, nothing connects A with B without associative consideration. Association is not representable in syntax, but feasible in it, association cannot be demonstrated (unlike analogy, see below), it can only be experienced. Therefore, it is meaningless to talk about the need for associations, an association can be any, most importantly, it must be feasible.

But association can be "experienced," you object.

What we experience is not an association, but a presented sign, indicating the possibility of its implementation, it is its conceivability that we interpret by its influence on us, but this is already happening in the syntax of the past.

The meaning of association is volitional by us. For a causal relationship, its meaning was presented in syntax, we were able to demonstrate the game content: referring to chess, we know how to use the game pieces, the signs presented have a demonstrable game content, we know what to do with them and, therefore, we can interpret connection as necessary or “correct”.

The question arises: what about the analogy? An analogical connection, of course, cannot be necessary, but, on the other hand, we are talking about “represented analogies”, about “exact and inexact analogies”, and about “incorrect analogies”, i.e. as if we are building a syntax of logical “truth” over them.

Undoubtedly, analogy is an associative connection, but the comprehension of this connection takes place in the following syntax to an already realized, experienced association, where, along with the analogous meanings presented, the structural connections of the realized association are also presented. Therefore, the syntactic consideration of analogies takes place in the syntax of the past, which makes it possible to speak of “exact” and “inexact” analogies. But still, we can talk about analogies only if we know the rules by which they are carried out. Being outside the cultural tradition of the East, we do not understand its poetic analogies, but we do not need any tradition to understand the indexal “this”.

Associations and analogies explicitly express the game conditionality of the semantic connection, since, unlike the cause-and-effect relationship, they do not demonstrate their game content and cannot be interpreted as necessary.

In other words, if for a causal relationship its signs point to the demonstrated (L) content (I) of the game, then the signs of association, they are often called symbols, require the implementation of their content (I) outside the reflection (I) of past relations, i.e. e. in the syntax of the present $I \rightarrow I$. The sign in the syntax of the past is a pointer to a place in the structure of the game being demonstrated, and the symbol in the syntax of the present is a pointer to the external implementation of the syntax itself, so the symbol cannot be understood without experiencing it. Only the experience of such an experience fills the symbol with content. But, bearing in mind the relationship of associations and analogies, we can say that sooner or later all symbols will turn into signs. This circumstance will occupy an important place in the third part of my book.

13.5 Intuition.

It remains for us to consider the most mysterious of all semantic connections - the intuitive connection. If the syntax of the present has in signs a represented pointer to its own implementation, outside the sign, then the syntax of the future does not have any representable pointer at all ($L \rightarrow L$), which gives reason to consider intuition as something unreal, non-existent, fictitious.

What then is intuition? - The semantic connection of the proposition of silence, the meaning-less significance of the form of memory beyond any game interpretations. Intuitive connection speaks of the non-significance of existence in the existing, of their fundamental non-identity. But how then to speak of intuition as a semantic connection?

Let us first answer the question: what is intuition in relation to the content of language games? - The answer is clear - it is the very possibility of implementing language games, i.e. a pointer to the very reflexivity of the form of memory demonstrated by silence.

When we talk about intuition, we say: "I intuitively feel this", "feeling" indicates the non-game (non-linguistic) connection of intuition. Intuition - the significance of the possibility of implementation, but not the play itself; the possibility of semantic connection, but not the semantic connection itself. Interpreting the significance of this possibility as the realization of the game, we interpret intuition by some realized but invisible semantic connection. In fact, we are interpreting the possibility of a propositional demonstration of the form of memory, so everything propositional can be considered intuitive.

For example, the concept of the identical is an intuitive concept that assumes its meaning to exist before any game, i.e. in any games and values. It's impossible to explain. In order to understand the meaning of "identical", one must already be able to think of it as identical to itself, therefore, the meaning of "identical" is in its possibility of demonstrating itself in the hermeneutic circle, which we interpret by the tautology $A=A$.

It can be expressed more generally that any propositional relations, as playful demonstrations of empty significance, are intuitive connections, possibilities of their own implementation.

Intuition is not a fiction, but the same propositional relationship of the form of memory as the law of identity, but intuition as game content can never be the subject of syntactic consideration, syntax is possible only for its implementation in games.

This is expressed in the dual nature of intuitive meanings. On the one hand,

the law of identity is our will: its “legality” indicates the significance of its implementation in any sense - this is the form $\delta\alpha\xi\alpha$. On the other hand, we speak about the identical only in the presented tautologies, demonstrating the givenness of the law of identity, its significance as a form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$. That is, intuitive values can be of two forms at once!

The paradox is easy to explain. We judge empty memory relations ($L \rightarrow L$) only through the content of game connections ($L \rightarrow I, I \rightarrow I$), demonstrating in it a hermeneutic circle that reveals both forms of significance.

Summing up, we can say that intuition is the elusive side of game reality, whose escaping is identical with the feasibility of language games.

Part III

Language games.

Chapter 14

Formal hermeneutics.

14.1 Rules of language games.

. Meaning is the implementation of a language game, representing a form of memory reflection, the vacuity of which is eliminated from game interpretations by the same implementation of the game.

The fact that we can talk about any meaning not only as a meaningful moment of the game (rook chess move), but also as “true - false” or “correct - wrong”, expresses the reflexivity of the meaning, which is eliminated from the content, but eliminated in such a way that the game itself, by its implementation, presupposes the possibility of interpreting what is eliminated (representativeness), i.e. opportunity for self-understanding.

Indeed, why are there game rules? Are games not enough? - Not enough, since we can make mistakes in games, express their reflexivity outside of their content. Consequently, the meaning of the rules of the game is associated with a game error (lie - reflection), when we are outside the game and consider its implementation in its content. Moreover, being outside the game, understanding it, we are trying to find something that was not in it when we played it, but irremovably important for it - its forgettable implementation.

We are looking for game rules - this means that we realize the understanding of what is for-gotten in the game - its “playing self” (unity of implementation), but this understanding itself is also a language game, if it is meaningful, understanding itself is also forgetfulness of its implementation, therefore, we are trying to interpret own eliminated realization by the meanings and meanings of an-other game that we understand. And this is nothing but the syntactic relations of the two games.

It turns out that any game implies the possibility of interpreting its implemen-

tation in the rules of syntax. Any game must have meaningfully representable rules (metaphysics and the paradox of not a game). Anything that makes sense can be interpreted.

Moreover, everything that makes sense requires its interpretation by its implementation. “Requirement” is an interpretation of the reflexivity of meaning, “forgetfulness in remembering” as a given to us of our existence. The very form of memory leads us along the path of syntactically revealing the rules of language games.

So, what are the rules of language games?

The rules of the language game are an interpretation of the meaningless significance of its implementation in the game of its syntax. Or, the rules are the interpretation of the form of memory in the structure of play connections of the language game under consideration, i.e. the same thing that we used to call “truth”. No wonder “truth” and “correctness” are synonyms.

Now we will not touch on the “truth” index, as before, but now we will be interested in how interpretations of the meaningless content of language games can be carried out at all. We will be interested in the semantic structure of such interpretations.

If the rules are an interpretation of the meaningless, then it would seem that the structure of the rules can be anything, as long as it reflects the structure of what is being considered, since every-thing fits the meaningless, but the interpretation itself is also the implementation of the meaningless form, therefore the rules should express this reflexivity of the meaningless, and not be whatever. Rules by their structure should express syntactic relations.

On the other hand, rule structures can be demonstrated in any meaningful connection. More-over, it depends on meaningful interpretations how fully and deeply it will be understood, i.e. the reflexivity of the game meaning is demonstrated, how deep the understanding of what is carried out in our memory will be, and, consequently, how diverse and wide will be the language games that appear on the way of syntactic consideration.

Our task is to consider what the syntactic disclosure of language games entails, what is hid-den in its structure.

14.2 Representativeness of hermeneutics

Since the depth of understanding depends on the choice of meaningful meanings, then what content should we choose, what will be our way of interpreting the syntactic relations of language games? What should be our hermeneutics?

Of course, realizing understanding in one way or another, we will somehow express the meaning of syntax in terms of whether science, theology, it doesn't matter. But in any case, our understanding will be carried out as a language game, and therefore it will interpret to the extent that its "playing self" allows, - the implementation removed from the content. We want to go as far as possible, we cannot leave any "playing self" out of consideration. Consequently, we must set as our goal the comprehension of the most eliminated realization of the game, we must consider meaning as a form of reflection of memory, that is, to understand how this eliminated form is represented in the content of language games. The understanding we exercise must be a formal understanding, and our hermeneutics must be a formal hermeneutics.

Only formal hermeneutics, the creation of the categorical apparatus of which the first two parts of the book were devoted to, is capable of pointing to an elusive realization, demonstrating it in logical forms. Let me remind you that the logical form is revealed when the language game and its syntax have indistinguishable meaningful interpretations, and thus the syntax demonstrates the feasibility of its content. Understanding represents itself in the understood .

How far can this formal understanding go?

No further than expressed in the language games of our form of life. Otherwise, understanding is limited by the metaphysics of "truth", by what language games say about "truth", what they mean by our "I". Formal hermeneutics fully expresses the meaning of both "truth " and "I", but pays for this with the emptiness of what is revealed, since, in the end, it demonstrates the very form of memory that is outside everything.

But what is this understanding for?

The whole point is this pragmatic phantom of the meaning "for what", as if understanding the self is a way of adapting something to something, moreover, the latter something does not need to be understood, since the understanding itself is "for it". Understanding is conceived as an instrument of coordination, and not the implementation of everything meaningful. In other words, in this "for what" the meaning of the "for what" itself, that is, that which realizes it, is taken out of consideration - the meaning of that "I" is forgotten in it, for the sake of which the "for what" exists, the meaning of this subject, of this "I" is conceived a priori clear, i.e. used without explanation.

Where does this entity come from? - He himself is the result and tool of a certain way of understanding - reflection of the existent (sign). It was created by a certain form of thinking, and therefore we cannot take it beyond the boundaries of

understanding with the question “what for?”, since the meaning of the predilection of the “I” is immediately lost in the a priori. We cannot leave this subject in a priori darkness, we must expose him to a game illusion, the purpose of which is the realization of a certain form of life.

Formal hermeneutics reveals the meaning of what was previously thought propositionally, it reveals the meaning of the proposition itself, formal hermeneutics does not “for what”, it itself creates or reshapes old metaphysical idols into new meanings, defining a new space for every “for what”, and, most importantly, it reinterprets our central idol - our self, and hence the whole world to us. Formal hermeneutics is an attempt to seriously look at the old values and, finally, not to proclaim, but to reevaluate them in fact, based on their own “essence”.

I repeat the most important thing, my hermeneutics exposes the “I”, “personality”, indicating that what we considered ourselves to be is not the goal and not the subject of life, and not even its point of perspective, but only an instrument of reflection of memory trying to represent itself. , i.e. to create another world in the presented signs - from this follows both the “transcendent”, and the “beyond”, and “God” himself, and science, and philosophy, and technology that restructures everything.

Formal hermeneutics equally desacralizes the world of religion and the world of science, and everything in general, even itself, reducing its meaning to demonstrating meaningless significance in a pointer to its own pointing.

14.3 Syntax and form of life.

So, we are trying to comprehend the rules of language games, and as soon as we make our attempt, we immediately enter into syntactic relations that interpret in the structure of rules a meaningless form of memory, therefore, this structure must demonstrate the proposition of meaning, known to us from the first part of our research.

The syntactic interpretation can be arbitrarily diverse, but there will always be certain game connections in it, expressing the reflection of the proposition of meaning. Any syntactic moments, be it “God”, “meaning”, “being”, etc., will always be allegories of the empty significance of the form of memory, demonstrated by the implementation of syntax.

Then what do we investigate, what can syntactic judgments tell us, if they are always an allegorical conjecture, an imitation of something elusive and close?

Of course, we cannot consider our philosophical research as similar to scientific research, since, due to the meaning of the central category of “forgetfulness

in mindfulness” put forward by us, we will never have an adequate method of analysis, that which gives grounds to speak of scientific mastery of the subject of research. Therefore, the judgments of syntax will never have the character of an algorithm for using the object under study, in this case our form of thought, since the “use” itself is also the object under study, the “user” itself disappears from under the mask of an a priori clear subject and becomes a way of existence, for interpretation of which we use its significance - ”I”.

That being said, philosophical syntax is the most useless thing in the world.

Let’s try to ask the question differently, not what do we study, but what is carried out by us in the syntactic study of the rules of language games? This is much more important, since it does not determine an object that has been removed from us, but creates us ourselves in our way of thinking.

This creation of our “I” contains the essence of syntactic considerations. Syntax, interpreting the empty significance of the form of memory by the unity of the player, creates a new game, in the content of which we realize the understanding of our own existence, interpreting it with the being of our “I”. Language games and their syntaxes carry out a semantic interpretation of ourselves, placing new semantic meanings that interpret “I” (death, desire, sin, physiologicality) into old structures - syntax reduces the sequence of language games, forming one or another form of life.

Syntax judgments are the way of revealing forms of thinking in language games, the way from the creation of culture, i.e. what we think of as human.

Let us ask the question, why do I separate one form of life from another, is it an arbitrariness of analysis or lies in the syntactic relations themselves?

Every syntactic path ends with the discovery of a logical form: an index structure that demonstrates the proposition of meaning. Usually the meaningful interpretation of this structure is called metaphysics, since it always interprets existence in preexisting and antecedent meanings. In the structure of metaphysics, the proposition of meaning is revealed to the extent that game connections and the meanings of games and their syntaxes that lead to logical forms allow, and therefore all language games form a semantic unity in the person of metaphysics, interpreting their common player. On the basis of the latter, I separate the forms of life as ways of semantic interpretation of a meaningless form of memory.

The Hellenic concept of a person is different from the modern one, and this is explained not by the level of development of civilization, but rather, on the contrary, the level of civilization is determined by those concepts that stand behind our and the Hellenic “I”. To take at least the concept of “single”, expressed in a

number, it is unlikely that we now understand (i.e., feasible in the game content, and not reinterpreted in our own way) numbers that have a sound tone and geometric structure, and the Greeks were hardly our functional unity of number would be understandable - “you cannot enter the same river twice”. Irrational numbers did not exist for the Greeks, even when they came across them, they either declared them non-existent or considered them rationally calculable. This contains one of the fundamental differences between two genetically related, but still different forms of thought. The “I” of the Hellenic and our “I” are different, we can only guess about the full content of this difference, reinterpreting the embarrassing paradoxes of the Hellenic texts.

Syntax thus reveals the forms of thought. Let’s trace how game moments are connected with metaphysical concepts in our form of thought, let’s see what is hidden behind our metaphysics, how it reveals itself and where it leads.

14.4 Quantifier judgments.

To talk about the rules of language games, one must interpret the meaningless indexical “truth” in verbal interpretations of the language game in question (Chapter 8). The lack of content of “truth” (correctness of judgments) is interpreted by the game unity of all judgments, in the connections of which the considered language game is carried out (verb). Therefore, the judgments of syntax must point to this unity as “all” game meanings, i.e. the subject of syntactic judgments should be a pointer to “everything” related to the game, and the game interpretation of this pointer (the predicate) will be another indexical, which speaks about the feasibility of the language game in the indicated connections, i.e. indicating a demonstration of the implementation of the game in its meanings.

The two named pointers that create the structure of syntactic judgments are known to us as two quantifiers: the universal quantifier - \forall , and the existential quantifier - \exists . The first quantifier (as the subject of the structure of a syntactic judgment $\forall\exists$) points to the considered meanings of the game (to its circle), the second quantifier (as a predicate $\forall\exists$) points to the game interpretation of the subject, which speaks of the feasibility or impracticability of the game in the indicated meaning connections.

Both quantifiers have meaning only in interpretations of each other, since the meaning of one is the realization of the interpretation of the other.

What does “everything” mean? What does it mean to “exist”? - Answering these questions, we are forced to turn to judgments that cannot be interpreted without their implementation, without demonstrating the pointing itself \forall and \exists

how "this" and "I" are, in fact, the same indexes. Such judgments, the interpretation of which is not possible without the implementation of their demonstration, we will call index or quantifier judgments. An indexal is always a demonstration of pointing (an action we perform).

"Everything" makes sense if I can point to "this", "this" and "this"..., as to "any" and "some" - the latter, the interpretation of the possibility of such an indication, i.e. interpretation of the index \exists in the structure $\exists\forall$.

"Exist" has the meaning of pointing to the meaningless significance of the pointing itself as distinct from the said "this" is an interpretation \forall in the structure $\forall\exists$.

The quantifier structure of syntactic judgments demonstrates the emptiness of a pointer to one's own pointing, whose playful interpretation in our tradition is known as "sign" and "significance", "existing" and "essence", "this" and "I", etc. The meaningful interpretation of the indexical judgment is at the same time "forgetfulness", i.e. elimination from the content of the game of the impossibility of separating "significance" and its "implementation", giving birth to the concepts of "existing" and "its being", two pointers to "identical" and "its other" - to the proposition of game significance, behind which there are always demonstrations index judgments $\forall\exists$ and $\exists\forall$).

Any game is carried out as a forgetfulness of the fact that all its interpretations are the implementation of their own interpretive judgments, and not just the content "interpreted" in them. An example - let's remember Plato's "horse" and "horseness". Are these interpretations of our quantifiers? Horse - a pointer to everything that has the content of "horse" (\forall); horseness - interpretation of the implementation (\exists) of pointing to the "horse", i.e. meaningless index "I". And since one quantifier is inconceivable without the other (playful oblivion in the demonstration $\forall\exists$ and $\exists\forall$), it turns out that "horse" and "horseness" are equally significant and equally feasible. And now we are already standing at the exit from Plato's cave and contemplating the idea of a "horse".

So what did Plato accomplish in his understanding? Did he discover the world of ideas? - No, he carried out a formal interpretation of syntactic relations, retelling them in his mythology.

14.5 Quantifiers and the hermeneutic circle.

So, the understanding of the rules of language games is carried out in syntactic language and through the structures of quantifier judgments $\forall\exists$ and $\exists\forall$. The values of the language game in question, pointed to by the index \forall , must be

interpreted by the syntax as the values in relation to which the language game took place. The indexal \forall indicates the feasibility of the game, but is not itself one, due to its indexical nature, so it must itself be interpreted in syntax. From the second part of our research, we know that the "truth" index interprets the feasibility of the game in demonstrating the hermeneutic circle. As a consequence, the indexical \exists must be interpreted as the subject of a syntactic judgment in the hermeneutic circle. But what will be the predicate in this case?

Since syntactic interpretations are verbal interpretations, the action of the verb of the game under consideration (\exists) will be different from the subject of the verbal action, i.e. unity of game significance in the presented values (\forall). Thus, the predicate for \exists will be a pointer to everything that demonstrates the implementation of the language game, i.e. universal quantifier \forall . The implementation of the syntax is interpreted by the givenness of what is presented for consideration, closing the demonstrated circle of the game.

We come to the conclusion that the structure of syntactic interpretation, begun by a proposition $\forall\exists$, must be completed by another quantifier proposition $\exists\forall$. Moreover, at the beginning, the quantifier indicates the meaninglessness of the "givenness" of the meanings under consideration, and at the end, the meaninglessness of the syntactic demonstration, in which both meaningless meanings are identified through the tautological closure of the circle of the game (play oblivion). Then the complete structure of the syntactic consideration will be the structure of the hermeneutic circle, revealed in the index-quantifier form:

$$\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall.$$

The first quantifier judgment demonstrates the significance of the game interpretation that is identical to itself: \forall - a pointer to the presented and significant in memory - a sign, the index \exists indicates the implementation of pointing, eliminated in the sign and interpreted by the possibility of realizing the meaning of the sign. The second quantifier judgment $\exists\forall$ demonstrates the same proposition of play significance, but in a reflexive interpretation of its eliminated realization, i.e. speaks of the importance of the implementation of the first judgment. Therefore, the quantifier judgment $\exists\forall$ demonstrates the proposition of the play connection ("and-or") in the reflexive interpretation of the proposition of the play significance ("identical-other").

It can be seen that the judgment $\forall\exists$, indicating the game significance, interprets it in a different game connection (\exists), and the judgment $\exists\forall$ interprets the game significance as an identical connection (\forall). That is, a quantifier structure $\forall\exists$ represents a judgment of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, and $\exists\forall$ a judgment of the form

$\delta\sigma\xi\alpha$. In a single language game, these judgments form either a form of assertion of certainty, or heteronomous forms in the circle of paradox, both here and there, demonstrating one hermeneutical circle.

From the above reasoning, we can describe two forms of asserting the authenticity of language games in the following quantifier structures:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{form } \varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta & - \forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall; \\ \text{form } \delta\sigma\xi\alpha & - \exists\forall \rightarrow \forall\exists. \end{aligned}$$

The two presented structures of interpretations of understanding can be called the basis of formal hermeneutics. Both formulas are equivalent. The second formula is also a quantorial structure of a syntactic game, like the first one, but only considering a language game of another form, the form $\delta\sigma\xi\alpha$. But in the future, under the structure of syntax, we will mean the first formula, since we are interested in the sequence of syntactic considerations of the same form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$.

Note that our formulas are heteronomous within the framework of one language game and, therefore , the assertion of the authentic $\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall$ is carried out by eliminating judgments of the second form from interpretations, which will be expressed in the following notation: $(\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall) = \forall\exists$.

Earlier we argued that interpretations of syntax are verbal interpretations - the verb, at first glance, dropped out of our quantifier interpretation. But we forgot about the indexical nature of quantifier judgments - that they cannot be interpreted without demonstrating them (without performing the action of a player outside of them). This speaks of the verbal nature of the connection $\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall$, which always requires its demonstration by our implementation, which allows us to interpret the feasibility of the game in question by the implementation of the syntax itself.

Quantifier judgments have a trinary structure, which implies a demonstration of our “I” under the third index.

Chapter 15

Availability. Topos. Sema.

15.1 Cash is a demonstration of quantifier judgments.

Let us turn to the first proposition of the quantifier structure of syntax, the proposition $\forall\exists$. Its subject \forall points to the game in question as a pre-giveness of the presented meanings, in the connections of which this game is realized, - what we called earlier (Chapter 4) the space-container of all possible realizations (interpretation of the predicate) of the game \exists . Thus, the judgment $\forall\exists$ is a structure for interpreting game significance as values of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, it demonstrates the significance of this form.

In another syntax structure, $\exists\forall \rightarrow \forall\exists$ the values in question will also be values of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, since the proposition $\exists\forall$ demonstrating the form $\delta\alpha\xi\alpha$ can only be interpreted in connection with the proposition $\forall\exists$, since it is it that represents it (“this $\exists\forall$ ”) to the syntax. Let’s not forget that we’re talking about syntax structure. To understand the will, it must be expressed.

In any case, syntactic consideration presupposes the “availability” of the meanings presented for consideration. The pointer \forall demonstrates the meaning of “cash”. “It” is always “something it”, other than the pointer “it” itself, than its pointing, in contrast to the pointer \exists - “I”, incapable of being other from itself, - “I” always indicates its implementation of pointing: if this is not so, then who points out?

”Cash” is thus an interpretation of the quantifier proposition $\forall\exists$, i.e. interpretation of the structure of syntactic interpretation.

Let us clarify the meaning of cashness - this is the interpretation of the outsideness of the meanings under consideration to the syntactic interpretation of their meaning (the syntax of the past).

So, the condition of syntax is the presence of the considered meanings (signs),

but what does this mean from the point of view of language games? - The fact that its game meaning cannot be expressed in syntax as its own implementation, but only indicated or demonstrated as presented in cash. But is it always possible? It may happen that the syntax will implement a new (the absence of a pointer to cash) game interpretation of what is presented for consideration and use it in its own interpretation of “truth”. In this case, the condition of “cashness” as an outsider of the syntax to the considered content of the game is violated, but the “truth” interpretation can be realized.

Therefore, we will distinguish between cash language games, whose syntactic consideration does not violate the cash condition, and non-cash language games, whose syntax inevitably violates the cash condition.

15.2 Cash language game. Topos.

The cash game is usually characterized by the referential relations of its meanings. For example, in front of you is a clockwork. No matter how hard you try to understand its workings, you will never change the mechanism itself, otherwise it will not be understanding, but designing or something else, but not the syntax for the operation of the clockwork. Another example is chess. No matter how hard you try to comprehend the art of the game, you will never, through your comprehension, make the knight walk diagonally. Otherwise, it's not chess.

There is something in the meanings of the cash game that makes them permanent, definitely meaningful. These meanings have a denotation with which they are in referential relationship, as modern logistics says. We will now try to understand the meaning of this phrase.

We will not deal with the denotation as an independently existing world. Such a statement is biased for us; is dominated by the stereotypes of certain language games. We will reveal the meaning of reference as an interpretation of the quantifier judgments of syntax, thanks to which the “objective” and “denotative” realize their meaning.

Entering into the syntactic consideration of the language game, we turn to its meanings in the structure of the quantifier judgment $\forall\exists$ of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, or rather, the consideration itself is carried out as a demonstration of the index judgments of our quantifier structure. That we can point to the meanings in question as “it” in our memory demonstrates the index structure of the syntax. And as long as we are playing a syntactic language game, the meanings in question will participate in the syntax as the meanings of this quantifier form.

So, we are trying to understand the “permanence”, the “givenness” of the

structure of judgment $\forall\exists$. That is, we are trying to understand the meaning of the meaning of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, which, in turn, brings us back to chapter 4, to the spatial interpretation of the proposition of meaning. Thus, the denotative determinateness of the meanings of the cash game is a logical demonstration of the proposition of meaning in a spatial interpretation. The “immutability” and “pre-givenness” of the denotation indicate the meaningless significance of the form of memory, expressing it in the connections of spatial interpretations.

But then such a logical revelation will involve all the attributes of the space-container of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$. The available language game must form in syntactic consideration the space of its meanings - the topos of the game. Therefore, the meanings of the cash game 1) as a predestination of the receptacle space must be meaninglessly significant, i.e. signs, - this is guaranteed by the quantifier structure of syntactic interpretations $\forall\exists$. 2) The infinity of space is expressed in the fact that the signs do not define the boundaries of the game, its syntactic meaning, - since the syntax is outside the meanings under consideration. 3) The signs must be isotropic, i.e. all of them, as empty meaningful ones, should have one index structure $\forall\exists$. 4) The meaning of the signs is determined by the sign correlation in the structure of the topos of the game. 5) Meanings in their structural correlation must be open, i.e. should be interpretable in a game of syntax. All of the above five points reinterpret the spatial attributes of the meaning proposition listed at the end of the third paragraph of the fourth chapter.

If you look closely, these five points express the meaning of the referential relations of sign and denotation. The first point says that the denotation must exist before the sign pointing to it, and the sign, by its indication, can neither generate nor change the denotation; 2) the denotation itself, as cash indicated by the sign, does not yet determine its meaning, which requires its game implementation: a pocket with money and a pocket without money are equal to cash, their difference will be-come meaningful if we stick our hand into them (make a game interpretation) ; 3) any equal sign can indicate any denotation under the terms of the language game, i.e. redesignations are possible without loss of meaning; 4) the description of the denotation (its changes, functions) is possible as a correlation of signs pointing to it, whose difference is determined by the place in the semantic structure of the topos of the game; 5) it is always possible to point to an existing denotation as presented and thereby interpret it as the “existence” of the sign.

Agree that without any of these points, referential relations are impossible.

The main thing for us is that the present language game in syntactic consideration is represented by a topos of its meanings, which says by its structure that

in this connection of meanings the game is feasible.

What is necessary for the topos of the cash game to be presented for syntactic consideration?

It is necessary that the cash game be carried out in its meanings. But what is the syntax for, if there is a realized game itself? - For the fact that in the content of the game there are no interpretations of its external implementation, we can understand it only in syntax.

From what has been said, it follows that for the syntactic interpretation of a language game, at least its two-fold implementation is necessary : the first - as forming the presented topos of the game in memory - cash as the possibility of its existence; the second is as a syntactic demonstration of the symbolic correlations of the topos.

Suppose that a language game can only happen once, can we interpret its content as "truth"?

"Once" implies that we can no longer reproduce the content of the game in memory, and if so, then we cannot perform a syntactic demonstration of its game connections, i.e. interpret them as "truth".

I will give an example of "my own birth or birth of the world" (taken from "On the Certain" by L. Wittgenstein). We do not remember the moment of our birth into the world, not so much because of our lack of a developed consciousness then, but because of the fundamental impossibility of interpreting this event due to its unique uniqueness for ourselves, which does not allow us to refer to it in the reflection of syntax . The same follows with respect to the birth of the universe. Therefore, whether the world existed before us billions of years, or appeared five minutes earlier than us, or even was born together with us, is completely unverifiable for us as a "true" statement. Any argument in one direction or another will be conditioned by its own choice, forming a vicious circle in the proof - the circle of paradox. After all, nothing can deny that "the world was born with me as if (rejection of reflection) had existed before me for billions of years." Our own and world births are neither true nor false events due to the absence of referential relations in their syntactic consideration.

So, referential relations can be established with the content of an event that, in principle, happens more than once, although with the "fact" of the event itself, regardless of its content, referential relations are possible, since an empty "fact" can be repeated as much as you like as an indefinite indication of "this" , which gives rise to cosmogonic and cosmological reasoning.

The disruption of referential relations draws our attention to other, non-cash

language games.

15.3 Non-cash language games. Sema.

Let's imagine that we have some text in front of us, in which a typo is made, a letter is omitted or a comma is not put, as in the well-known expression: "execution cannot be pardoned." From the context of the content, you can correct the error and put the comma in its proper place, but, in any case, the understanding of the presented text will be determined by the very way of understanding, the syntax itself must realize the meaning of the values presented for consideration outside the relations of the past (Chapter 4, 5), and do not show it in "stock". Consequently, the content of the text in question will not be available to its syntax, and its meanings will not be referential. The first point of the referential relations described in the previous paragraph is violated: the topos of the language game ceases to be a predestination of the space-container of all its implementations, the denotation (meaning of the text) does not exist before the syntax pointing to it.

Indeed, where is the meaning of the phrase "execution cannot be pardoned"? No matter how you look at it, this meaning is not in front of us. Until we, by our own will, make a choice, i.e. let's not implement the language game of understanding, and any understanding is syntax, and we won't point to one of the two: "execute, you can't pardon" or "execute you can't, pardon", - the meaning of the presented phrase is not defined, it does not exist. To comprehend the presented phrase, our choice is required, and it is nothing but a pointer to our very understanding, to the very implementation of the syntactic game. Even in my case, when I use the vagueness of this phrase in my reasoning, I still make my choice, i.e. I give it this meaning, realizing the syntactic play outside the relations of the past, and not simply pointing to it as presented to me in the topos of signs of the play.

The language game we have considered - a text with a typo is a non-cash language game, since the syntax, when understood, realizes the meaning of its meanings as its own game meaning - this will be the main requirement for the non-cashness of language games in the future.

Let's try to explain what it means "not to indicate the predestination of meaning, but to realize it as one's own play content." That is, what is the difference between the demonstrated meaning in the syntax and its implemented game content, because both of them are involved in the syntax.

Let us be presented with some sign, for example, a hieroglyph. We are trying to understand its meaning, i.e. we are to him in the syntactic relation of the

past, expressed by the index quantifier judgment $\forall\exists$, pointing the subject \forall to our hieroglyph. To understand a hieroglyph means to interpret it in a syntactic structure $\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall$ that ends with the same index \forall , but already in place of the judgment predicate, i.e. \forall points to the realization of the meaning of the proposition $\exists\forall$ of syntax as something ('this') to be demonstrated. On the other hand, the meaning of a pointer \forall in its other implementation of pointing is "this". Therefore, \forall in place of the predicate, he points to the non-significant realization of syntax as a sign presented to it (outside): the representation of a sign interprets the outside realization of the syntax itself. And if in the course of syntactic interpretations in the topos of the meanings of the game under consideration such a sign with the above interpretive function is found, then the meaning of the hieroglyph can be spoken of as being present, indicated in the topos of the game. If such a sign (which interprets the external implementation of syntax by its representation) is not found in the topos of the game, then the indexal \forall will indicate the possibility of its implementation, which is not signified in the syntax, i.e. point to their own implementation as the meaningless significance of the "possibility" of understanding the hieroglyph, interpreting the hieroglyph with an indefinite sign. We will call such a meaning of the hieroglyph a non-cash or semantic meaning, the structure of the judgment of which by the subject indicates the very implementation of syntax $\exists\forall$, and the predicate, not finding the necessary interpretations, requires further implementation of the syntactic interpretation, i.e. implementation of the game "opportunity".

Summing up, we can say: the present, indexical meaning will be the value for which, in the syntactic structure of interpretations, $\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall$ the second proposition $\exists\forall$ can be interpreted by the sign of the present topos of the game under consideration $\forall\exists$, i.e. $(\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall) = \forall\exists$. A non-cash or semantic meaning will be a meaning for which such an interpretation is impossible, and which requires the very implementation of syntax as a language game outside the syntactic reflection of the past: $(\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall)\dots \rightarrow \forall\exists \rightarrow \cdot$. The semantic interpretation ends not with a quantifier judgment $\exists\forall$, but with a judgment $\forall\exists$, the predicate of which points to the meaningless significance of the syntax it-self, which is not presented anywhere in it, - the index "I" (\exists), and the subject to the previous syntactic judgments, i.e. on the very realization of the syntactic structure $(\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall)$, but already as a meaninglessly presented sign, the meaninglessness of which is interpreted by the presentation of the syntactic judgments themselves, i.e. by the fact that we remember them and can point to them in the same way as to the considered meanings of the topos of the language game. Semantic interpretation

is therefore syntax to syntax, since it points to its own judgments as represented.

In the index structure $(\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall)=$, $\forall\exists$ the identity sign says that the circle of the game is complete and closed in tautology, since we found in the topos a sign that interprets the meaningless significance of the implementation of syntax: judgments $\exists\forall$ and $\forall\exists$ are identical. For the semantic structure $(\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall) \rightarrow \forall\exists$, the circle of the game is not completed, but only the path or possibility of semantic interpretations is outlined, when the interpretations of the syntax are considered as signs of the presented topos. The structure of the same $(\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall) \rightarrow \forall\exists$ presupposes the further execution of the game, considering itself as the actual value “x”: $(\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall) \rightarrow \forall\exists=x : (\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall) \rightarrow \forall\exists$, where after the colon the usual indexical interpretation of the syntax is performed, of course, if it is possible, the first indexical \forall of which points to the sign “x”. In what follows, we will call such an indexical interpretation of semantic meanings the cashing out of a syntactic language game.

Let’s demonstrate our formal structures of indexical $(\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall) = \forall\exists$ and semantic $(\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall) \rightarrow \forall\exists = x : (\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall) = \forall\exists$ interpretation on the example of reading text in familiar and unfamiliar languages.

In the first case, we read a word, i.e. we represent it as a sign $\forall\exists$, then we recognize it, remember its meaning $\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall$ (the implementation of memory as a language game of syntax), which the predicate points to \forall and which coincides $(=)$ with the sign in front of us $\forall\exists$. Coincidence, in turn, says that the language game is over, the circle is closed and the word has been read by us. Here’s what the notation $(\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall) =$ means $\forall\exists$.

Consider the second case, we are also trying to read a word unfamiliar to us, i.e. represent it as a sign $\forall\exists$, remember it $\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall$, but the predicate \forall points to the empty significance of the implementation of the syntax, and not to the sign of the topos, i.e. we know that there is meaning (presence as an empty significance), but we cannot point to it as a sign presented in our memory. Then we play further: we take a dictionary and interpret it according to the alphabetical index, i.e. we perform a semantic interpretation of the syntax $(\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall) \rightarrow \forall\exists$, thanks to which we find the sign of the translation of an unfamiliar word $(\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall) \rightarrow \forall\exists =x$, after which we read the rubric “x”, as in the first case: $(\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall) = \forall\exists$. In symbolic notation, it all looks like this:

$$(\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall) \rightarrow \forall\exists = x : (\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall) = \forall\exists.$$

Let’s pay attention to the second element of the same structure $(\exists\forall \rightarrow \forall\exists)$, it coincides with the quantifier structure of the form $\delta o \xi \alpha$, and in our case it corresponds to the dictionary translation. Indeed, why did we get the idea that

the sign "x", indicated in the dictionary, corresponds to the sign $\forall\exists$ presented for syntactic consideration? From nothing. We just made an implicit (playful oblivion of the heteronomous form) choice, assumed that the dictionary definition of the match is correct, i.e. made a language game of the form $\delta o\xi\alpha$, which was reflected to us by the quantifier structure as part of the semantic interpretation $(\exists\forall \rightarrow \forall\exists)=x$ (if we do not trust either the dictionary or translators, then we will never recognize an unfamiliar word, - volition - the need for our under-standing) .

The doxic element of the semantic structure $\exists\forall \rightarrow \forall\exists$ is not such an unimportant thing, allowing the choice of dictionaries. The fact is that this element indicates, when reading the text by an index, \exists the implementation of syntax (indexal "I") as a reader and, on the other hand, identifies (assumes - the form $\delta o\xi\alpha$) with the sign "x", and it is already like the sign $\forall\exists$ is represented in the topos of present meanings. It turns out that the doxic element, as it were, moves the reader (the implementation of the syntax - \exists) into the presented topos of the language game, for example, into the novel being read. Earlier it was called - to be captured by reading, to live among the heroes of the novel, to experience the numinous myth. And if the author has managed to force the reader to make this interpretive element, to realize it by his own will, as if referring to a dictionary of feelings and images, then this is a talented author. The secret of talent, therefore, is not in the brightness of the presentation, but in the ability to make the reader perform the doxic element of the structure of semantic interpretations. Not to subjugate the reader, but to give him the opportunity to express him-self in the presented images, since true understanding is at the same time self-expression. We have just shown this at a formal level. To make this element of the form $\delta o\xi\alpha$ the reader is capable only of his own free will. Although "own will" is also a conditional game interpretation.

15.4 "I" - seme and sign.

The quantifiers \forall and \exists can be considered, as mentioned earlier, as interpretations of the indexes "this" and "I", respectively. Now we will talk about the semantic interpretation of the index "I", the index on its own implementation of pointing, interpreted by the "player" of our games. That is, we will talk about the semantic structure of what we are used to thinking of ourselves, our personality, the essence of the human self.

What is the formal meaning of our "I"?

Let us immediately point out the non-cash character of the "I", interpreted by the quantifier judgment $\exists\forall$. The subject of the judgment points to its own

realization (\exists), the meaningless significance of which must be interpreted by the index \forall , i.e. by some represented sign (usually our body), whose external representation interprets the emptiness of the exercise of an indexical judgment. In formal terms, it looks like this:

$$(\exists \forall \rightarrow \forall \exists) = x : (\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) = \forall \exists.$$

The first part of the formula interprets the cashing out of its own implementation of the syn-tax, demonstrating it in the sign "x"; the second is an indexical consideration of the sign "x" as given and outside the syntactic demonstration.

As you can see, the formula for understanding the indexal "I" almost completely coincides with the quantifier structure of semantic interpretations, with the difference that in our case there is no judgment $\forall \exists$, since the contentless significance of the implementation of syntax is interpreted, which is not representable in itself.

Our formula can be called a quantifier structure of "significance" (sign) irrespective of the presented content, i.e. the quantifier structure of a formal sign, as something presented, i.e. symbol structure .

This structure is a presentation of an unrepresented implementation of the memory form , i.e. the structure of "oblivion in mindfulness", since in it the presentation of the sign "x" appears out of nowhere, interpreted by significance in general. But "from nowhere" is not conceivable in the content of games, even as "from nowhere" it must have a beginning and an end in a game. In order to eliminate the groundless "from nowhere" from the content, to forget it, it is interpreted by the pre-givenness of the sign, by the fact that the sign is thought to exist independently in relation to the syntactic consideration the $(\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) = \forall \exists$, index "I" is interpreted as "this is me".

The quantifier structure of the sign can be deciphered in the words: "I" am "this I". And from now on, "this I" will tell me about my existence, about the implementation of my language games in the syntactic consideration of "this I" - $\forall \exists$ i.e. substituting a judgment $\forall \exists$ ("this is me") at the beginning of our structure, we get the structure of semantic interpretations:

$$(\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) \rightarrow \forall \exists = x : (\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) = \forall \exists,$$

in which the meaninglessness of the sign acquires a playful content, as "this" sign with "these" semantic interpretations ($\exists \forall \rightarrow \forall \exists$). My "I" becomes a "person".

Consider the semantic structure in a slightly different way, namely:

$$\forall \exists \rightarrow (\exists \forall \rightarrow \forall \exists) = x : (\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) = \forall \exists,$$

from such a consideration it is clear that all game meanings have meaning

only in so far as they are regarded as our own realization of memory. Everything that exists “exists” only in the game interpretation of our games, the mechanism or structure of such an interpretation is my “I”, i.e. structure of meaningless significance:

$$(\exists \forall \rightarrow \forall \exists) = x : (\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) = \forall \exists.$$

It follows from this that our “I”, my “personality” are transformed from the subject of their own existence into a method of semantic interpretation.

15.5 Cash and memory.

Syntactic relations, chapter three, depending on which game syntax considers: another to it-self, its realization as the meaning of “this meaning” or as its play unity (the circle of the game), can be syntaxes of the past, present and future (I do not say time) . In the quantifier structures of syntax judgments, they look like this:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{past syntax} - (\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) &= \forall \exists; \\ \text{syntax of present} - (\exists \forall \rightarrow \forall \exists) &= x : (\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) = \forall \exists; \\ \text{future syntax} - (\exists \forall \rightarrow \forall \exists) &\rightarrow \exists \forall : \forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall = \forall \exists. \end{aligned}$$

If the first two expressions do not need special explanation: the past is the topos of what is present, the present is a demonstration of empty significance in pointing to one’s “I”, then the last expression, the syntax of the future, requires explanation.

The first part of the expression $(\exists \forall \rightarrow \forall \exists)$ is a demonstration of the empty significance of the exercise of memory, but unlike the present, its significance is not interpreted by some sign “x”, “I” is not “this I”, and further demonstrates the implementation of syntax, the indexical judgment of which points to $\exists \forall$ itself syntax (subject \exists) as something different to him, “indefinite” in him, “possible” (predicate \forall) - in a word, “future”. The last interpretation is given by the second part of the expression $(\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) = \forall \exists$.

If we want to interpret the future not as “indefinitely significant”, and give it a semantic interpretation, for example, introduce the concept of “probable event”, then we must interpret the quantifier proposition that ends indefinitely as a sign, $\exists \forall$ i.e. $\exists \forall \rightarrow \forall \exists = x$, and reduce our formula to the semantic structure of interpreting the future as represented:

$$(\exists \forall \rightarrow \forall \exists) \rightarrow (\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) = x : (\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) = \forall \exists.$$

We have identified two identical brackets in the formula in the chain of interpretative judgments, which speak of the reflexivity of the interpretations of the syntactic structure itself $(\exists \forall \rightarrow \forall \exists)$. That is, the structure of the hermeneutic

circle - the proposition of meaning - is clearly demonstrated in the interpretive connections of syntax. Earlier (Chapter 4, §5) we said: in order to interpret the future, it must be presented as a semantic structure representing in the circle of the game the proposition of meaning (circle: “one of two: the battle of Salamis will either take place or not take place”), - our quantifier structure expressed the same.

In all three variants of syntactic relations, the quantifier structure of interpretations ends with the same - the syntax structure of the past $(\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) = \forall \exists$. It follows from this that everything that exists, everything that can be realized in memory, exists as its own cash, open to syntactic consideration. Even the “absolutely incomprehensible” and “inconceivable” is already in these words presented and comprehended by us with absolute accuracy as “such”.

From this, two incorrect conclusions are usually made: that everything that exists can be with the existing in the presence - the objectivity of being; and the second, following from the first, is that memory is a collection of records (a record is a kind of objectivity). The error of these conclusions lies in forgetting that these conclusions about the unconditional “presence” are themselves made in language games, on which, in turn, syntactic constructions are possible: the syntax that occurs on these pages is itself a language game and, therefore, allows you to do conclusions within their stipulated limits. Therefore, we have no grounds to speak of “existent” being, since “representability” and “availability” do not point us to an empty meaningful “being” (implementation of memory) as such, it cannot be pointed out, it can only be demonstrated by its existence. , - but on the way of understanding this “being” and this “memory” in “this” syntax.

The world is present by virtue of our reflective consideration of the world, pointing to it with the index “this”. “This” and the “presence” of the world are two mutually interpretive moments of our language games. The meaning of “this” is impossible without the present denotation, the object of the world, the meaning of “cash” is impossible without the implementation of the index “this”: what is this object that cannot be pointed to? But, on the other hand, the presence of the world will at the same time be a demonstration of the significance of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, a demonstration of a proposition, thus the existence of the world and the realization of our memory will be indistinguishable for us. Moreover, “indistinguishability”, due to its playful nature, will not express either the primacy of memory over the world, or the primacy of the world over reflective memory, since the meaning of “indistinguishability” is propositionally demonstrated, and not interpreted, it does not contain a subject of difference - our meaningfully

interpreted “ Γ ”.

Chapter 16

Syntax of available language games.

16.1 Topos of the available language game.

The syntax of the available language game considers it as a topos of structural connections of meanings. The topos of the game is not just the presence of meanings, but at the same time their structural correlation, determined by the play of syntax. The “availability” of a topos also indicates the nature of its syntactic consideration, since the very meaning of “availability” is already realized in syntax; the structure of the topos is the realization of the syntactic demonstration of the game in “these” meanings, in “these” game connections. The “structure” acquires its meaning not in the presence of the topos, but in the semantic interpretations of the syntax itself, - the structure of the topos does not exist before the implementation of the syntactic consideration, but, on the other hand, the “topos” itself, outside its structure, will not be the topos of “this game”.

Let us recall an example from “Philosophical Investigations” by L. Wittgenstein (part II, XI) with a drawing depicting at the same time both the head of a duck and the head of a hare - Z-U-head. Before us on a sheet of paper is the presence of a certain geometric structure depicting the head of a hare. But is the structure before us, or is it just cash? - We ask ourselves: is it a duck? - And we see the head of a duck. But this is a different semantic structure. One presence can have several semantic structures, everything depends on the way of syntactic interpretation (on the way of “presence”), on its semantics. Asking the question: is it a duck? - we change the syntactic interpretations and, consequently, the structure of the topos of the game in question.

What, then, is meant by the structure of the topos of a game?

Only one thing - the openness of the topos of the language game for semantic interpretations of the syntax that considers it. The “existence” of a topos has the meaning of a proposition $\forall\exists$, which predicate points to an empty implementation of syntax, i.e. on the “possibility” of a game interpretation of “cash”.

Speaking about the structure of the topos of the game, at the same time we are talking about the way it is syntactically interpreted, which implies our ability to play the game in question, i.e. demonstrate it.

But you can object: we have such semantic structures at hand, which, by their very presence, also determine the mode of their consideration, i.e. syntax is not external to them, for example, the three-dimensionality of the space in front of you. No matter how hard you try, anyway, you will be guided in it by three coordinates.

- Not at all, there are examples of interpreting space not with three, but with six or four coordinates (north, south, east, west). Everything depends on the meaning of “orientation”, and it is determined by its language game. Another question is that the openness (read - structuredness) of the topos of “space” makes it possible to carry out various semantic interpretations, the mutual interpretation of which leads to the identification of logical forms, in particular the trinary structure of the judgment, which we interpret by the certainty of syntax. There is certainty here, but the certainty of our entire form of thought, and not of this considered topos of the language game.

Thus, the “presence” of a topos always acts as its structurality, but, on the other hand, structurality is also possible as a kind of presence: in order for the structure to take place, i.e. semantic interpretations of syntax have been realized, syntax must interpret something different from its interpretations that have not yet been realized. He must interpret the significance of the “cashness” itself, the judgments of which $(\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall) = \forall\exists$ are usually thought of as the “representability” of the structure of the topos. The structure thus interprets the proposition $\forall\exists$ of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$. The very possibility of pointing to the present topos, to its meaninglessly significant representation, i.e. to carry out interpretations of the well-known quantifier structure $(\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall) = \forall\exists$, is the basis and guarantor of the semantic interpretation of the “topos”. The way of “presence” is demonstrated by the way of syntactic interpretation.

Consider the structure of semantic interpretations:

$$(\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall) \rightarrow \forall\exists = x : (\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall) = \forall\exists.$$

It is based on the same element $\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall$, but the element $\exists\forall \rightarrow \forall\exists$ is a doxic connection of judgments, i.e. is equivalent to the equal sign between $(\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall)$

and $\forall\exists$, which is always possible as our will, not considered, i.e. forgotten in interpretations of syntax (dictionary correctness). Consequently, if we implement the element $\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall$, then the entire semantic structure of interpretations (not specific interpretations, but their quantifier structure) is feasible, since we do not consider the implementation of the syntax itself in “existence”, and therefore syntactic interpretations can be re-interpreted by the index structure $(\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall) = \forall\exists$. And in this structure itself, the doxic element is present as an unconsidered tautology that closes the circle of syntax (the equal sign).

The oblivion of tautologies in our formulas is indicated by the colon sign (:), which, in comparison of two structures, shows what is eliminated (forgotten) from the content of the syntax, i.e. its doxic element.

16.2 List of syntax rules.

Structuring the topos, syntax interprets the presented presence of the topos by the realization of the game in “these” structural connections of “these” meanings. The meaning of correlated connections is interpreted by the game “unity”, i.e. meaningless significance of the “cash” of the topos. “Cash” is considered the unity of all connections of meanings in which the considered language game is feasible, i.e. the unity of the list of syntactic rules interpreted in the index structure $(\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall) = \forall\exists$, where the index \forall at the beginning points to the emptiness of the “presence” of the topos, and at the end - to the “unity” of its structure as a list of those game connections in which the game under consideration is feasible.

Interpretations of the syntax are completed by pointing to the presented topos of the cash game as the “truth” (it is the unity of the list) of its values, as a result of which, the “truth” of the game can also be represented in the topos of meanings, as well as their “cash”. That is, when implementing the syntax of a cash language game, we forget about its doxic element and place the “truth” of meanings in the cash topos itself, “cash” is thought of as “truth,” although the meaning of “truth” is realized in the syntax, and not in the game under consideration. This is the basis for a false assertion about the propositional, and not the playful nature of “truth”: supposedly there are true and false sentences, regardless of how they are considered.

The usual argument for the propositional nature of “truth” is the judgments of empirical facts, in essence the judgments of the available language game. Indeed, you will not deny that the sentence “the fact that the world exists” (or you yourself exist) is a true sentence.

But what does it mean that the world exists? - That its presence is under-

stood by us as "existing". "Truth" points to the realization of "this" syntactic interpretation, and not to the very existence of the topos of the "existing world". "Truth" is a game element of syntax, whose meaningless significance of implementation in the game allows us to interpret the "existence" of a topos by the "unity" or "truth" of its syntactic rules. Syntax as a game removes from its content this reflexive meaning of "truth" and thus places it in the topos as an attribute of its meanings.

It is interesting that Moore was partly right in arguing the external existence of the world by the silent demonstration of his own hands, since he demonstrated that way of syntactic consideration in which the meaning of the "external world" is realized. Showing his hands, he demonstrated the syntactic interpretation of the "cash" of the presented "truth". Moore's silence should symbolize the ban on further syntactic considerations of the most demonstrated mode of interpretation, depriving the "outer world" of its playful meaning.

16.3 Conceptual apparatus.

So, the list of syntactic rules is a semantic interpretation of the cash game topos as its structure, demonstrating the game realization in the presented meanings and connections. Let us turn to what is forgotten in such an interpretation and, therefore, implements it. Let us turn to the "truth" index - to the index for the implementation of syntactic interpretations. Note that syntax itself is not a language game, since it considers its own realization in "truth".

What does it mean to point out the true meanings of the language game, i.e. on the values in connection with which the game is feasible? - It means to interpret the "existence" of the topos by the "unity" of its structure - "truth". But the meaning of all these concepts is its implementation, which is outside of syntax, i.e. "truth", "unity" - the meanings used in the interpretation of syntax without explanation, they are a priori clear for him, as they express the external implementation of syntax. A priori clarity is the reverse side of the forgotten (empty) sense of "truth" and "unity", indicating the implementation of syntactic demonstrations of the game. Therefore, knowing the meaning of "unity" and "truth" is identical to the ability to play the language game and its syntax.

I will call such indexes for the implementation of syntax its conceptual apparatus. The "a priori clarity" of which allows us to interpret the "existence" of the presented topos by its structural "unity" - "truth".

As a result, the syntax of the available language game is characterized by three moments: the topos of game meanings, the list of syntactic rules, and the

conceptual apparatus of syntactic consideration - a priori clear meanings used without explanation (the condition of game oblivion).

Note that the “a priori clarity” of the conceptual apparatus remains such as long as syntax is being implemented, but as soon as syntax itself becomes, in turn, the subject of syntactic consideration, the “a priori clarity” of concepts turns into a demonstration of semantic interpretations of syntax, i.e. into the semantics of the meaningless, which cannot but lead to problems in the syntax itself, since it is carried out as the elimination (oblivion) of interpretations of the meaning of the conceptual apparatus from its content - the syntax becomes impossible. Let's illustrate this.

That is, let's try to reveal the meaning of the conceptual apparatus in the content of the syntax of the cash game, and see if then a “truth” interpretation of its judgments is possible.

Imagine that we have before us (syntax) multicolored balls, and we must choose red ones from them (read - “true”) and put them separately from the rest. This simple task will be performed by any sighted person (not colorblind), i.e. one who can play the syntactical game of identifying colors. We do this - and point to a separate pile of red balls. The question is settled completely - the game is over. Now let's try to do the same, but in order to choose a red ball, we will each time answer the questions (syntax to syntax): “why do we consider this ball to be red?”, “how do we know that we can distinguish colors?” . - Any answer to these questions will appeal to the demonstration of color discrimination, i.e. to the implementation of the game of choosing the red ball, but we can-not complete it before the answer. As a result, the choice of red balls and the answer to our questions form a vicious circle: the meaning of one requires the prior realization of the meaning of the other. The case will end with the fact that we will not be able to take a single red ball. Our game will turn out to be unrealizable, since an additional condition for answering the questions posed will reveal the meaning of the “a priori clear” (i.e, forgettable) conceptual apparatus of our syntax “choosing red balls”.

Thus, we have demonstrated that the implementation of syntax is identical to the elimination (or oblivion) of its content of semantic interpretations of its own conceptual apparatus; syntax is possible with a priori clarity of its concepts, i.e. when used without explanation. The “clarity” of the concepts of syntax is the interpretation of the immersion (the implementation of “oblivion in mindfulness”) of our “I” in “this” game.

16.4 Conceptual and abstract.

The identification of the conceptual apparatus within the framework of its own syntax does not carry out any meaning, except for the circle of the game, demonstrating the reflexivity of memory. But we can get around this difficulty by constructing a new syntactic game with its own conceptual apparatus, interpreting the conceptual apparatus of the preceding syntax.

Let's see how the meanings of the present language game correlate with the game interpretations of the conceptual apparatus of its syntax. Of course, such consideration is possible in the next stage of syntax.

Thus, we have a structurally interpreted topos of the cash game and an interpreted conceptual apparatus of its syntax. Now we want to carry out a mutual interpretation of the meanings of the topos and the meanings of the conceptual apparatus. Since the conceptual apparatus points to the implementation of interpretations of the “availability” of the topos, then the relationship between the values of the topos and the values of the conceptual apparatus will be determined, on the one hand, by the “place” of the considered values in the structure of the topos of the game, and, on the other hand, the meanings of the conceptual apparatus will interpret itself “place” of the topos as its location in the structural connections that carry out the language game, i.e. as an empty meaningful realization of the form of memory. Consequently, the meanings of topos and the conceptual apparatus in mutual interpretation will demonstrate the hermeneutic circle of the game, expressing the conditionality of the “abstract” and “concrete”, where “abstract” will interpret the external implementation of the language game (“place” as such), and “concrete” will interpret “the place” of the topos the place of “these values”.

“Abstraction” is an index to the externality of the implementation of the syntax of cash and play, whose semantic interpretation is possible as a demonstration of the game circle.

Further identification of the conceptual abstractions of syntaxes will lead to an understanding of the deeper relationships of memory forms, ending with the demonstration of logical forms: when some “abstractions” will be interpreted by exactly the same abstractions, which gives rise to “cash out” logical concepts and place them in the topos of the meanings under consideration. This is how “truth” finds its “place” in our world.

16.5 Cash and denial. Gödel's theorem.

One of the interesting abstractions of the conceptual apparatus is “negation” or “falsehood”. Earlier I devoted the eleventh chapter to them. Let's try to explain the old meaning of ”lie” in the new interpretations of ”cash”.

“Lie” is a special index of the conceptual apparatus. If “unity”, “whole”, “true” indicate the implementation of syntax in the present connections of the topos of the game, then “false” also indicates the implementation of syntax, but as an extraneous value to the present values of the topos. For ”lie” there are no available connections of the game, since it is the reflexivity of its implementation.

If the “truth” and the present values of the topos form mutually interpretive connections : “truth” is the unity of the structure of the topos, the “availability” of the topos is the truth of the game connections, then “falsehood” and the values of the topos do not form such connections (try to build a circle of “lies” without using negation of “not”), since the reflexivity of memory is never placed in the presence of a topos. “Lie” is not semantically interpreted, but only demonstrated as a series of “not this, not this ...”, etc. to infinity, since everything that is carried out in memory is different from “falsehood” in its meaning. Consequently, ”false” and ”truth” cannot form a complete dichotomy, but are independent concepts of the apparatus of syntax; one index indicates the meaningless significance of the play meaning, the other indicates the reflexivity of the play connection.

But we still manage to interpret the “falsehood” by the unity of the structure of the topos, but already at the next level of syntax, where the “unity” of the structure is interpreted as some game meaning located in another topos, in the topos of the syntax of the first syntax. “Lie” takes on the meaning of the semantic interpretation of “unity” in relation to other meanings that are not included in the topos of the first syntax. “Lie” becomes a “negation” of what is present, the difference between two already indistinguishable topoi, although its meaning remains the same “falsehood” - the reflexivity of the form of memory.

So, “denial” is always “negation of this”, there is no such thing as negation at all, if we forget about it, then sooner or later we will come across various paradoxes, one of which is Gödel's in-completeness theorem (chapter 11, § 4).

Gödel considers the topos of a certain available language game, whose unity of structure is expressed by a system of axioms (conceptual apparatus) in the light of the “truth” and, importantly, “untruth” (provability) of topos judgments. If we confine ourselves to the indicated topos (the theory is not an extension of arithmetic), then no incompleteness arises, since everything related to the structure of the topos will interpret the axioms by the “unity” of the structure. But through

“negation” as the reflexivity of “falsehood” (here they are easy to confuse), the boundaries of the topos disappear (all statements of arithmetic are included), since the semantic interpretations of “proofs of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems” constantly get into it, - “falsehood” cashes them out “denial.” As a result, the topos of axioms merges with the topos of Gödel’s syntax itself, fortunately, we are talking about logical abstractions that allow such a mixture. Indeed: “not this” of the topos of axioms means “this is this” of the topos of syntax, realizing the meaning of “not this”, and indistinguishable from the first topos. As a result, anomalous judgments appear in Gödel’s analysis: on the one hand, they do not belong to the topos of axioms, they express the meaning of “negation”, on the other hand, they carry out Gödel’s consideration itself and are cashed in by the meaning of “falsehood” in the same topos of axioms, i.e. .e. they are true, realizing Gödel’s syntax, but since they are not in the topos in the sense of “negation”, they are not provable from the axioms. Because of the confusion of “falsehood” and “negation,” incompleteness arises.

But how did this confusion in Gödel’s proof come about?

Yes, it is not easy to organize it, since “negation” and “falsehood” are two reflexive and indexicals - for this Gödel needed the structure of game reflection: judgments, their Gödel numbers and diagonalization (Gödel numbers of Gödel numbers).

What is the meaning of Gödel’s results?

First, Gödel stumbled upon the non-cash character of logical language games by revealing the reflective structure of meaning.

Second: the non-propositional nature of “truth” and “falsehood”. If there are true judgments that cannot be interpreted as “true” (irreducibility to axioms), then “truth” itself becomes meaning-less as an integral attribute of meaning.

Third, it is possible to speak of “truth” and “negation” without confusing the topos of meanings and the topos of their syntax: semantic interpretations of syntax should not fit into the structure under consideration.

Fourth: the proofs presented by Kurt Gödel, however, like all modern mathematical logic, are essentially language experimentation, leading to the concept of “language game”. Mathematical logic, using the apparatus of logical formalism, builds complex reflective structures that reveal the correlation of the a priori meanings of the “symbol”, “sign”, “truth”, “proof” with their real game functions, which clarifies the forgotten foundations of our games and desacralizes the idols of the metaphysics of the sign.

Chapter 17

Syntax of non-cash language game.

17.1 Syntax as non-cash.

Any non-cash language game can be considered as syntactic. We shall devote the present section to the proof of this.

Not every syntax is non-cash, - a game of chess by “rules”, when the move is chosen on the basis of theoretical knowledge (a list of syntactic rules), but any non-cash game can be considered as some syntax of a cash game.

Non-cash, as we have defined it, is the interpretation by the language game of its own fulfillment, either directly or indirectly. The main thing is that in the course of game interpretations, judgments by their subject must point to their own implementation of the game and, therefore, the non-cash game becomes indistinguishable from its syntax, and its syntax becomes a double syntax - the syntax of syntax.

In the language of quantifier structures, what was said above boils down to the fact that the first subject of the structure of available interpretations $(\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall) = \forall\exists$ points to a value with the quantifier structure of the symbol: $(\exists\forall \rightarrow \forall\exists) = x : (\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall) = \forall\exists$. As a result, syntactic interpretations interpret the doxic element $(\exists\forall \rightarrow \forall\exists)$, whose oblivion results in the present syntax $(\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall) = \forall\exists$, - its judgments can no longer be characterized by an index form (the forgettable is revealed), their quantifier structure becomes clearly semantic: $(\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall) \rightarrow \forall\exists = x : (\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall) = \forall\exists$, where the first subject indicates the structure of the sign: $(\exists\forall \rightarrow \forall\exists) = x : (\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall) = \forall\exists$, so that the indexal -“I” is ultimately interpreted \exists , indicating the implementation of the syntax. But the semantic interpretation begins with a judgment $\forall\exists$ pointing to the present topos, therefore,

the emptiness of the realization of a sign or symbolic structure must be placed in the topos as a present sign "x". Syntax is cashed in, symbol structures appear in the topos of meanings: $(\exists \forall \rightarrow \forall \exists) = x : (\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) = \forall \exists$, and syntax interpretations become explicitly semantic.

In other words, any non-existent language game can be considered as a syntax of an available topos, among the meanings of which are symbolic structures.

But is it possible in this case to speak of a topos at all? - Yes and no. Yes - as about the contentlessly significant "cash"; no - as about the representation of the structure, since the latter, through the symbolic meanings of the topos, always presupposes its further reinterpretation (we do not fully know the syntactic method of interpretation, its method is non-existent), therefore the topos of non-existent syntax loses structural certainty. That is, when performing semantic structuring of the available topos, we, due to the presence of symbolic values in it, cannot interpret its structure in the index form: $\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall = \forall \exists$, since the structure of the topos will interpret the implementation of this indication, which dooms us to its endless interpretation.

Of course, there are no interpretations to infinity, and the very emptiness of the "infinite" ends the non-existent syntax. This is done in a banal way: under the meaning of the symbol "x" they begin to understand certain cashed structures of syntax, placing them in a topos, and thereby demonstrate the hermeneutic circle through meaningless indexes (truth, etc.). The emptiness of the "infinite" interprets the emptiness of the circle, which demonstrates the very realization of syntactic interpretation, the very possibility of an infinite interpretation.

It follows from all this that in the topos of non-present syntax there must always be indexical meanings that close the circle of the game, whose meaning is shown to be clear a priori. As a rule, the topos symbols take on the role of these indexes.

Indeed, what is "one" as the significance of a number? - A pointer to the possibility of pointing, to the possibility of counting.

17.2 Cash and structure. Proposition.

The non-cash syntax is carried out as its cashing out. But how long can cashing out be carried out? Or - what is cashed in the syntax?

The available syntax ends with the interpretation of the "presence" by the "unity" (or other) of syntactic rules, eliminating the interpretation of the conceptual apparatus from the content. In non-cash syntax, the conceptual apparatus is placed in a semantically interpreted topos of meanings - these are symbols and

their interpretations that require their own game interpretation. That is, non-cash syntax tries to interpret its conceptual apparatus, but the implementation of syntax is identical to the elimination of this interpretation from its content. Therefore, in order to implement non-cash syntax, it is necessary to interpret its implementation, but outside of its semantic interpretations. A task that has one solution is to close syntactic interpretations through index symbols into a hermeneutic circle demonstrating the implementation of syntax. Therefore, non-cash syntax will be realized or cashed in when the proposition of meaning is explicitly represented in the structure of its interpretations, demonstrating the content of which will be the meanings of the conceptual apparatus.

As a result, the very method of syntactic consideration can be characterized by the demonstrated conceptual apparatus, its own proposition of the game, irreducible to any other interpretations, except for the demonstration in the hermeneutic circle. Of course, the propositionality of the conceptual apparatus (the proposition of “this game”) can crumble as a result of the following steps of syntactic consideration, then the proposition of the game turns into abstractions. As a proper proposition, we will consider only the demonstration of the hermeneutic circle, which is reproduced in any syntax.

It follows from all this that if you want to define the whole structure of the topos of non-cash syntax, you need to demonstrate on all clarified interpretations the hermeneutical circle of its play. In itself, this statement does not contain anything remarkable, since in order to reveal the proposition of the game, it is necessary to determine the structure of the topos. But the non-cash syntax is the syntax of the syntax, and so on. to infinity, closed by a demonstration of a logical form. Consequently, in order to determine the structure of the topos of non-cash syntax, it is necessary to interpret on all the cashed interpretations the proposition of a logical form, expressed, for example, in logical connectives.

It must be understood that this is not an algorithm for absolute understanding - it does not exist, since someone must also identify logical forms, but this is the basis for the following important conclusion: if a proposition of meaning is revealed in logical forms for all language games that lead to the demonstration of this proposition, then new games, new in structural content, you will not create. You have cashed out the whole form of life, and you are left with only epigonism, whether it be science, art or philosophy. Forms of thought are mortal. Their death is in their logic.

17.3 Semantic illusion of the sign.

The conceptual apparatus of non-cash syntax is demonstrated by its circle of play, in which propositional indexes participate in connection with semantic interpretations in such a way that an impression of the richness of the sign-indexal is created. There is an "illusory" opportunity to comprehend the "truth" in much the same way as we comprehend the structure of a mechanism or some object.

Let us consider the meaning of this "illusoryness".

The meaning of the illusion of the game interpretation of the "sign" is that we can talk about it, as well as about any game moment, because with this sentence I am interpreting the sign. Then what is the illusory nature of such an interpretation? - In the fact that it has no meaningful ending outside of itself, outside of the demonstration of the most interpreted index. All semantic interpretations of indexals refer to the demonstration of a hermeneutic circle, the way out of which, in order not to fall into another, is a simple indication of the very presence of a perfect circle: - "I" \exists can realize it, \forall - "this" is its realization.

Let me explain using the example of "one" and "many". What is the one? - "The significance of the correlations of the many". - What is a lot? - "The Significance of Interpretations of the One". Now, in the first answer, we substitute the second answer for the place of "many", and we get: "the one is the significance of the correlation of the significance of the interpretations of the one". If the first two answers give the impression of being meaningful, then the second, their variation, is the most ordinary rubbish, the only one that showed us that "the one is the one", i.e. just something meaningful.

Conclusion - indexes are not interpreted, indexes are shown.

What is the reason for this?

The fact that semantic attempts to interpret indexes are carried out in a quantorial structure ($\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall \rightarrow \forall\exists$), which interprets both the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ and the form $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$, i.e. heteronomous forms of the language game (Chapter 12). But in the identification of heteronomous forms, the game cannot be realized as a statement of certainty, since the identification of one of the heteronomous forms makes it impossible to play the other, as a result of which dialectical throwing around the hermeneutic circle of these unperformed games is formed, which can be interrupted in the only way - to point to the circle of the game. like a meaningless sign.

17.4 Propositionality - forms of life.

The conclusion of the third paragraph can be formulated more precisely: the propositional structure does not interpret the form of memory, but demonstrates it. This is the essence and basis of the possibility of understanding something. We understand something exactly to the extent that we are able to realize this something as our form of memory - to realize and demonstrate, i.e. to cash it out - to place its realization in the topos of our memory, "I" to interpret as "this is me".

Propositional demonstration is thus the foundation of all the diversity of the meaningful. But if you look at my interpretation of the proposition, or at its modern interpretation - all the same, the structure of the proposition will be pale enough that "our variety of language games came out of it." The fact is amazing, but its amazingness lies in a false attempt to comprehend the proposition semantically, to think of it as some core object from which everything in our cultural tradition is born. Any such interpretation is illusory, although this illusory nature creates the game reality of our life - this is the essence of both the illusory and the real. If illusoryness casts doubt on reality, then reality equally casts doubt on illusoryness, being the realization of its meaning.

The meaning of the proposition is revealed as a system of memory actions in indexal signs, representing the illusory nature of its semantic interpretation by the game reality of our existence. While existing, we forget about the illusory nature of game interpretations, since we ourselves are realized in their implementation.

Life, cashing out its myths, makes them real.

Let me explain this.

Since everything understood is realized as a form of memory, then any syntax of language games can be interpreted in the structures of hermeneutic circles, which our "I" points to - the illusory nature of the conceivable. Thus, everything that exists turns out to be an interpretation of our "I". And the "I" itself is that way of interpreting the empty meaningful, whose playful reality creates our form of life - the most real of the real: one can doubt the reality of God and the world, but one can-not doubt the reality of the doubts themselves, etc.

Otherwise: in what way we understand and interpret our own "I", in this way our life is realized.

How does our "I" forget the illusory nature of semantic interpretations? - The interpretation of our existence as the existence of some significant unity - the subject of existence: life is always represented by the life of some "I", although, perhaps, it is not it.

But you say that such a formal unity is inherent in any thinking, and therefore it is meaning-less to talk about different forms of thinking and life.

Let us note that the proposition of meaning is not reduced only to an indication of the meaningless significance of the “single”. The proposition of meaning is expressed in complex semantic structures that appear on the way of syntactic consideration, the essence of which is not in the definition of “who” plays games, but through “his” understanding to realize “his other” (reflection) in one or another cultural tradition.

In other words, formal unity is necessarily revealed in games, but it does not have to be interpreted a priori by a clear player in our games. For example, in the syntax presented on these pages, the unity of the “I” is not a subject of comprehension, I don’t have it at all, but a way of creating the language games of our Western culture. And because of this, my thinking is not Western thinking, but the thinking of its reflexive syntax. It breaks the reality of the semantics of our life, desacralizes its idols of science, religion, philosophy, but pays for it with a formality. By the way, it fully provides an opportunity to think of the player of life not as “I”, but as “all of us”, although this palliative will not give anything new - the collective “I” is the same “I”. It will be more radical if my thinking puts an end to the very reflexivity of thought, considering it a priori clear, like our “I”, i.e. will put an end to “personality”, “science”, “religion”, “art”, etc. So other forms of life are possible.

The trouble is that we are fundamentally unable to understand them in our thinking, since for this they must be implemented and, therefore, created.

You object - a person lives by interests, not by forms.

“Interest” is also an interpretation of our “I”, the same semantic illusory nature of the meaningless. “Interest” means that we are absorbed in our games, that we forget ourselves in them. It is not for nothing that oblivion and intoxication were considered, and are still considered, the closest states to God, to true being. Enthusiasm is an obsession with God or truth. “Interest”, therefore, does not contradict my conclusions, but confirms them, interpreting “forgetfulness in remembering” in its own way.

17.5 Structure of understanding, three-dimensionality of space.

Understanding essentially non-cash syntax. “Understanding something” already contains the problem of semantic interpretation of the illusory and real,

otherwise there would be no problem of understanding, but there would be a simple indication of “this”, understood as “cash presented”. We know that behind every understanding, as behind a language game, there is a proposition of meaning, revealed by a sequence of syntactic considerations. Therefore, any understanding must demonstrate the structure of a proposition - the structure of the hermeneutic circle: that is, whatever we understand, our interpretations will represent the propositional relations of the form of memory.

Let's demonstrate this with examples.

Everyone knows the mutual conditionality of the dual concepts of “one-many”, “part and whole”, “existence and non-existence” All these concepts express the identical game significance of memory implementation (the form $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$), but “significant” always and its “other” - the realization of the meaning of “significant”, what we called the proposition of “identical and different” - this expresses the considered duality.

Another example: let's answer the question “why is our space three-dimensional?”. First, what does three-dimensionality mean? - Definiteness of position in space, i.e. the certainty of its meanings is the syntax for playful significance.

Recall that the demonstration of the proposition of meaning in the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ is characterised by the pre-definiteness of the space-container of all realisations of language games. We must reveal the definiteness of meaning of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$. The definiteness of meaning is its interpretation in judgements of games, hence the structure of understanding the definiteness of meaning $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ will be the trinary judgement structure (subject, predicate, verb), that is, the significance of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ in syntactic reflection will be determined by three indices - the third index, unlike the two of the form $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$, arises from considering the very reflexivity of syntax as a representation. The three indexes are: a pointer to the 'place' of meaning in the topos of play (the subject); to its play relation performed in the topos (the predicate); and to the very reflexivity of the performance (the player) of language play (the verb).

Our geometric or physical space are also interpretations of the space-container $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, so the understanding of their certainty will also have a trinary structure of indexes, interpreted by us as three-dimensionality.

But earlier it was said that space can be interpreted in six or four coordinates, isn't there a contradiction here? - No. Six-dimensionality is possible as a playful or semantic interpretation, and not as a logical demonstration of the proposition of meaning, six-dimensionality can be reduced to three-dimensionality in a sequence of syntactic considerations, and not vice versa. All multidimensionality is the

semantics of certain games, a way of interpreting game functions, that's the only way it makes sense. And if someone speaks about the four-dimensionality of space in the sense of the logical identification of its structure of understanding, then this speaker must express himself in judgments with a tetrad structure. What is it - ask him.

17.6 Language is a syntactic labyrinth.

"What can be understood can be said" is a well-known thesis. More precisely, I would say: "What can be understood can be indicated in statements", meaning the demonstrative nature of indexical judgments.

What is the indexical "it"? - Its understanding is its own demonstration: "the certainty of the understood" - but what is it? - "it..." - is a demonstration of the realisation of the indexical. Language creates a complex space of indexical interpretations, it gives expression to the indicating, including the form $\delta\alpha\xi\alpha$ - "I", as fully as possible, i.e. more complex in all kinds of reflexive structures.

So what do the indexes "this", "I" mean? - They express the language itself, i.e. the possibility of making all meaningful connections.

Language should not be understood narrowly linguistically or philologically. A language is anything that can interpret the indexes "this" and "I" as a form of memory reflection. Language is the ways of realizing meaning, or it is a labyrinth of meaning, a labyrinth of meaningfulness of life flowing in its corridors.

Normal labyrinths always have an exit or at least an entrance, but our language - the language of non-cash games - has neither. He does not allow his representation from outside - from the exit, since the exit from it is the loss of any meaning, any significance.

But isn't syntax a way out of the labyrinth of language?

It would seem that syntax, formalizing understanding, is closer than anyone else to the exit from the labyrinth, close to the meaningless as meaningless meaningful. But still, I mean! - And the output of the syntax turns into a dead end. In a closed space without walls.

Conclusion - language is not a subject of research, it is a means of one's own reflective understanding, i.e. implementation.

17.7 Faith.

If language or the totality of the meaningful cannot be represented as something meaningful in our games, i.e., is always non-cash, then the meaning of their

very demonstrated non-cashness can be interpreted semantically as an external realization of the semantic interpretations themselves. This interpretation is called "faith." Let's consider its meaning.

"I believe in it" means that "I" cannot "know", i.e. I cannot interpret this statement as certain, which is identical with the impossibility of further semantic interpretations, closed in the meaningless tautologies of the hermeneutic circle. The closure of syntaxes demonstrates logical forms, and if in the phrase "I believe in this" the pointer "this" points to this demonstration, then we will be talking nonsense: how can I believe in it or not believe it, if I, by my own faith, realize "this ". It is impossible to believe in logical forms, since such a belief renders itself meaningless, and both "knowledge" and "ignorance" - the reflexivity of thought. It was this kind of faith that Kant planted in "practical reason." Another thing is when "this" points not to the form of demonstration itself, but to its semantic interpretations, different from its demonstration, i.e. outside him. Then "faith" has the meaning of "non-cash" or the outsideness of the implementation of language games.

It is impossible to believe in the logical "unity" of significance, since doubts in such both mean the doubt itself, and indeed any semantic interpretation. But one can believe that "God is one" - in the semantic interpretation of the demonstration of the meaningful.

So what is the meaning of "faith"? - Faith points to the very outsideness of game values . But the indication of "belief" in the semantic interpretations of the games to which we turn, steps over the groundlessness of "faith" by treating it as a semantic meaning. "Faith" thus refers us to its form of thought, pointing to its way of understanding.

By preaching faith, we teach or guide ourselves and others to the realization of this or that way of thinking, this or that form of life. When we preach "faith," we become involved in its language games.

"The preaching of foreign gods" is the realization of a foreign form of life, and, therefore, the destruction of one's own, for which Socrates was executed. For the same reason, the intellectual Tacitus called Christians "haters of the human race."

Faith, especially religious faith, is the Holy of Holies of any culture, because through it the realization and protection of culture is possible. Let us not blame either the judges of Socrates or himself: one guarded the Holy, the other carried it out.

Chapter 18

Number and sign.

18.1 Number is the structure of a proposition.

The semantic illusion of a sign lies at the basis of any semiotics, including mathematics , the hermeneutics of which we will deal with.

We will consider as mathematics the system of all language games, one way or another interpreting the significance of the number - the significance of the form *επιστημη*. We know (chapters 4, 6, 17, §5) that the reflexive structure of significance *επιστημη* is characterized by three indexals representing the proposition of meaning - this is the trinary structure of judgment (chapter 6).

The first index is a pointer to the “place” in the topos of game values.

The second is on game interpretations of the “place” in meaning connections.

The third - on the very reflexivity of the implementation of the language game (externality and grok). - Subject, predicate, verb.

The subject of the “number” is the index of the significance of the pointer “it” as a self-identical value . The predicate “number” is the interpretation of the subject in the connections of the game $A \otimes B \leftrightarrow C$, the meaning of the sign “C” interprets the significance of the connection of two numbers A and B cashed out in the game (binarity is a demonstration of the proposition of the game significance, - “identical-other”). The verb “numbers” is the outwardness or reflexivity of the game action of interpretations over cashed out signs, what brings $A \otimes B$ out of the game of numerical interpretations into the game of syntactic consideration of numerical action, forming a topos of meanings called the natural series.

The number is thus a syntactic interpretation of the meaningless ”this” indicator.

Can the interpretative connection of numbers be any? - The answer is that yes, it can, but the next stage of syntax says that the interpretative connection

of numbers (values $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ should be such that the structure of the topos of interpretations of the index “this” would represent the structure of the proposition of the value. On the other hand, the structure of the topos is characterized by the unity of the list of syntactic rules, indicating which interpretative connections play the game of indicating “this” and which do not. Then the meaning of any interpretation of $A \otimes B$ must have the value C , which belongs to the topos of our game ($A \otimes B \leftrightarrow C$), since the list of rules speaks only about significant connections, about those connections that can be pointed out, and indicated for us - placed in the topos of game values ”This”. The reverse side of this is that each topos value must have its own name, its own semantic interpretations of the “place” of the topos: one, two, three..., since the meanings of the “this” topos acquire the semantics of the syntax that interprets them.

But why 1, 2, 3, and not vice versa?

What does vice versa mean? - to call unit three? But this is meaningless, since with the semantic interpretation of the index “this” by the quantity (three) is out of proportion to the significance of the “place” of our triple in the topos of meanings, the structure of the topos will not change from this, and the triple will remain a triple, no matter how you call it. One is one because it is determined by the whole topos of meanings of the syntax of the index “this”, the whole structure of the topos, the empty “presence” of which interprets the emptiness of the implementation of indicating “this”.

So, when we say: one, two, three, we thereby mean that we can reproduce any interpretive connection of the structure of the natural series $A \otimes B \leftrightarrow C$, otherwise we are talking nonsense, i.e. we don’t know how to syntactically interpret ”it”.

It turns out that the number series is given to us from outside? - No, his devotion interprets the meaningless significance of the index “this”, its infinity - demonstrates the reflexivity of the implementation of indicating “this”, and the question of where it comes from, as a question about the beginning of thinking, leads to the elimination of thinking itself (Chapter 1).

We know the interpretive connections of the syntax of the index “this” in their quantitative interpretation by the addition $A + B = C$, where the connection of two different indexes ($A + B$) interprets the binarity of the game significance proposition, as mentioned above. The numbers A and B say that the significance of the implementation of the mathematical game (action $+$) is the same value of the topos C as A and B : A - identical to the significance of “this”, $+B$ - its other than add-ing, the sign “=” indicates that the language game placed the significance of its realization ($+B$) in the values of the exposed topos (A), thereby

interpreting it semantically (C).

What is the meaning of the natural series?

Its meaning is determined in the next step of the syntax, which interprets the implementation of the mathematical operation, removed from the topos of numbers, the meaningless significance of which is demonstrated by the very implementation of the syntax. What is the infinity of the series (it is also the meaningless significance of implementation)? - Its meaning is that you can always find a number different from those presented ($n + 1$), you can always perform an action of pointing different from the specified number, you can always demonstrate an outside implementation of the game. The infinity of the natural series is an index to the demonstration of one's own implementation of the game interpretation (+). Infinity - the significance of the reflection of the game action, its "identical", but it is possible to interpret the "other" of the reflexive significance, expressing the very outsideness of the action of pointing to the indicated, that indicating "nothing" from the indicated is an empty set \emptyset or zero ($1 + 0 = 1$): the realization is nothing of the realized.

18.2 Suggestions of mathematical syntax.

Mathematics never considers expressions like $a + b$ and nothing else, for it the expressions $a + b = c$ make sense, talking about the implementation of the language game ($= c$ - syntax exposure), - mathematical syntax is always non-cash syntax. Therefore, all sentences of mathematics, in addition to the game sense, must represent the proposition of meaning. Sentences that interpret mathematical expressions as syntactic structures (i.e., speaking about the realization of a language game), we will call sentences of mathematical syntax.

Note that the comprehension of sentences of mathematical syntax occurs in the syntax one step higher than the presented mathematical structures.

Thus sentences of mathematical syntax are the usual sentences of mathematical games, but their meanings are interpreted by the index structure of the sign, i.e. the trinity of the judgment of syntax.

Let us explain the meaning of these proposals.

So the symbol "a" is the index of the subject of the syntactic judgment $a + b = c$, $+b$ is the index of the predicate of the judgment of mathematical syntax, the third index, due to its non-significance in the subject-predicate structure (Chapter 6 - verb), is interpreted by whole cashed out structures ($a+b=c$) or symbols indicating the implementation of the language game. Such structures are real number, ∞ , \emptyset etc.

All three indexals make sense in the unity of the syntactic judgment representing the proposition of meaning, so our indexals can only be spoken of in structures expressing the propositional nature of meaning.

For example: “a” speaks (demonstrates) about the unity of the proposition of meaning, demonstrated by the index “this”, the expression “+” does not say anything at all, since the index has the meaning of the game interpretation of the subject of judgment (a, b, c), those. makes sense only in the expression $a + b = c$, interpreting the significance of the implementation of the game (+) by the significance of its game content (c).

Consider the proposition $a+a=c$, it would seem that it is exactly the same as the expression $a+b=c$, but here one index indicates both the identical realization (+) and its other (b is absent), therefore, the proposition of the value in $a+a$ it is not interpreted semantically, but demonstrated, since the other significance is not cashed out in the topos. Our expression is a reflexive consideration of the significance of the action (+) of the game, usually interpreted by “multiplication”: $a \cdot b$ - the number “a” demonstrates the action of addition ($a + a$) b-1 times in reflection of the consideration. Thus, multiplication is a syntactic interpretation of addition.

Similar syntax relations can be found anywhere, but they are useful where the outwardness of the implementation of the game, interpreted in it, leads to some paradoxical results: the undecidability of logics, Gödel’s theorem (Chapter 11, § 4) .

18.3 Löwenheim-Skolem theorem.

Let us consider a sentence of mathematical syntax of an arbitrary structure $L(a,+)=a$, where L is a sentence of some mathematical game, (a,+) are cashed out indexes of the syntactic judgment structure, the third index in symbolic structures can also be cashed out ∞, \emptyset or in some other cash structure - provability, Gödel numbers, decidability, etc. The “=” sign says that this sentence should implement a language game, i.e. cash out their semantic interpretations in the topos of the meanings of “a”.

What can be said about when the syntactic sentence $L(a,+)=a$ performs a language game, and when it does not?

I contend that the syntax sentence $L(a,+)=a$ is not feasible in any language game only when its structure points to its own implementation of the syntax, leading to a circle of paradox.

It is clear that if such a representation of the hermeneutic circle (a circle in the form of a paradox) takes place, then the heteronomous forms of the language game are mutually interpreted in it (Chapter 12), excluding the assertion of its authentic form in the circle of tautologies, i.e. play as its authenticity cannot be interpreted. Paradox is neither true nor false.

For any other sentence $L(a,+) = a$, one can always find a language game whose interpretations realize its syntactic structure as true. Let's prove it.

Consider $L(a,+) = a$ as a pointer to the unity of its own structure, as an index judgment $\forall\exists$, as a consequence of its being outside of pointing, we interpret it in the index form $(\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall) = \forall\exists$, i.e. we interpret $L(a,+) = a(L)$ as represented cash. As required to prove - the game is implemented.

In the case of the hermeneutic circle of the paradox, the interpretation of "cash" will not succeed, since in $L(a,+) = a$ it will be necessary to cash out the very interpretation of "cash", and so on. Note that if the third index of the last syntactic stage of consideration (\emptyset, ∞) is cashed out in the topos, then even in the case of a paradox, interpretations of the game can take place through a tautological reference to the cashed symbol (\emptyset, ∞) of the third index. Example: real number π , pointing to it, we mean the possibility of arbitrarily precise interpretation of it, i.e. the symbol π tautologically indicates a demonstration of the exercise of the game.

Thus, if we place a symbol in the topos of the game that indicates the implementation of the syntax itself, then we can implement the game of the same syntax. Let's take an example. It is known from Tarski's theorem that the set G of all Gödel numbers of sentences and true numbers in arithmetic itself is indeterminate. But if we introduce into the arithmetic topos the symbol of the class - the set of sets of Gödel numbers, indicating the very implementation of the interpretation of the set G , then the class of all G - the set of sets of Gödel numbers of true sentences will be determined in arithmetic. If we try again in this topos to interpret the meaning of the class, i.e. If we try to interpret the implementation of the next stage of syntax by defining the set of all definable sets (a syntactic generalization of the set of Gödel numbers), then we will return to the structure of the hermeneutic circle of paradox, which does not allow the language game to be realized. And, indeed, the set of all definable sets in arithmetic is not defined in itself.

But let us turn again to the topos of the natural series, to the topos of interpretations of the index "this".

In mathematics, any sentence $L(a,+) = a$ corresponds to a certain degree of syn-

tactical interpretation of the significance of $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ - the index “this”. We have also shown that any interpretation, even the interpretation of the structure of the hermeneutic circle of paradox (real number), can be reduced to the topos of interpretations of the indexal “this” - to the natural series, by placing in the topos of the indexal on the very implementation of syntactic interpretations. In view of the above, we can make the following statement that any mathematical theory (sentence) can be considered as a system of syntactic interpretations of the index “this”. That is, everything in mathematics is an interpretation of the topos of the numbers of the natural series. A particular version of our statement is the well-known Löwenheim-Skolem theorem: “if a set of sentences has a model, then it has a model with a countable domain”.

Indeed, the “set of sentences” is our syntactic system of mathematics , the model is the specific semantic content of our interpretations of syntax, countability is the correspondence between interpretations and the natural series being interpreted.

As for the impossibility of the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem in the logic of second- order predicates, this does not at all mean that we interpret a different significance in it. The meaning of this is that the logic of the second order is a syntax for the logic of predicates of the first order, in which the significance of the implementation of the language game (the significance of the game connection) is revealed in the predication aPb , hence its undecidability (Chapter 11, § 4) . The logic of the second order, as another syntax, reveals the very reflexivity of the implementation of the language game - the “other” of the game connection in aPb and $\forall P$, and not just the identical game connection, as in the logic of the first order. And since the structure of the reflexivity of the connection of the game is placed in the general game topos, it must be in it and interpreted in cashed-out meanings. And what does it mean to interpret a different connection, the very reflexivity of the game, which is not signified in any topos? - Only one thing - to demonstrate in the present values of the topos that the meaning of this index cannot be indicated in the present values: ”not this, not this, ...”. The “uncountability” of the domain of definition just expresses the meaning of this demonstration.

Indeed, what sentences in the logic of predicates of the second order have only an uncountable domain of definition of their values? - Sentences that deny the meaning of inductive inference, demonstrating “negation” as otherwise of game connections.

18.4 Cantor's uncountability.

My assertion that any syntax can be reduced to the syntax of the index "this" can be countered by the fact that there are uncountable sets, and their presence cannot be interpreted by the "countability" of the natural series, that the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem is violated in the logic of second-order predicates, but the last we explained in the previous paragraph.

But I will put the question differently: does "uncountability" itself exist?

Let me remind you the meaning of uncountability (G.Kantor's diagonalization algorithm): let us have a list of sets of natural numbers $S = S_1, S_2, S_3, \dots$. Let's construct a set of natural numbers D as follows: $m \in D$ if $m \notin S_m$. Then the set D is not in our list, since if $D = S_m$, then $m \in D$ and $m \notin S_m = D$ - i.e. the presence of the set D in the list S is tantamount to a contradiction, - a demonstration of the meaningless significance of the extraneous implementation of the syntactic consideration of "uncountability".

Based on the above grounds, Cantor concludes that the set of all subsets of the natural series is uncountable, i.e. there is no list S , where all subsets of the natural series would be listed, since it is always possible to find from this list a set of natural numbers that does not belong to it.

But is it always possible to find such a D ? Is it always possible to start our algorithm? Since the list S is arbitrary in Cantor's reasoning, it also implies a list S^* , which always has $m \in S_m^*$ (we can always build our list from any other, adding a diagonal number to it, if it was not there before). It is easy to see that for the list S^* the diagonalization algorithm will not be able to select a single element, the set D will not be formed, since its formation begins with the discovery of $m \notin S_m$, and there is no such case for S^* .

Cantor's algorithm is not universal and, therefore, his conclusion about uncountability is unfounded. Attempts to denote in the case of S^* the set D by an empty set \emptyset do not give anything, because firstly: in order to denote something related to the algorithm, the algorithm must work, but it did not work for us, nothing says about its work; secondly: the very concept of an empty set is a contradictory concept (an index to a "different" game connection - the reflexivity of the game), as well as uncountability, - if a set, then it \emptyset must have the significance of the "set of natural numbers", identical to itself, since we must point to it \emptyset . If \emptyset is empty, then it cannot be pointed out as the set of natural numbers: what does it say about "emptiness" as "this emptiness"? Therefore, the empty set both has a value and does not have it at the same time. The empty set is not a set, but a demonstration of the reflexivity of the set-theoretic interpretations of the

index “this”.

Let us now discuss uncountability from the point of view of hermeneutics.

Let's write down the sentence of mathematical syntax $A(S)=D$. Its hermeneutic meaning is that Algorithm A interprets the list S as not containing the set D. What is the value of S? S - any set of any subsets of natural numbers, i.e. S is an enumeration algorithm, or rather, indicates the implementation of an enumeration as its meaningful “possibility” of implementation (“any”). Algorithm A has exactly the same meaning, but A already enumerates the lists S, i.e., is to them in a syntactic relation (enumeration of enumerations) of reflection, A is a syntactic interpretation of S, interpreting the significance of S as the “other” of its game connection, as its realized meaning, outside the enumerated (infinity of enumeration). This outsideness (reflexivity) is indicated by the “negation” index: “S as not containing D...”. Therefore, $A(S)=D$ tries to interpret the implementation of the enumeration as some enumerated value, i.e. represent the realization of something as realized $X(X)=X$ in revealing their syntactic reflection.

Of course, such a language game is not possible, since it is carried out by eliminating from its interpretations the meaning of the difference between the implementation and the realized, and at the same time it tries to reveal this difference in the reflection of the structure of the hermeneutic circle. But it can still be realized if, in the topos of meanings, an empty indexical-symbol is placed on the very external realization of the recalculation (on the demonstrated reflexivity itself), i.e. introduce the concept of “uncountability”, “empty set”, etc. Therefore, Cantor's uncountability will make sense until the meaning of these indexes is revealed as indexes that identify the significance of the number and the significance of its interpretations (the significance of recalculation). But Cantor's uncountability loses its meaning when this difference begins to figure under the names of “power”, “cardinal number”, etc., which is expressed in the famous paradoxes of equipotential sets: the set of natural numbers has the same cardinal number (number of elements, - let's conditionally interpret so one-to-one correspondence), as well as its subset of even numbers, or - the line and the entire three-dimensional space of Euclidean geometry turn out to be equally powerful. The meaning of these paradoxes, of course, is not that there are as many points on the line as there are in the whole space, but that the points of the line and space equally interpret the meaningless implementation of their language games in the structure of the syntactic sentence $X(X)=X$, where “X” is the character structure. Both the “line” and “space” occupy the same position of the symbol in the topos of our language game, they perform the same interpretive function of

pointing to the demonstrated reflexivity of the hermeneutic circle. Here and there we interpret one indexal “this”, by the way, Skolem’s paradox is also based on this, speaking about sentences with an uncountable domain of definition only through sentences with a countable model, since any uncountable model is conceived by us as some countable topos of values with added to it indexal on the reflexivity of its game interpretation.

And even in the case of paradoxes of equivalence, signs-symbols, demonstrating meaningless significance, are able to organize the following language game, presenting the symbols of “uncountability” as something semantically interpreted: aleph-zero, etc., i.e. to organize, at the expense of other structures, the elimination from the content of reflection of the difference between the implementation and the implemented.

But why do these additional quantities arise - uncountability, cardinal numbers?

Because the syntax for the syntactic sentence $X(X)=X$ will be the same, and we will have to outline the same hermeneutic circle until the end of our lives, if we do not begin to meaningfully interpret the meaningless in new game structures. But one must understand that the new interpretations of the number will be different syntaxes of the index “this” and, therefore, have a rather distant relation to the quantitative interpretation of the natural series. The only thing they have in common is that both are equally playful interpretations of the trinary structure of the judgment.

18.5 Provability and solvability.

The proposition of the mathematical syntax $X(X)=X$, revealed in the previous section, also underlies the problems of provability and decidability.

Let us recall Gödel’s consistency theorem: if a theory is consistent, then its consistency in itself is unprovable.

Let us reveal the meaning of “provability” and “consistency”. Provability - demonstration of the implementation of syntax as a meaningless index “true”, indicating the reflexive significance of the demonstration. Consistency - the implementation of the language game in its topos of meanings (the meaning of negation). Therefore, sentences of mathematical syntax about provability will be the structure $X(X)=X$ known to us, which places the implementation of the interpretation of the topos $X(X)$ in the topos X itself.

If Gödel’s theorem deals with provability, then, as a consequence of the reflexive structure $X(X)=X$, this language game will be a non-cash language game, the

values of its topos will have the structure of a symbol:

$$(\exists \forall \rightarrow \forall \exists) = x : (\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) = \forall \exists.$$

If we are talking about the provability of its consistency, then the semantic structure $(\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) \rightarrow \forall \exists = x : (\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) = \forall \exists$ as the first subject will point to its own realization, but then the realization of the meaning of the symbol $\exists \forall \rightarrow \forall \exists$ itself must fall into the topos of the game, as a result of which the index indication cannot be realized. to this symbol $(\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) = \forall \exists$, since it is done by removing $(= \forall \exists)$ the doxic element from interpretations. In order to prove the consistency of the game, it is necessary to get out of it, exclude the identification of its implementation as the meaning of the pre-givenness of the topos to it and vice versa, thereby bypassing the circle of paradox.

That is, if the game is consistent, - has a cashed topos of meanings, - then we cannot indicate the implementation of the proof of consistency in its cashed topos, - we cannot identify the indication with the indicated one, because the absence of a contradiction does not allow demonstrating the reflexivity of the game.

To the same syntactic structure $X(X)=X$ belongs the undecidability of predicate logic of the first order, proved by Church, as well as of the second one (see Chapter 11, §4).

18.6 Turing machines. Church's thesis.

The irresolvability of first-order predicate logic is equivalent to identifying in a language game its heteronomous form - any attempt leads to game disambiguation. That is, the meaning of "insolubility" lies in the impossibility of identifying the realisation of the game and its realised meaning and in revealing their reflexivity. The equivalence of these problems was demonstrated by J.R.Buchi, who used the reflexive structure of the hermeneutic circle constructed from Turing machines to prove the insolubility of first-order logic.

The Turing machine is a general syntax for the natural series. To organize a hermeneutical circle, we need an index for the implementation of syntactic interpretations of Turing machines, an index for their reflexivity of work. The most appropriate is the "stop" index of a Turing machine, telling whether the machine is running or not, interpreting or not.

Next, we turn to the syntactic structure $X(X)=X$, which in our terms would sound like this: is there a Turing machine that determines the "stop" of any other Turing machine, including itself. It is easy to show that if such a machine exists, then this is tantamount to a contradiction (demonstration of the lack of

content of reflection) - the representation of an unimaginable implementation of interpretation.

Let's show this: let $M(N)$ be the above Turing machine, its output values are: 0 - machine N has stopped, 1 - machine N is running. Let L be a Turing machine that runs endlessly (demonstration of reflection) if its input is 0 and stops if its input is 1. Together, the machines L and $M(N)$ form the machine $K(N)=M(N) \rightarrow L$. Now, instead of N , we substitute the number of the car $K(N)$. Then, if the machine $K(N)$ stops, then, according to the meaning of the machine L , it will work to infinity, and vice versa - if it works to infinity, it will immediately stop. We have obtained an obvious contradiction. So there is no such Turing machine. And then, as Büchi showed, first-order logic is undecidable. In fact, Büchi described undecidability as the operation of a Turing machine.

At the center of the meaning of undecidability is the same hermeneutic circle, the same syntactic structure $X(X)=X$.

The question arises - how compatible are Turing machines and the language of first-order predicate logic?

Recall our assertion that any game of mathematical syntax is a sequence of syntactic games interpreting the meaningless "this" pointer, the meaning of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$. Both Turing machines and the first-order logic language are equal to the "this" pointer syntaxes, and this provides the basis for their combination in a language game that demonstrates the empty significance of the form of memory. It is only necessary that the values of the Turing machine and the values of the language of logic form one topos, equally interpret or point to the index "this", represented by these or those values.

When these conditions are met, it makes sense to assert that any two language games of mathematics can be considered within the framework of one. A special case of this statement is Church's thesis, which states that the set of functions computable in some sense coincides with the set of functions computable on Turing machines, since when combining language games that interpret the index "this" equivalently, their topos does not change, and on common interpretations of the same semantic structures are possible in it.

18.7 How mathematics is possible.

Language games of mathematical syntax, like any other, are possible as oblivion (the elimination of their content) in game interpretations of one's own reflexive implementation of interpretation. The meaning of this oblivion has been shown in the previous paragraphs. But it still remains mysterious how such diverse

syntactic interpretations of a single index “this” are possible. How is mathematics possible?

Let’s make the following chain of syntaxes: index ”this”, natural series (number - its quantitative interpretation), mathematical operation, algebra. Each of these syntactical stages brings with it a mass of new semantic interpretations, revealing the external realization of the previous stage by eliminating its own realization from the content. It turns out a kind of branching labyrinth of semantic connections, each of which reveals the meaning of the other, eliminating its own in it.

Another interpretation of mathematics may be as follows: mathematics tries to interpret \exists the index “I” with the index “this” (\forall), i.e. fully cash out the symbol structure:

$$(\exists \forall \rightarrow \forall \exists) = x : (\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) = \forall \exists.$$

In other words: describe the description of the sign, describe the description of the description of the sign, and so on ad infinitum, always eliminating the implementation of the last stage of syntax from the cashed topos.

What is mathematics in this context?

Interpretation of the meaning of one’s own ”I” through the formal symbolic language of mathematical syntaxes. Mathematics explains to us the symbolic structure of what we consider the meaning of our “I”, the meaning of our “personality”, “life”.

Modern mathematics is feasible only by a person who considers himself a conceivable subject of his own existence, whose meaning is in functional connection with other pre-existing given data that require reflexive syntax for their understanding.

Who am i? - Sergey Surin. But this is only a place in the topos of meanings, the meaning of this place in the structure of interpretations of my “other” existence: a logician, a philosopher, a person...

Who are you? - Octavian August, - who has no profession, whose meaning is in him with am, - everything else only accompanies him.

Two different questions - two different answers, two different concepts of number. Behind the first is the functionality of the index “this”, behind the second - the “cash” of one’s own existence.

In the ancient world, a number cannot be irrational (a pointer to an “other” realization of memory), just as there cannot be an unimaginable person - Proteus, and he has his own visible forms. In Rome and Athens there are people-things, but there are no people-functions: a slave and a barbarian cannot function as

Hellenes - “praise the Gods that I was born a Hellene, and not a barbarian.” And whoever you become, whatever you do, you will never become a Greek, in our time you can become the president of another state.

But everything comes to an end - the invisible God of the Jews, who came out of the Platonic cave, brought the Gauls to the Senate of Rome, which became a sign of the end of the old “I” and the beginning of a new “I”, the end of the ancient number and the beginning of a long journey of creating and revealing Western thinking of our days, the new mathematics and the new man.

We can say that ancient mathematics is a syntactic interpretation of the meaningless indexal as the significance of the form $\delta\alpha\xi\alpha$. Our mathematics is the interpretation of the significance $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$. Both mathematicians cashed out their meaning, what remains? - Express the heteronomy of the two forms of significance. This is what happens in Gödel’s, Church’s, Tarski’s theorems, in uncountability and Cantor’s cardinal numbers, or in other “constructivist” mathematical games that try to hide the emptiness of the hermeneutic circle behind a complex web of conceptual structures in which the devil himself (Church) will break his leg.

Modern mathematics demonstrates what modern culture is, producing modern man. - Everything is very complicated and it is not at all clear why.

True, they say that we will find out the answer to the question “why” “later”, over time, when we find applications for mathematical theories (as if the tip of an ax explains the Raskolnikov phenomenon). But this will require new people. I see in this all the same old semantic structure of putting the meaning of meaning in another realization ($\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$), or, as another author put it: “seek the Kingdom of Heaven, and the rest will be added to you.”

We ask ourselves, what is the meaning of the “inapplicability” of theories?

What is not applicable is that which has no further interpretations other than those presented. Western man has identified himself in his cultural structures and found that there is “no point” in doing anything about it. The “Kingdom of Heaven”, “eternal life”, which determined the “I” of modern man, have become desacralized, have lost their meaning, and not because their hypotheticality or untruth has become clear, but because our “I” itself has become meaningless, turning into an empty meaningful index. And why does the indexal need eternal bliss?

Chapter 19

Syntax of all syntaxes.

19.1 Syntactic sequence.

Mathematics is a sequence of syntactic games interpreting a contentless meaningful index. In the very structure of syntactic interpretations: $(\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) \rightarrow \forall \exists = x : (\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) = \forall \exists$ the central element is the quantifier structure of the symbol: $(\exists \forall \rightarrow \forall \exists) = x : (\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) = \forall \exists$, usually interpreted by our “I” - the “player” of all our games. Therefore, it can be assumed that any arbitrarily complex semantic structures (literature, religion, art, politics, science) are, from a formally hermeneutic point of view, syntactic sequences of games that interpret the index “I” as “this is me”.

Is it possible to represent understanding otherwise than as a syntactic sequence of interpretations?

Let us have some language games represented by their topos of meanings. We want to understand them, not in the sense of “learning to play them”, but in the sense of “interpreting their topos by some structure of connections that make the game” (I can understand music perfectly and still not be able to play any instrument). That is, I am interested in how the topos is structured, therefore, I must show how semantic interpretations are carried out in it, pointing to the implementation of my own understanding. And this is equivalent to the fact that the topos I am considering will be the topos of signs-symbols of a known quantifier structure, the first subject \exists pointing to the very realization of understanding, i.e. on the structure of semantic interpretations of the next stage of the syntax $(\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) \rightarrow \forall \exists = x : (\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) = \forall \exists$, but then the second part of this structure will cash out itself, since the symbol “x” indicates the actual syntax of its cashing out, i.e. the syntax will point to the sign as its realized meaning, and will therefore interpret itself. Therefore “understanding” will be understanding

in the semantic structures of syntax. The very semantic structure of syntactic interpretations forces us to consider the understood games as the same syntaxes.

Understanding is identical, therefore, with the syntactic sequence of games.

Will such a chain of syntaxes ever end?

Necessarily, as soon as the understood and structured topos of meanings demonstrates the implementation of its interpretation, i.e. turns into a demonstration of the meaningless significance of the form of memory (logical form).

19.2 Cashing out - loss of meaning.

Thus, the central core of syntactic sequences is the structure of cashing out the implementation of the language game, the structure of cashing out the conceptual apparatus of syntax.

What is the meaning of cashing out?

Understanding the topos of the game, i.e. the interpretation of the “presence” of its meanings takes place in the known quantifier form $(\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) \rightarrow \forall \exists = x : (\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) = \forall \exists$. Let us now imagine that understanding has been realized, i.e. some semantic structure is indicated in the topos. What does ”specified” mean? The fact that the game meaning of understanding is no longer realized in the quantifier form of semantic interpretations, but in the structure of indexical indication $(\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) = \forall \exists$. “The meaning is in front of us.” As a result, there is a discrepancy between the semantic structures of the topos, which represent semantic interpretations, and the structure of the realization of their meaning in a cashed syntax, which represents indexical interpretations. We no longer realize the game meaning, but turn to it in the present presentation of the topos.

Let us consider this discrepancy between the cashed-out structure and its indexical interpretation .

Since the meaning is always the implementation of a language game, the presented game meaning also becomes a pointer to the implementation of the presentation $(\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) = \forall \exists$, and the original game meaning of semantic interpretations $(\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) \rightarrow \forall \exists = x : (\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) = \forall \exists$ is lost, i.e. Once realized, it is no longer carried out.

The loss of meaning, and even what is before our eyes, is an absurd thing. It’s hard to believe in this .

Meanwhile, there is nothing more familiar to us than such a loss of meaning in his about cash - it’s boredom!

Yes, boredom is a logical category that interprets the cashedness of the reflexive form of memory.

To be bored means to be inconsistent with the presented semantic structure by the structure of one's playful interpretations of the syntax, directed towards the interpretation of the presented.

Let me explain the above with familiar examples.

Imagine that you are watching a movie or reading an interesting book for the first time. You are engrossed in reading, you are absorbed in it. Now you are reading the book for the second time, for the tenth time, so that you remember it almost by heart (this means cashing out). What's going on? - You start to yawn over previously exciting pages.

What is the difference between the first and subsequent readings?

The fact that for the first time you understand the text in semantic structures $(\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) \rightarrow \forall \exists = x : (\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) = \forall \exists$, which, due to their symbolic core $(\forall \exists \rightarrow \forall \exists) = x : (\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) = \forall \exists$, i.e. the structure of our "I", place it in the topos of symbols of the text. The meaning of your "I", the meaning of your life becomes the meaning of the text you read.

When you read the text for the second time, or, more precisely, when you remember it - cash or, then you understand the meaning of the text in the structure of the index address to it $(\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) = \forall \exists$, in which there is no character element $(\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) = x$. The meaning of your "I", the meaning of your life cannot become the meaning of the text, you are not captured by it, you are bored - you are realized in the primitive structure of an empty presence.

The loss of meaning in the cashing out of language games is an essential element in the syn-tactic sequence of our culture. On the one hand, "consistency" is the escape of syntax from the loss of its cashed out meaning, on the other hand, the flight itself cashes out the syntactic game, makes it meaningless. This logical mechanism is the structure of the disclosure of forms of thought in all spheres of our activity, and it is also what destroys, makes meaningless the symbols and values of our culture. This is the mechanism of creation and death of civilizations.

Clear signs of the loss of meaning can be seen in all modern life - from religion and science to symbolic art and mass values. Interestingly, the forms of fading, of desensitisation, these days coincide with the same forms of decline of another great culture, the culture of antiquity. The Western life-form is simply a reinterpretation of the ancient form: in our syntaxes we interpret contentless significance as the significance of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, and they interpret it as the significance of the form $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$. This distinction is difficult to detect, because we think differently, all the more so because most of the sources we use to judge antiquity date from the decline of the ancient $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$ to the dawn of the Western $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, i.e. from

Socrates to the Ecumenical Councils and possibly a few centuries beyond. A rigorous analysis is not possible here, as everywhere we would stumble upon a mixture of high antiquity with the "new ferment" of thought. But still we will give a few parallels.

In the field of art: secondary, appeal to the old canons and quotations. Philosophy interprets more ancient authors than he thinks on his own. The same is true today: all varieties of abstract art are cunningly disguised quotations of the old, only not old artistic images are cited, but old quotations from literature and philosophical thought, even if these quotations are two weeks old. Critical conceptual commentary (reference to citation) is becoming an integral part of contemporary art. Force the critics along with the authors to be silent - and the black ones together with the red squares will have a rather remote relation to something "deeply meaningful" and "artistic". Take away the books on psychoanalysis and Salvador Dali will be an epigone commentator for Hieronymus Bosch.

In the field of mass values: both then and now, the crowd (the masses) swarm in adoration before ... tragedy? the Eleusinian mysteries? before the scope of Gödel's and Tarski's logical deductions? - no, no matter how, - in front of "flutists with pomaded faces." The innermost dreams of people are not the lot of a hero and a sage (what heroism! - we are pacifists), but a measure of vanity, pleasure and well-being. Pragmatism triumphantly marches through the senseless ruins of a once great race (rasa - essence). And indeed, why wish for anything other than what is "needed", except for what can be pointed out and what can be "consumed".

In the field of religion: complete pluralism. When in Rome, as now, magicians, apostles, priests and charlatans gathered from all over the world were swarming everywhere (Christians, like others, were oppressed not for their faith, which then looked like "wild superstition", but for failure to comply with and disobey the Roman law. Moreover, the Romans were not at all interested in whether you believed or not in Roman cults, they were no longer for faith, but for the fulfillment of the law, and it is above all.). Religion has lost its meaning - this is the essence of all the religious throwing of our time and attempts to purify or improve Christianity, i.e. make it "necessary" for our time.

In the field of politics and the state: a great world power (world power means complete) - the Roman Empire and its death in the waves of the barbarian world, but death not from barbarians, but from its own senselessness. And now it is a great world power (Europe, including Russia, and America - the West), which also conquered the whole world, forcing it to accept its "technological" cults, and,

alas, the impending death from the “vertical barbarian invasion”.

Am I wrong in my pessimistic forecasts?

First: I am not alone in predicting - Nietzsche: ”the age of spiritual wars” - the twentieth century fully justified this forecast; secondly: this forecast is not pessimistic for me , I do not want to scare anyone with it, on the contrary, there is something invigorating in it - the decisiveness and accuracy of the movement of death. Thirdly: the mechanism of the death of civilizations lies not in any negative processes of society, but in the logical forms of our thought. It is possible to deceive in processes and to deceive processes, logic - never.

19.3 Logical form.

In the first paragraph, we showed that all understanding, and, consequently, all cultural development, is a sequence of syntactic games. Let us now show that any sequence of syntactic considerations must sooner or later end with a demonstration of logical forms, i.e. there is a syntax of all syntaxes for each of the life forms.

We want to understand the topos of the language game X_1 , and perform its syntactic interpretation by the quantifier structure $(\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall) \rightarrow \forall\exists = X_2$: $(\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall) = \forall\exists$. The first subject points to X_1 , then the doxic element of the structure considers it as X_2 and cashes out $(\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall) = \forall\exists$, placing X_2 in the topos X_1 . Briefly, we can write $[X_1] = X_2$, square brackets are the quantifier structure of semantic interpretations. Next we want to understand X_2 and get $[X_2] = X_3$ and so on. In general, we obtain the recurrence relation $[X_{n-1}] = X_n$, moreover, all X_1, \dots, X_{n-1}, X_n are placed in a single topos of values.

And since syntax is a consideration of its own structure (paragraph 1), it is always possible $[X_{n-1}] = X_n$ and $X_{n-1} = X_n$, if the value of X_{n-1} is an index of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, i.e. $X_{n-1} = \forall\exists$, since the structure $(\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall) \rightarrow \forall\exists = \forall\exists$: $(\forall\exists \rightarrow \exists\forall) = \forall\exists$ will interpret its own indication of its implementation, i.e. demonstrate it in semantic interpretations, which is equivalent to $X_{n-1} \equiv X_n$. Moreover, another interpretational assumption, except for $X_{n-1} = X_n$, $(\forall\exists = \forall\exists)$ cannot be allowed, since the interpreted meaning $\forall\exists$ is a heteronomous form of the doxic element of the assumption, eliminated in the syntax.

As a result, if at least once $X_k = \forall\exists$, then for any $n \geq k$ $[X_n] = X_{n+1}$ and $X_n = X_{n+1}$. The need for the appearance of a meaningless index $\forall\exists$ cannot be shown, since it relies on our will in semantic interpretations, but the loss of the game meaning makes its appearance inevitable, since it turns us to interpreting index judgments.

As can be seen, the syntactic sequence ends with the identification of the tautology $= \forall \exists, \forall \exists$ forming a hermeneutic circle. Let's look carefully at the expression $(\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) \rightarrow \forall \exists = \forall \exists$, if we take into account that the meaning is contained in $(\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) = \forall \exists$, then our expression is identical to the expression $(\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) \rightarrow (\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) \rightarrow \forall \exists = \forall \exists$, double repetition of structural brackets (or arbitrarily multiple) means a clear demonstration of the proposition of meaning - the hermeneutic circle. The values forming such a structure will be the values of the logical form. And since all the meanings of the topos constitute a single syntactic sequence, they can all be interpreted in the meanings of the logical form - this is usually called the logical universality or the laws of logic.

We will call the quantifier structure we have obtained the structure of logical interpretations or the quantifier structure of the hermeneutic circle. But it can be written in another way: $(\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) \rightarrow (\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) = \forall \exists : (\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) = \forall \exists$, we simply removed the second doxic element, replacing it with the “=” sign, which is the same thing, as a result, the second half of the structure should cash out itself: reveal its own heteronomous form, the meaning of indexical positing. That is, such a record corresponds to the circle of paradox - the hermeneutic circle, demonstrating the reflexivity of memory, and not closed in tautologies.

Thus, the same identified logical form can be interpreted in two ways: the hermeneutic circle - the circle of tautologies or the circle of asserting the form of a reliable one , and the hermeneutic circle - the circle of paradox, demonstrating the reflexivity of the heteronomous forms of the language game.

Let me explain our two structures of the hermeneutic circle using the law of identity $A=A$ as an example. The first tautological formulation of the hermeneutic circle: "any meaning is identical to itself, the meaning of the identity is demonstrated by the identity of the meaning with itself." The second, paradoxical formulation of the hermeneutic circle: "in order to consider meanings identical to themselves, one must know the meaning of "identical", and in order to know the meaning of "identical", one must assume the identity of meanings", - as a result, we will never be able to identify anything, and how to deal with identity the most paradoxical formulation.

The first formulation demonstrates in tautologies its own semantic identity with itself, the second reveals the meaning of its positing realization, i.e. its heteronomous form, therefore, it is not about the meaning itself, but about its "other" - about the meaning: "to suppose ...".

Still, we have not proved the necessity of the existence of the syntax of all syntaxes. But what does it mean to prove its necessity? - Interpret it as reliable,

as “true”, and this is possible only in the next syntactic stage, different from the “syntax of all syntaxes” - the logical form. But then the very meaning of the proof contradicts the meaning of the “syntax of all syntaxes”, since the proof itself is its syntax. Conclusion - the logical form cannot be proved, the logic can be demonstrated. That is why we call the meanings of logical form propositional meanings, demonstrating the meaningless significance of the form of memory.

19.4 Metaphysics.

Let us turn to interpretations that involve propositional meanings.

On the one hand, these meanings carry out language games, since they participate in them, on the other hand, their semantic identification in mutual conditionality excludes the assertion of the form of the authentic, they cannot be either “true” or “false”.

Consequently, propositional meanings participate in language games as meaningless indexes, giving the impression, beyond the game boundaries, that a proposition has a semantic content, that propositional meanings are ordinary game meanings. For example, in the content of games there is an interpretation of the “other” by negation - the meaningful meaning of the game. Further, they conclude that everything in our games, in our thinking, expresses the dichotomy “this - not this”: yellow - not yellow, etc. That is, negation is interpreted as a propositional attribute of thinking, which leads to the paradoxes of Godel’s theorems or to the paradox of “being and non-being”, which forced Hegel to identify pure being and pure nothingness.

But as soon as we try to interpret the interpretation of the proposition: “non-being must also be something significant, since we are talking about it,” we find that the semantic meanings of the proposition lose their meaning. But they still exist and, therefore, have significance, but the significance is not of game interpretation, but of the very implementation of demonstrating the hermeneutic circle, where they play the role of meaningless indexes.

By interpreting propositional meanings by their playful interpretations, we eliminate the distinction between realization and realized, between meaning and its demonstration. This is how the meanings of the logical form received their semantic equivalents: being, God, reality, matter... interpretive meanings, commonly called metaphysics.

The “uncertainty” of metaphysical categories, of course, does not mean their falsity, nor does it mean their truth - these interpretations have nothing to do with them. Uncertainty means that the semantic interrelationships of these meanings

do not form a language game, but demonstrate the meaningless significance of our existence, so that each of the demonstrated indexes points to its own language games, where it acquires its semantic interpretation.

Thus, metaphysics, as already noted in the first part of the research, forms , on the one hand, a demonstration of the logical form, on the other hand, it points to all language games in which the logical form, the form of our thinking, is revealed. Metaphysics becomes the core, introducing into a concrete form of thinking. Therefore, metaphysics cannot be known, its knowledge is the ability to carry out its language games, their mastery of us.

19.5 The form of life and metaphysics.

The metaphysical demonstration of a logical form, together with language games in which this form is revealed (demonstrated), we will call a form of life or a form of thought. Why is life here identified with thinking, why do I follow the saying of Parmenides: “Being and thinking are one”?

The first is because I am talking about being, i.e. I philosophize, which means I carry out a language game. Second, otherwise I cannot understand either being or thinking. Therefore, thirdly, I understand being in the realization of thinking. For me, they are equally indexes to the implementation of a form of memory.

Let us pose again the question that has arisen more than once: why am I talking about forms of life, and not about one form? After all, the pointer “one” is a pointer to an equally empty implementation for all games.

The first - ”one” as an index - is not the same as its semantic interpretation of quantity. Secondly, if “one” is interpreted by quantity, then this will speak of the unity of logical forms and language games in which the logical form is revealed, which does not exclude the existence of another unity of language games and their logical forms. Although, of course, these various logical forms can be interpreted by the “particulars” of another form, but for the very metaphysical demonstration of the logical form, such a reversal is not possible, since the “particular” will be an exit from the given metaphysics into a different form of thought or coincide identically with the first representations. Another form of thought cannot be reinterpreted (realized) in a different form - we either do not understand it, or we reinterpret our own metaphysical structure on its meanings. Therefore, we must speak of forms of life, since we have no reason to speak of ”one form.”

Strictly speaking, I cannot understand other forms, this is tantamount to my realization of them, for example, the realization of the life of a Hellenic, but I

can guess my misunderstanding of them by different interpretations of the same indexes: number (Hellenes and ours), God (Hellenes and ours), beings, etc.

Isn't "reality" the common ground for all forms of thinking? - But the meaning of "reality" is always realizable within one or another form of thought, while the "basis" itself is meaningless significant (and in this it is not general). Reality is the game moment of our interpretations.

What meaning do life forms have for us, if we cannot understand them, then why do we need them?

To understand is to realize something as a form of memory. What to implement? - Language games, their "playing self". To understand means to realize in games another "I", "I" of a different form, a different personality. It is possible, the other is impossible - to play two "I"s at once, two forms, if we succeed, then we distinguish the forms of memory, therefore, they are not meaninglessly significant. But I can try to bring out that which does not allow me to understand the other form and, consequently, to bring out more deeply the meaning of the "I" of my form of thought, of my metaphysics.

"Forms of life" become a tool for understanding the meaning of one's own metaphysics. Behind the results of the research presented in these pages is such a comparative analysis. Sometimes I showed its elements explicitly, but in most cases it remained outside the scope of the text, since a comparative analysis of cultural traditions cannot become a philosophical reflection - the comparison itself must reflect on itself.

A comparative analysis of two metaphysicians (ours and the Hellenes) served as an auxiliary tool for me, allowing me to see the invisible foundation of our thought. The general method is simple - if you want to understand your form of thought, turn to another, asking what the indexes of the most semantic significance mean for it: God, number, soul, etc. And if the answer "does not fit into any gates", then this is what should become the subject of your semantic analysis, what lies in the o-existence of your games.

19.6 Two metaphysics.

Despite the mutually exclusive varieties of life forms, it is still possible to say something in common in them. All of them are representations of a form of reflection of memory, all of them are carried out as the oblivion of the implementation in the memory of the realized meanings of language games. Consequently, all forms must speak of the realized meaning as something significant in games - about "existing". All metaphysical systems known to us to the village should be

a meta-physics of reflection of the existent (religious metaphysics), placing the significance of reflexive consideration in the considered topos of language games. 'Being', 'God', 'I', 'life' - all 'is'.

The metaphysical positing of this "is" is carried out as a doxic element and interpretations, interpreting the meaninglessness of the implementation by the groundlessness of the positing of "will", whether it be religion or mathematical axiomatization. Therefore, all forms of thought up to now have been forms of beliefs, under various cults and names that have assumed their "is".

'I am' is the essence of all metaphysics.

But a reflexive understanding of the existent as a contentlessly significant existence is possible - as a form of reflection of memory, evidence of this is the present study. Metaphysics is possible, which reveals in its statements the outwardness (forgetfulness) of the realization of the assumption "is". It is not about "significance" as a thinking subject "I", but about realization in subjects, it is not about the existent, but about the certain, - a metaphysics of the certain is possible, saying that "I am nothing of what what is".

The metaphysics of the authentic is a completely different semantic structure, different from the metaphysics of the existent. In her propositional interpretations, there is no negation, which is a playful interpretation of the "other". But the metaphysics of the certain will not be another form of life, since the language games through which metaphysical interpretations are carried out remain the same as those of the metaphysics of beings that created them.

Why, then, is a metaphysics of the certain necessary?

For a new interpretation of old cashed forms.

But what is the purpose of new interpretations?

The goal is clear, although it is difficult to pronounce it - the goal is to desacralize and destroy the human "personality" - the subject of existence. The goal is to free life from the living idols of "existing". We must understand and, therefore, implement language games that speak of our "playing self" not as an a priori clear subject of the game, but as its tool for implementation. Such an understanding should radically change all our metaphysical ideas (science, religion, politics, art) and value attitudes. Life must desacralize and destroy its "unity". There must be a "reassessment of all values".

I understand the full responsibility of what I have written - the new metaphysics should become an instrument for the destruction of our form of thought, but the destruction of the "human self", and not with the very life along with "man".

Our self, the "personality", is one way or another doomed to annihilation, to

meaninglessness in the cashing out of culture, the death of the “I” is logically inevitable. We will have to sacrifice our selves one way or another, but we should not sacrifice life itself.

Chapter 20

Metaphysics of being.

20.1 "I" - the meaning of the game.

The metaphysics of reflection of "existent" is a form (method) of interpretation, which thinks the implementation of language games is something significant in them. The meaning of the game is placed in the topos of its meanings as an indicator "I am this", that is, I am its "player"; everything that makes sense in language games should be for the "player", through the "player" and the "player" himself. As a result, the meaning of the "player" becomes the usual game meaning, - his role in the game, - the "player" becomes the subject of his game manipulations, the reason for his own interpretations.

But the external realization of language games remains external to the metaphysical positing of the player. Language games represent this externality by the special status of "playing self" - "I" becomes the "creator" of all games under the name of "God the Creator Almighty", i.e. "creativity", "creative self" - that which can create from nothing (out of the outside to language games) becomes a sign of our life form.

What is the direction of the creativity of our "I"? - For the implementation of games in the chain of syntactic sequences, for the cashing out of its implementation in the semantic interpretations of the topos of our culture, i.e. on the creation of a "different" life, "represented" in the topos of signs and, therefore, having meaning in it - the highest value. We called it differently: the world of Plato's ideas, the Kingdom of Heaven of Christ, Progress and a society of universal well-being - pragmatism, etc.

And what should happen to the "player" himself in another life, to the "I" himself? - As mentioned above, the player becomes the subject and reason for game interpretations. Consequently, the player must completely submit to the

course of the game, to its meaning revealed in the topos. “God the Creator” must be crucified (the highest obedience is an inactive representation in the top axis-space) according to the rules, - the laws of the world, - according to the cashed out structures.

The goal of the above game forms, of course, is not in “God”, not in the “Kingdom of Heav-en at Sleep” and not in “Progress”. The goal is to affirm the “I” as the subject of existence. The goal is to create a form of life in which the human “personality” acquires a game meaning - a meaningfully interpreted pointer to the enumerated propositional meanings.

The creation of a “personality” is the foundation of our metaphysics of existence. Having embarked on this path, we made the main choice, everything else was logically inevitable in the structures of syntactical disclosure. God and man with logical inevitability were subject to crucifix-ion. And the crucifixion isn’t over yet.

20.2 Depersonalization of the subject.

So, the goal of our form of thought is the creation of game interpretations of the subject of existence in the most diverse syntactic sequences. Moreover, the subsequent steps of syntaxes cash out the previous semantics of the subject, making the “personality” meaningless, reducing it to an empty meaningful index.

These words are the whole point of this paragraph. In the following, I will try to illustrate it in some reflections.

Change of syntaxes - change of meanings of “personality”, leading to its meaninglessness. Let us look, at least superficially, at how the meaning of the human “personality” has changed in our cultural tradition.

Antiquity. Personality - $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$, literally corporality. But one should not understand the personality of late antiquity as the significance of experienced emotions, interpreted by corporality. Indeed, mature antiquity was preceded by such a doxic-emotional positing of the personality, interpreting the meaningless index for existence by the significance of $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$. When “personality”, its meaning and its highest manifestation were correlated with the ancient Aryan Deity Soma (consonant with $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$), interpreting personality with intoxicating ecstasy and inspiration, i.e. emotions (form $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$). This ancient interpretation of “personality” was manifested by the era of the mysteries of Dionysus and more ancient female cults - a demonstration of emotional capture - sexual intercourse. The Dionysian syntax, like any other, also led to the cashing out of its forms and to the meaninglessness of its idols. But in the doxic interpretation of significance there is no

place for its “other”, therefore, the meaning of the Dionysian personality becomes its own destroying ecstasy, - cashed emotions - stopped emotions: Bacchus dies, torn to pieces by intoxicated maenads. Pieces - a symbol of ”nothing” from the cashed out. Dionysus is eaten by the Titans - he is nowhere to be found, only rumors.

The personality of Dionysus turns into a pointer to the very meaningless place of the topos of emotions - to the possibility of emotions outside of emotional experience (here and now), interpreted by pre-givenness, i.e. the outwardness of the experience to the experienced - “Fate”, “Fate”, which should be interpreted by the significance of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, since the cashed out emotions of the meaning of this form.

With this begins a new syntax of the cultural tradition of the West. What in ancient Hellas was called Apollo.

From now on, the personality is not experiencing the emotional significance of the form $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$, but the pre-given manifestation of these experiences. The body is interpreted by the form of manifestation and openness of everything significant, - Heidegger understood this deeper than any-one: to the ancient Hellenes “the world appears”, to us - “the world appears to us”. Among the ancients, at the beginning of the syntax, the pointer “this” (its propositionality) has not yet been cashed out in the topos, which is why “the world appears” without “it”.

But the syntactic sequence was begun, cashing in began to turn the “manifestation of the world” into “manifestation to me”. Significant milestones on this path were Platonism and Christianity: the first laid the foundations of the formalism of the sign identified by Aristotle, the second destroyed the remnants of the ancient Hellenic personality and opened the way for a new Platonic syntax.

From this moment on, “personality” over the centuries turns into what was said in the first paragraph: “creative personality”, “beginningless God, creating from nothing”, “God crucified - cashed in a topos”, “man - the subject of game manipulations ” etc.

Now we are in front of the almost completely exposed propositionality of these interpretations. The stupidity is behind them.

Our “cashed-out personality”, unlike the Hellenic one, is located in the topos, its meaning (“other”) is there. Therefore, a person does not disappear in ecstasy, but functions in the presented structures of culture and production. The whole meaning of a person in such functioning is to be placed in a topos. The essence of a person for itself becomes the subject of game manipulations : “I made myself” - a reason for respect and pride. ”Deed” - the act of placing oneself in cashed out

structures - is the essence of everything. It doesn't matter who you are, it matters how you are - your salvation depends on it - the eternal topos, i.e. topos itself. "Repent!" - learn how to act correctly in the game . And what's next? - Further revealing the meaninglessness of "highest values" - the propositional meanings of our form of life.

The first thing that the cashing out of syntaxes should reveal is the very meaningless significance of propositionality - "faith". "Faith" is no longer the unconditional basis of our games, it loses its justifying meaning, which gives a playful oblivion to the meaningless: one cannot believe in "everything", in the beginning of everything; "faith" itself cannot be the beginning, because in order to believe, you must know that you believe.

"Faith" loses its meaning, the era of "knowledge" and "verifications" comes, but their meaningless significance is also revealed, returning scientific axiomatics to "faith" that has lost its meaning. Foundations crumble - God dies.

"God is dead!", "Great Pan is dead." - We still do not want to understand the meaning of these words. Although their meaning is clear, and does not concern either epistemology or soterology, nothing else, except that "personality", "human self" lose their playful meaning, turning more and more into meaningless indexes . Personality loses its meaning, "I" is lost between "words and things." "God is dead" - life loses its game meaning.

What's next? - Further imitation of a dying form, imitation of the meaning of "I" as the significance of the form $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$ (emotionality as the highest stimulus to life - chapter 5, §9). The creation of a new society, revolution, the triumph of the world of entertainment (imitation of the significance of $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ through the significance of $\delta\omicron\xi\alpha$) and consumption - the top of the imitation of meaning, ending with the creation of "virtual reality" secondary (technically) educated games of mass culture. If the "dissolution of a person between words and things" is now partly figurative, then virtual reality will give it a literal one. It is enough to connect a computer with human memory, encoding signals into a neural form - and that's it! And no one will prove to you that the current reality is at least somewhat different from the virtual one. And if you use amnesia to eliminate the "virtuality" of what is happening from the memory, and eliminate reflection on it from the game, which o-limits game actions, i.e. remove the concepts of the end and death, then we will become immortal and blissful. Game "Kingdom of Heaven" for two dollars in any kiosk! Here is your long-awaited salvation! True, the resurrection of the dead is somewhat poor, however, the role-playing imitation of branching structures based on the data bank of the living compensates for this.

Whoever is not in the data bank means that he never existed.

But we can abandon virtual reality - what's next? - Further, the inevitability of the arrival of such a mechanism of dissolution of a person that we cannot refuse, so that going into "virtual reality" may turn out to be the most humane way to eliminate the human personality.

20.3 Dialectics of contradictions.

What characterizes the thinking of a cashed form of life?

The fact that in all language games cashed out, the syntax will reveal the structures of the hermeneutic circle, which interprets the implementation of the game by its own meaning. That is, the "other" of play significance is interpreted by what is represented in the game (difference from what is represented), and this is nothing but the meaning of "negation" (Chapter 11). Thus, the hermeneutic circle expresses the propositionality of "significance" through its negation, placing both of them in one topos of meanings, in the "unity of contradiction", demonstrating heteronomous forms of language games and bringing to light what we call dialectics (chapter 12).

Therefore, the thinking of cash games will be the thinking of dialectics against oracles.

Let us recall the trinary structure of the dialectical form (why trinary, of course, is understandable: exactly for the same reason that space is three-dimensional - both are representations of the trinary structure of judgment) - thesis, antithesis, synthesis.

The thesis is a pointer to the structures of the topos of language games, whose meanings are subject to syntactic consideration.

Antithesis - the revelation in the hermeneutic circle of the externality of the implementation of the language game through the denial of the meanings of the topos - the demonstration of heteronomous forms. The meaning of negation becomes the realization of the hermeneutic circle, demonstrating the externality of the form of memory - "not this, not this ...", therefore the realized meaning of "negation" cannot be interpreted by any dialectical syntax, therefore, in the metaphysics of being, it is thought of as propositional and a priori clear (playful oblivion of the meaningless), i.e. carried out without further interpretation.

Synthesis is the interpreted manifestation of the hermeneutic circle. Since the hermeneutic circle is demonstrated in the same topos of meanings, therefore, it can be interpreted in the presented structural connections of the topos as another interpretation of the index "this", giving it a "new" semantics called synthesis.

What is the result?

The structure of the topos remained the same, but interpretative connections of synthesis appeared in it, which with a light heart can be taken as an understanding of the essence of the matter, for an understanding of the “spirit” going in synthesis (mediation) to Absolute knowledge (Hegel), a walking spirit cleaner than the crucified God.

Where is this procession from?

From the false propositionality of “negation”. The meaning of “negation” — the reflection that is being demonstrated — while remaining unexamined in its lack of content, begins to be interpreted by the significance of the meaning in general, of everything that exists. The universality of such an interpretation is presented by the Absoluteness of knowledge, the Absolute unity of being, although no one has proved the uniqueness of the latter. As a result, “negation” itself deprives “existing” of its unity: “pure being and pure nothingness are one” (Hegel). Moreover, such a nuance that if non-existence is not “is”, then it cannot be pointed out and, therefore, one cannot talk about it, is completely ignored.

If negation is not propositional, then there is no non-existence. One cannot deny that which cannot be imagined, which the index “this” cannot point to. Non-existence is a thought without a thought, silence without a silent one is nonsense! Life and death are not opposites. The “other” of being is not non-being, but its meaning, realized in its games.

20.4 Formalism of the sign.

The cashing of games also concerns the very language of syntactic consideration. The meaning of games is reduced to the structural representation of the connection of signs, i.e. everything that can be understood can be expressed in a sign structure.

To understand, it is enough to point to a sign structure that represents the implementation of the language game - this is what we call the formalism of thinking.

What makes formalism possible? - The fact that language games and their syntax are equally exposed in the same topos of meanings, where the syntax interprets the implementation of the language game, i.e. says that the realization of the meaning $(\exists \forall \rightarrow \forall \exists) = x$ presented for consideration $(\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) = \forall \exists$, is the very semantic structure of the interpreted symbol: $(\exists \forall \rightarrow \forall \exists) = x : (\forall \exists \rightarrow \exists \forall) = \forall \exists$.

To understand a cashed-out language game, there is no need to play it, it is enough to play its syntax, since an appeal to the sign structures of the syntax will also be an appeal to the sign structures of the language game, provided that the syntax is implemented on the entire topos of the game .

Formalism becomes a powerful tool for creating syntactic sequences , always aimed at the next step of syntax, since the sign $(\exists \forall \rightarrow \forall \exists)=x$, cashing out the meaning of syntax, is always out-side of the cashed out (judgment $\forall \exists$), always implies the next syntactic step until it closes in revealing logical form. Logic is therefore always connected with the formalism of understanding. Logical language is the language of sign formalism.

The formalism of the sign, just like the dialectic of contradictions, which considers “negation ” to be a proposition, has its own idol similar to the dialectical one, formalism asserts: everything that can be understood can be understood in sign interpretations.

Science obediently serves this idol, basing its epistemology on it, which ideally tends to turn into semiotics - mathematics is an exemplary science. Forgetting that the very implementation of semiotic formalism is not signified in it, but is only demonstrated in logical forms, which leads to the desacralization of the idol of formalism in Gödel’s theorems. It turns out that not everything that can be understood can be understood in signs.

But if not everything can be understood in terms of signs, then formalism is logically and philosophically untenable. So the logician must give way to the poet?

Do not rush to conclusions. I did not claim that not everything can be understood formally, I argued that not everything can be understood in the forms of the sign presented for consideration.

20.5 The meaninglessness of the formal.

The formalism of the sign, interpreting negation propositionally, determines the meaninglessness (emptiness) of its logical-philosophical interpretations.

What is the meaning of the law of identity $A=A$? - if he himself is attributable to any meaning. It cannot be ”applied” because the ”applying” itself must carry it out. Therefore, he is ”nothing for”.

Having cashed in everything, including itself, the formalism of the sign did not cash out the meaning of “negation ,” the very reflexivity of memory; always implies something different from what is presented. Consequently, the very meaning of the formal will be realized as the meaning of “negation”, i.e. detached from

cached in the topos - the ideality of the models. The meaning of the formal is thus transformed into an empty abstraction - into a ritual of demonstrating logical form through demonstrating negation.

The formal is also ideal, i.e. nowhere realizable, hence meaningless.

What is the symbol A? The written letter is not; the class of all written letters (Frege) - but where did you “see” it.

Of course, this does not mean that the language of mathematics is stupid, but the point of mathematics is in its playful interpretations of the formal, in “applied” use. Everyone knows what one orange is, what a mathematical unit is - many, but what a symbol is in itself is not clear - we can only demonstrate the possibility of indicating in general, and therefore demonstrate the outwardness (reflexivity) of the meaning of “negation”.

The formalism of the sign is meaningless, and to hell with it. What do we care about this? - But the essence of the meaninglessness of the formal lies precisely in the “deed”.

The point is that the cashed out syntactic sequences of our culture themselves cash out the language of formalism. Formalism turns into a purely playful action, “other” to a cashed topos, formalism leads to a demonstration of the feasibility of thinking, to a demonstration of the meaning of “negation”. Formalism turns into action-deed, and the meaning of this deed is the negation of what is present.

The path of syntactic formalization is the path of an incessant conveyor of cashing out, leading to the meaninglessness (negation) of existence.

The “cause”, which reproduces itself until its complete destruction, is a demonstration of the meaning of negation, “cause for the sake of the cause” becomes the dominant way of life, the person himself becomes an instrument of the “cause” - a “consumer”, whose function is to ensure the production of the “cause” through consumption (negation-destruction) of its results. The “consumer” is the negation and therefore the reproducer of the “cause”.

The revelation of the logical form of the metaphysics of the existent ends not with the drawing of a hermeneutic circle, but with the “denial” of the meaning of existence.

The conclusion is that the decline of the metaphysics of the existent cannot be cultural stagnation, its exposure leads to its alienation from its own meaning. “Existing” must be meaningless, i.e. destroyed. As you can see, the apocalyptic prophecies of the end of the world are not without foundation. Moreover - logically inevitable.

Catastrophe - that is the essence of the decline of “existing”.

20.6 The reality of being and the essence of the real.

The metaphysics of the existent interprets existence by the significance of the present topos of language games, by the significance of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$, which implies the space-container of all implementations of language games. The essence of significance, therefore, will be representation in the space-receptacle, this essence of the significant we call reality.

For us, “to be significant” and “to have a place” are one and the same. To “exist” for our thinking means “to be”, to be represented in presence - what Heidegger called the openness of being. Really existing - located in a space open for indexical indication of cashing out. Even abstract mathematical concepts “have a place” with us.

Therefore, reality is a representation for syntactic consideration. But the very realization of the “representation” of syntax falls out of this reality.

What can we say about the reality of space itself? Is it not a fiction of the mediation of the objects in it?

What does it mean to present space for consideration? - It means to find a point of view out-side it, but then the meaning of representation is lost, since representation implies unity between the point of view and the space under consideration, this unity is the space itself, including the “point of view”. Consequently, we cannot consider space, since we cannot represent it from outside.

we cannot talk about the reality of space itself (as a container for all the realizations of all games) without entering into a contradiction with ourselves.

If the space is not real, i.e. “reality”, like “illusion”, has nothing to do with it, then “where is it all happening”? What is the essence of our very reality ? - Then all our ideas about the unity of the structure of our Existence - the Universe - are fictitious outside of specific language games. The Universe is not real (and certainly not ideal), the Universe is a playful interpretation of the propositional significance of the form $\varepsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$. The universe, like reality itself, is not a metaphysical, but a mythological concept, a playful variation of the meaningless significance of the hermeneutic circle.

Chapter 21

Metaphysics of the certain.

21.1 The mythology of being.

Universe, universum, reality - one of the many mythological concepts that build our form of life. But I still need to explain what I mean by mythology.

As is clear from the previous chapter, mythology is a playful interpretation of propositional meanings, but almost all the meanings of language games are such interpretations. To some extent, any game can be considered as mythology, which Losev tried to do in his *Dialectic of Myth*. But I will not speak so broadly about mythology, otherwise mythology will be an extra, meaningless term.

I will speak of mythology as a language game trying to interpret the entire metaphysical structure of propositional meanings. How is this possible? After all, the metaphysical structure reveals the hermeneutic circle and cannot be a language game - it is a demonstration, not an interpretation.

For this, it is necessary that certain game interpretations point to the external realization of the hermeneutic circle as the circle of a language game, so that in their content the circle does not close on its own demonstration, but interprets it (indicated as a game meaning). But this is impossible - the realization of the form of memory is outside the game content. What to do?

Only one thing - to forget about this impossibility.

Meanings and interpretations involved in forgetting the outside (reflection) of the implementation of the hermeneutic circle, I will call mythological. If the propositional meanings of the logical form reveal the emptiness of existence, then mythology makes us forget about it in the mythical story.

Actually, speaking of the metaphysics of being, I have already introduced mythological concepts into the definition of the meaning of metaphysics itself, pointing to the realization (being) as an identical meaning to itself or, which is

the same thing, assuming “negation” to be propositionally significant. But otherwise I would not have revealed my logical forms. Metaphysics creates its concepts in the interpretations of mythology.

The central myth of the metaphysics of the existent is the myth of the “existent” itself. The myth that we are something significant has been both the means and the end of our form of life, and perhaps of all previous forms. It was not enough to point to existence as “something”, as “I”, in order to interpret the metaphysical structure, mythology must also point to the realization of this “I”, representing the proposition of “identical-other”. Hence, God arises - another “I”, giving meaning and creating the first “I”. But mythology must also interpret “negation” as a propositional meaning - from here Satan arises in biblical mythology, heaven and hell in Christian mythology, from here arises “non-being” and “nothing” in the dialectic of contradictions (Hegel). Moreover, such obvious objections - if God is unknowable, then one cannot talk about him directly, not indirectly, even in the form of a ban on such a conversation: what cannot be pointed out, cannot be said about - are not taken into account, they are forgotten, they are eliminated from the content of the myth for the reason that if they are not forgotten, then both God and dialectics will turn out to be nonsense. And that’s right! - because only in such oblivion is any meaning and any culture realized. Let us remember that the source of this realization is not some “source”, whether it be God or the law of the Universe, but the very reflection of existence.

Since our myths interpret the same metaphysical structure, then all the mythologies of science, art, religion will be isomorphic to each other.

We have already talked about the idol of mathematics - the idol of the formalism of the sign, it is also the principle of axiomatization, in it one can easily recognize the “All-Seeing and Almighty God”. The religious myth of our tradition insists on the creation of the world from nothing and its destruction, our science follows our religion - the Universe is born as a result of the Big Bang and dies in a collapse. Christ perishes and rises in a new life - revolutions of all stripes: social, cultural, scientific and technical - destroy old forms and create a new person in a society of well-being and comfort. Eternal life turns into unconditional universal human values. Who wants to can find dozens of similar matches.

The main thing for us is to distinguish the mythical from the logical, which interprets itself by demonstrating its implementation, and not by the semantic connections of the game. It does not matter that logic is expressed through games, the trouble is that the game is taken for logic.

In this context, I want to talk about the philosophical “mood” of Heidegger.

“Openness”, “concern”, “mood” - all this is considered by Heidegger as existentials, i.e. propositional givens of human existence. As a consequence of the mythological nature of these meanings, Heidegger cannot consider the question of the meaning of “I” as a subject of existence, the meaning of “I” is always outside these interpretations, but without this “I” the whole concept of Heidegger falls apart before our eyes: “openness” - in front of whom? - “concern” - who? Heidegger’s metaphysics interferes with Heidegger’s thinking, therefore, he demands to overcome it. But all his thinking reproduces the old metaphysical structure, reproduces the propositional nature of negation. One thing remains - to consider the old metaphysics in new existential terms, the whole point of which is to distance oneself from traditional metaphysical and logical concepts. Heidegger does this brilliantly, masterfully playing with the semantic connections of our language, destroying old metaphysical myths. But destruction itself is a game of destructible metaphysics, which is expressed in the semantic apriorism of “openness”, “concern”, supposedly underlying existence, I’m not even talking about whether there is a “foundation” itself - the expression of contentlessness. Heidegger closes his eyes to the obvious: in order for the meaning of his existentials to be realized in human thinking, a person must learn them, learn how to interpret them, i.e. turn to them out of the emptiness of existence.

Even such moods as “pain”, “desire”, “fear of death” are not propositional, they cannot be demonstrated outside of their games, we learn all of them by entering the games through mythology. “Pain” is meaningless without a playful “how it hurts”, without this “how” pain is indistinguishable from sensation (Nietzsche). The meaning of how painful is determined by what games we play - Muzzio Scaevola and the child in the dentist’s office. “Fear of death” is a mythological interpretation of the significance of the “I”, the subject of existence. If our “I” ceases to be the unity of our existence, for example, “I” acquires the meaning of all living things, then the fear of “my death” will be meaningless, I will be afraid of my death no more than cutting my hair. If the “I” completely loses the play significance of the subject of the game, then death will lose all meaning. And no “concern”. All these are our myths - important, valuable myths that create us ourselves, but still - myths.

We are obliged to understand this, we are obliged, if we still want to think, and therefore exist, to expose our myths that lead us to nothingness of the cashing of culture, we must destroy our main myth in all forms of our life - the myth of our “I”, our “personality.” That is, we must conquer death.

21.2 "I" - a game of "I".

Until now, in our tradition, "I" was considered the subject of the game, its "player". The cashing out of a life form leads to the fact that the player becomes a play value, a play interpretation in the cashed out structure of the topos of games. This is happening literally before our eyes. The virtual reality of mass culture will reduce our "I", our life to an empty index to the cashing out of cultural experience. The cashed form of life will close its existence on the presented semantic structures, without the possibility of a reflexive analysis of this presentation, for the reason that there will be no one else to analyze.

I don't want to turn a great tradition into the lowing of blissful dumplings. I am ready to sacrifice the human "I" for this. What should I do?

To withdraw our "I" from game interpretations, but not to leave it as an external subject of the game, but to turn it into a tool of the game. The player must become the game itself, since the instrument of the game is the game itself. The player as a subject must be eliminated, but not in the pointer to the cashed out structures, but in the "understanding" of one's own difference from the cashed out, in the understanding of the difference of one's existence from everything that is being realized, even from one's own meaningful unity of the "I". "I am nothing of what is."

What is this formula?

The ability to create games, games without a "player", but not without a person. Creating games whose implementation will at least be aware of its externality to the implementation.

This means that the games will not be "games of our self", but "games of our self". That "personality" will no longer have unconditional game significance, even if games talk about it as the highest value. These games will not be cultural virtual reality games, because virtuality has the meaning of being presented in front of the "I".

So what will happen to our "personality"? Alas, it will not exist at all, but the possibility of existence will remain, perhaps leading to a different form of life, the one that Nietzsche called the superman.

In principle, nothing can be said about this new form before its realization, since its realization will be its understanding, but this does not mean that we should deprive it of the possibility of being for this reason. Therefore, we must understand what is still subject to our understanding - we must understand our metaphysics of being in its external implementation. We must understand the metaphysics of the existent as the metaphysics of the certain, the metaphysics of

the language games that are carried out.

21.3 Dialectics of forms.

The entire present study, which has already come to an end, is devoted to understanding the metaphysics of the certain. It remains to pay attention to some aspects that require more detailed re-search than the remaining pages.

First of all, let us turn to the philosophical way of thinking - to the reflective consideration of the significant. The metaphysics of being has determined philosophical thinking by the dialectic of contradictions, expressing its central moment - the propositional nature of "negation".

The metaphysics of the authentic, having revealed the non-propositionality of negation, defines its philosophical thinking by the dialectic of forms, where the form is the interpretive structure of the implementation of the language game within the framework of its syntax. The dialectics of forms will thus be the dialectics of syntactic constructions that reveal semantic connections in the representations of the form of memory.

This is all that philosophy can give to our understanding, all that can reveal the meaning of our existence.

If earlier the essence of the world was presented as a struggle of opposites, ups and downs of life, then the metaphysics of the certain considers the world (i.e. the meaning of our existence) as an escape from the meaningless significance of the existing into game interpretations. Such a change in outlook is fraught with a real reassessment of all values from "I" to "it", from "desire and passion" to "fear and death", from "happiness and prosperity" to "death and destruction of everything". This worldview is the only atheistic worldview, because in the essence of the way of thinking, and not according to engaging slogans, he does not need God: neither the God of religion, nor the God of science, nor even the God of our atheism. This worldview is supposed to create in "truth" an immortal man, whose life will come out from under the power of the myth of death in all its forms. This worldview will create a person for whom "salvation" and "eternity" will be meaningless. This worldview will create a person who will not have an idol of "I".

- This worldview will create a scary person!
- No, just another.

But in order to create such a worldview, it is not enough to philosophize reliable metaphysics, it is necessary that the thinking of the dialectic of forms enter into all spheres of our culture. In fact, we must create new myths of our culture,

reflecting on the cashing out of the old ones - the myths of art, politics, ethics, etc. For this, it is necessary that the metaphysics of the authentic be not only a worldview, but also an ideology.

21.4 Ways of a new formalism.

I find it difficult to define a new formalism, this is the task of future research, so I am talking about the ways of formalism. It is possible that the proposals of mathematical syntax or the quantifier structures of interpretations will serve as the basis for it.

But the main thing is not in this, but in what the new formalism brings with it, what will be its path?

Formalism is a game of building syntactic sequences, therefore, the paths of the new formalism will be the paths of syntaxes leading to the identification of logical forms throughout the space of our games. But the logical form is already revealed in these pages, its propositional meanings interpreted by me. Does it follow from this that the path of the new formalism is over before it has begun?

The logical form is really revealed, but it is revealed in the form of a logical-philosophical research; in the forms of art, science, history, religion, the logical form remains outside our interpretations, outside our understanding. We must see the logical form in all structures, where the instrument of vision must be a new formalism. This will be his path. But where will it lead?

At the end of all paths stands the meaningless significance of the hermeneutical circle, meaninglessness stands at the end of the path. The new formalism destroys the old meanings and values and leaves us with nothing.

The new formalism will be the destruction of an obsolete and lulling life form of thought, it will free life from the idols that kill it. Yes, we may be left with nothing, but we will be free.

But what do we do with this freedom?

Now for us such freedom is fatal, it will accelerate, sharpen the process of cashing out the dying of human life, since to expose idols does not mean to free ourselves from them. A mindless idol is a vengeful idol. We need not only to expose the old myth, we need to create a new mythology, the central idol of which will be the understanding of our own mythology. It is mythology, since logically pointing out the mythology, as I did, does not mean anything yet. A game reality is needed that exposes its mythic nature, and any reality is mythology. And already this myth will show what we should do with the given freedom, what our race is.

We have to create a new myth from the wreckage of old idols, we have to dig in the carrion to get ourselves a life. The only guiding thread in this labyrinth will be a new formalism, a new double-edged labrys. Only its persistent and merciless use will allow us to get out of the trap of our labyrinth into which our life has become. No mercy for yourself or for the Gods. Everything must be re-evaluated, both our “I” and our “life”.

21.5 Proposition of the game.

The proposition of meaning can be interpreted not only by the empty significance of our existence, but also by the significant need for the implementation of game interpretations. Necessity and lack of content become attributes of the game.

“Play” reveals the meaning of the realization of the form of memory, pointing to the difference between the realization of forms and their meaningful interpretations, interpreting this difference by giving meaning to everything that exists. The proposition of meaning can be thought of as the proposition of a game. Where the “game” is no longer our game. Revealing its categorical meaning is one of the most important tasks of the metaphysics of the authentic.

The concept of “game” is known to us in relation to the metaphysical myth of the reality of “existing”. In order to reveal the meaning of the “game”, we need to identify the realized meaning of “reality”, determine the inconsistency of reality in our games, which follows from the propositional interpretation of “negation” (the meaninglessness of the reality of space, chapter 20, §6), and interpret this inconsistency of the game carried out by reality. Our reality must turn into a “game reality”.

Only in this way will the game become a philosophical category. The meaning of this “game” will be fundamentally different from our ideas about it as something conditional, transient, secondary. The “game” will have nothing to do with the Hindu-Buddhist conception of the world as Maya and Avidya, since its meanings and visions will be the only reality. “Game” will also have nothing to do with imitations of the reality of “existent” in popular culture games. But the “game” will become the bridge that will allow one to hope to find at its end a new form of thought and a new form of life.

It can be said that the goal of all reassessments of the metaphysics of certainty will be the reassessment of the “reality of being” into the “playful reality” of existence.